essay on christian theology

• Yale Divinity School

Reflections

You are here, theologies of hope.

This article is a shortened adaptation of a two-part “For the Life of the World” podcast on the theme of hope that YDS Professor Miroslav Volf posted in summer 2020, produced by the Yale Center for Faith & Culture. You can listen here to podcast Part 1 and Part 2 .

Fear, more than hope, is characteristic of our time. In the late 1960s, we were optimistic about the century’s hopes for the triumph of justice and something like universal peace, but that has given way to increasing pessimism. “No future” scenarios have become plausible to us. As I write in summer 2020, the coronavirus pandemic gives the dominant shape to our anxieties. But even before the pandemic, we feared more than we hoped. We feared and continue to fear falling behind as the gap widens between the ultra-rich and the rest who are condemned to run frantically just to stay in the same place yet often cannot prevent falling behind. We fear the collapse of the ecosystem straining under the burden of our ambitions, the revenge of nature for violence we perpetrate against it. We fear loss of cultural identities as the globe shrinks, and people, driven by war, ecological devastation, and deprivation, migrate to where they can survive and thrive.

Politically, the consequence is the rise of identity politics and nationalism, both driven largely by fear. Culturally, the consequences are dystopian movies and literature, and the popularity of pessimistic philosophies. In religious thought and imagination, too, apocalyptic moods are again in vogue. Hope seems impossible; fear feels overwhelming.

A Thing With Feathers

The Apostle Paul has penned some of the most famous lines about hope ever written: “For in hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what is seen? But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience” (Romans 8:24-25). Hope is a strange thing – as Emily Dickinson declares in her famous poem , it’s a “thing with feathers” perched in our soul, ready to take us on its wings to some future good. In fact, hope is a thing that has already taken us to that good with the tune that it sings. In hope – or perhaps by hope – “we were saved,” writes Apostle Paul. In hope, a future good which isn’t yet, somehow already is. A future good we cannot see, which waits in darkness, still qualifies our entire existence. We might be suffering or experiencing “hardship … distress … persecution … famine … nakedness … peril … sword … we are being killed all day long” (Romans 8:18, 35-36), and yet we have been saved and we are saved.

Interpreting the phrase “in hope we are saved,” Martin Luther suggested in his Lectures on Romans that just as love transforms the lover into the beloved, so “hope changes the one who hopes into what is hoped for.” [1]   Thus, a key feature of hope is that it stretches a person into the unknown, the hidden, the darkness of unknown possibility. For Paul this can happen because God is with us – God who gives life to the dead and calls into existence things that do not exist.

Hope vs. Optimism vs. Expectation

When I hope, I expect something in the future. I cannot hope for my 18-year-old son to know how to ride a bike, because he knows that already. But I can hope for him to do well in college, for that’s where he is headed in the fall. Without expectation for the future, there can be no hope. But we don’t hope for everything we can expect in the future. We generally don’t hope for natural occurrences, such as a new day that dawns after a dark and restful night; I know , more or less, that the next day will come. But I may hope for cool breezes to freshen up a hot summer day. We reserve the term “hope” for the expectation of things that we cannot fully control or predict with a high degree of certainty. The way we generally use the word, “hope” can be roughly defined as the expectation of good things that don’t come to us as a matter of course . That’s the distinction between hope and expectation.

The God who creates out of nothing, the God who makes the dead alive, justifies hope that is otherwise unjustifiable.

In his justly famous book Theology of Hope (1964), Jürgen Moltmann, one of the greatest theologians of the second part of the 20th century, made another important distinction, that between hope and optimism. [2] The source of the distinction relates to the specific way some ancient biblical writers understand hope. Optimism, if it is justified, is based on extrapolations we make about the future based upon what we can reasonably discern to be tendencies in the present. Meteorologists observe weather patterns around the globe and release their forecasts for the next day: the day will be unseasonably warm, but in the early afternoon winds will pick up and bring some relief; now you have reason to be optimistic that the afternoon will be pleasant, perhaps you even look forward to sailing your little 12-foot sloop on three-foot swells. Or, to take another scenario, you and your spouse are healthy adults of childbearing age, you have had no trouble conceiving, and the obstetrician tells you that your pregnancy is going well; you have reason to be optimistic that you will give birth to a healthy child. The present contains the seeds of the future, and if it is well with these seeds, the future that will grow will be good as well. That’s reasonable optimism.

Hope, argued Moltmann, is different. Hope is not based on accurate extrapolation about the future from the character of the present; the hoped-for future is not born out of the present. The future good that is the object of hope is a new thing, novum , that comes in part from outside the situation. Correspondingly, hope is, in Emily Dickinson’s felicitous phrase, like a bird that flies in from outside and “perches in the soul.” Optimism in dire situations reveals an inability to understand what is going on or an unwillingness to accept it and is therefore an indication of foolishness or weakness. In contrast, hope during dire situations, hope notwithstanding the circumstances, is a sign of courage and strength.

What is the use of hope not based on evidence or reason, you may wonder? Think of the alternative. What happens when we identify hope with reasonable expectation? Facing the shocking collapse of what we had expected with good reasons, we will slump into hopelessness at the time when we need hope the most! Hope helps us identify signs of hope as signs of hope rather than just anomalies in an otherwise irreparable situation, as indicators of a new dawn rather than the last flickers of a dying light. Hope also helps us to press on with determination and courage. When every course of action by which we could reach the desired future seems destined to failure, when we cannot reasonably draw a line that would connect the terror of the present with future joy, hope remains indomitable and indestructible. When we hope, we always hope against reasonable expectations. That’s why Emily Dickinson’s bird of hope “never stops” singing – in the sore storm, in the chilliest land, on the strangest sea.

Hope Needs Endurance, Endurance Needs Hope

We are most in need of hope under an affliction and menace we cannot control, yet it is in those situations that it is most difficult for us to hold onto hope and not give ourselves over to darkness as our final state. That is where patience and endurance come in. In the same letter to the Romans, in the same passage that celebrates hope and its transformative darkness, Paul writes: “If we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience” (Romans 8:25). “Patience” is here the translation of hypomone , which is better rendered as endurance, or perhaps “patient endurance.” 

Neither patience nor endurance are popular emotions or skills. Our lives are caught in a whirlwind of accelerated changes; we have little endurance for endurance, no patience with patience. Technological advances promise to give us lives of ease; having to endure anything strikes us as a defeat. And yet, when a crisis hits, we need endurance as much as we need hope. Or, more precisely, we need genuine hope, which, to the extent that it is genuine, is marked by endurance.

When the great Apostle says in Romans 8:25 that if we hope, we wait with endurance, he implies that hope generates endurance: because we hope we can endure present suffering. That was his point in the opening statement of the section on suffering in Romans 8:18: “I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory about to be revealed to us.” The hope of future glory makes present suffering bearable. But, in Romans 5:3-5, he inverts the relation between hope and endurance. There he writes, “suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope.” Now endurance helps generate hope. Putting the two texts together, Romans 8 and Romans 5, we can say: hope needs endurance and endurance needs hope; genuine endurance is marked by hope; and genuine hope is marked by endurance.

The God of Promises

More than half a century after his Theology of Hope , Jürgen Moltmann has written an essay, On Patience (2018), about two aspects of patience we find in the biblical traditions: forbearance and endurance. Writing as a 92-year-old, he begins the second paragraph of this essay on patience autobiographically:

In my youth, I learned to know “the God of hope” and loved the beginnings of a new life with new ideas. But in my old age I am learning to know “the God of patience” and stay in my place in life . [3]

Youth and old age, Moltmann goes on to say, are not about chronology, but about experiences in life and stances toward life. Hope and patience belong both to youth and to old age; they complement each other. He continues:

Without endurance, hope turns superficial and evaporates when it meets first resistances. In hope we start something new, but only endurance helps us persevere. Only tenacious endurance makes hope sustainable. We learn endurance only with the help of hope. On the other hand, when hope gets lost, endurance turns into passivity. Hope turns endurance into active passivity. In hope we affirm the pain that comes with endurance, and learn to tolerate it. [4]

Hope and endurance – neither can be truly itself without the other. And for the Apostle Paul, both our hope and our ability to endure – our enduring hope – are rooted in the character of God. Toward the end of Romans, he highlights both “the God of endurance” (or steadfastness) and “the God of hope” (Romans 15:5, 13). Those who believe in that God – the God who is the hope of Israel, the God who is the hope of Gentiles and the hope of the whole earth – are able to be steadfast and endure fear-inducing situations they cannot change and in which no good future seems to be in sight. But more than just endure. Paul, the persecuted apostle who experienced himself as “always carrying in the body the death of Jesus,” was hoping for more than just endurance from the God of hope. Toward the very end of his letter to the Christians in Rome – in the second of what looks like four endings of the letter – he writes: “May the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, so that you may abound in hope by the power of the Holy Spirit” (Romans 15:13). In the midst of affliction, the God of hope opens us up for the possibility of joy and comprehensive well-being.

Our salvation lies in hope, but not in hope that insists on the future good it has imagined, but in hope ready to rejoice in the kind of good that actually comes our way. The God who creates out of nothing, the God who makes dead alive – the God of the original beginning of all things and the God of new beginnings – justifies hope that is otherwise unjustifiable. When that God makes a promise, we can hope.

Miroslav Volf is Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at YDS and founding director of the Yale Center for Faith & Culture. He is the author of A Public Faith: How Followers of Christ Should Serve the Common Good (Brazos, 2011) and other books.

[1] Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans , edited by Hilton C. Oswald, volume 25 of Luther’s Works , edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut Lehmann (Concordia Publishing House, 1972), p. 364.

[2] Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology , translated by Margaret Kohl (HarperSanFrancisco, 1991).

[3] Jürgen Moltmann, Über Geduld, Barmherzigkeit und Solidarität (Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2018), p. 13, my translation.

[4] Moltmann, pp. 13-14.

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Philosophy and Christian Theology

Many Christian doctrines raise difficult philosophical questions. For example, Christians have traditionally insisted that they worship a single God, while simultaneously identifying that God with a trinity comprised of three numerically distinct, fully divine persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It is not easy to see how three divine persons add up to one God. Similarly, Christians have also asserted that a human man, Jesus of Nazareth, is also God-the-Son, the second person of the divine trinity. It is not easy to see how a human man, who is born, lives, and dies, could also be a fully divine being. Consider also the relationship between divine providence and human freedom. Are human beings free to accept or reject God, or does God alone decide who will accept or reject God? Any answer to this theological question will also assume some specific philosophical account of human freedom and moral responsibility.

Christian thinkers have always drawn on philosophy to help answer these kinds of questions. In the earliest years of Christianity, running roughly from the second to the seventh centuries CE, and often called the “Patristic” period, the emerging Christian Church faced the daunting task of defining doctrinal orthodoxy in the face of internal and external challenges. In pursuing this task, Patristic thinkers typically did not understand themselves as “theologians” in contrast to “philosophers”. Indeed, they may not have endorsed any sharp distinction between philosophy and theology at all. But they still reasoned about their Christian commitments in the intellectual idiom of the ancient Mediterranean world, which was the idiom of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophy.

Over the course of the Patristic period, as the early Church successfully established its own intellectual framework, it formally defined the boundaries of Christian orthodoxy through a series of ecumenical councils. These councils—including the Councils of Nicaea (325 CE), Constantinople (381), and Chalcedon (451)—established the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and its corollary, the doctrine of the Incarnation (see Kelly 1978).

Yet even after the parameters of orthodoxy were established, Christian thinkers continued to face difficult philosophical questions about the meaning, coherence, and plausibility of settled Christian doctrines. They continued to try to answer those questions using the best philosophy of their day—from Scholastic Aristotelianism in the Medieval period to analytic metaphysics today. For Christian thinkers, the already settled doctrines of Christian orthodoxy provide a normative framework within which this philosophical reflection occurs, by demarcating the logical space that constrains the field of acceptable solutions. For example, it is not open to an orthodox Christian thinker to dispel the logical problem of the Trinity (the problem of how God can be both three and one) by arguing that there is in fact no God, or that God is not triune, or that the Father and the Son are two stages in the temporal life of the one God. These theoretical options are ruled out by virtue of the philosopher’s own orthodox Christian commitments.

As a general, formal matter, this point holds even though different Christian groups disagree about what the constraints of orthodoxy actually are. So Roman Catholic Christians and Protestant Christians will accept different constraints about, say, the nature of the Eucharist, and rival Protestant Christian groups will differ with each other in a similar way. But as a formal matter, Christian thinkers who think philosophically about Christian doctrines typically do so inside the intellectual framework provided by what they regard as authoritative Christian orthodoxy. Obviously, it is not the case that everyone who wants to think philosophically about Christianity must accept the constraints of Christian orthodoxy, even in this more relativistic sense of “orthodoxy”. Some modern and contemporary thinkers still identify as Christians even though they reject the very idea of normative orthodoxy, for example. And, of course, non-Christian thinkers, including non-theists, will reject any notion of Christian orthodoxy in its entirety. Yet they can still think philosophically about Christian doctrines.

Because its twin foci are so broad, an encyclopedia entry on “Philosophy and Christian Theology” could legitimately go in many different directions. This entry has two related aims. First, the entry discusses methodological questions about how philosophy and theology should be related. Accordingly, it surveys some of the most important ways they have been related in the history of the Christian tradition ( Section 1 ), before turning to contemporary debates about the way Anglo-American analytic philosophy of religion interacts with theology ( Section 3 ). Second, in between these two methodological sections, the entry also discusses recent work in analytic philosophical theology ( Section 2 ). Note that the previous version of this entry (Murray and Rea 2008 [2021]) focused on topics in contemporary philosophical theology. That version is archived and available via the Other Internet Resources but see, also, the topic-focused entries linked in the Related Entries for additional coverage.

Philosophical critics of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion (APR) are often struck by just how Christian and theological much of it seems. This criticism expresses the worry that APR as such looks too much like Christian philosophical theology. At the same time, theological critics often fault APR for lacking theological sophistication ( Section 3 ). In order to understand both poles of criticism, it is useful to have a better sense of the relevant historical background ( Section 1 ). But it is also important to appreciate what the best contemporary work in analytic philosophical theology actually looks like ( Section 2 ).

1.1 Integration

1.2.1 cooperation, 1.2.2 disjunction, 1.2.3 conflict, 1.3 from historical models to contemporary philosophical theology, 2.1 trinity, 2.2 incarnation and christology, 2.3 atonement and salvation, 2.4.1 the first sin, 2.4.2 the fall of adam and eve, 2.4.3 original sin, 2.4.4 personal sin, 2.5 other topics, 2.6 the rise of “analytic theology”, 3.1.1 narrowness of scope, 3.1.2 inappropriate methods, 3.1.3 responses to the worry that apr is “too theological”, 3.2 or not theological enough theological critiques of analytic philosophy of religion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the relationship between philosophy and theology in the christian tradition.

Although modern thought tends to assume a sharp disjunction between philosophy and theology, it is not at all obvious how to distinguish them in a principled way. Suppose that we take philosophy in the broadest sense to be the systematic use of human reason in an effort to understand the most fundamental features of reality, and suppose that we take theology in the broadest sense to be the study of God and all things in relation to God. Then we should expect to see considerable overlap between the two: after all, God, if there is a God, is surely one of the fundamental features of reality, and one to which all the other features presumably relate.

In practice, when we survey the history of Christian thought, we do see considerable overlap between philosophy and theology. With respect to their topics of inquiry, philosophers and theologians alike ask questions about epistemology, axiology, and political theory, as well as about metaphysics and fundamental ontology. Similarly, with respect to their methods of inquiry, philosophers and theologians alike interpret authoritative texts, deploy arguments, and marshal evidence to support their conclusions. Here one might insist that Christian theological claims are grounded by appeals to “faith” or “authority”, whereas philosophical claims are grounded by appeals to “reason”. This contrast is promising when suitably developed, but it is not as sharp as one might initially suppose. Theology also makes appeals to common sense and ordinary human reason, and philosophy also has its versions of faith and authority.

Of the making of typologies there is no end, but it is still worth examining some of the most common ways that Christian thinkers throughout the centuries have understood the relationship between philosophy and theology. Without this historical background, it becomes all-too-easy to draw the relationship in naïve, anachronistic, and overly simplistic ways. In fact, no single interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology can claim overwhelming support from the Christian tradition. From outside the Christian tradition, while many non-Christian thinkers see philosophy and theology as quite distinct, others deliberately blur the distinction between them—because they think that theology is actually just misguided philosophy.

At the top-level of the proposed typology, we can distinguish between “Integration” and “Contrast” views. Integration views do not distinguish philosophy and theology at all, whereas Contrast views do. We can disambiguate the “Contrast” category into “Cooperation” views, “Disjunction” views, and “Conflict” views. The most prominent Cooperation views treat philosophy as a valuable, perhaps even necessary, tool for theological inquiry, and still allow some degree of overlap between the two. Disjunction views, by contrast, regard philosophy and theology as non-overlapping forms of inquiry, which feature distinct and ultimately unrelated goals and methods. “Conflict” views treat philosophy and theology as not only distinct but mutually antagonistic. In fact, however, few Christian thinkers have endorsed outright conflict between philosophy and theology. But it is still worth discussing the Conflict view explicitly, because some prominent Christian theologians throughout history—for example, Tertullian, Martin Luther, or Karl Barth—initially seem to advocate Conflict. Upon closer inspection, however, their views are closer to those in the Disjunction category.

These categories are crude. They could each be further divided, and subdivided again. They focus mainly on different Christian attitudes toward the interaction of philosophy and theology, rather than on the attitudes of non-Christian philosophers. Some non-empty categories are omitted altogether. But these categories do capture much of the landscape, and at least show that there are more options available than a naïve conflict between faith and reason.

The Integration model treats philosophy and Christian theology as continuous, integrated activities. On this model, rational inquiry about God does not sharply divide into discrete activities called “philosophy” and “theology”. Instead, there is simply the single, continuous intellectual task of trying to understand God, and all things in relation to God, using all of one’s intellectual resources. This account does not deny the importance of faith or revelation to the Christian intellectual life; rather, it denies that faith and revelation properly belong to a separate activity called “theology” in distinction from another activity called “philosophy”. According to this view, when we engage in rational inquiry of any sort, we should draw on every available source of knowledge that is relevant to that inquiry. So when we engage in rational inquiry about Christian topics, we should draw on scripture, Church tradition, and other such sources of knowledge, whether we call the resulting inquiry “theology”, “philosophy”, or something else. To do anything else would be to hobble our inquiry from the outset, according to the Integration view.

This account of the relationship between philosophy and theology has deep roots in the Christian tradition. Before the rise of the medieval university, it was the dominant view, and it still has contemporary defenders (discussed below). Patristic thinkers did not typically describe their own intellectual work as “theology”. The term “theology” already had a fixed meaning in late antiquity. It meant “poetic speech about the gods”, and was in general associated with pagan story-telling and myth-making: the great “theologians”, were Homer and Hesiod. Even though Christian thinkers like Gregory of Nazianzus sometimes acquired the honorific title “Theologian”, they did so because of the lyrical and poetic quality of their writing, not because they wrote about Christian doctrinal topics (Zachhuber 2020; McGinn 2008).

The general term that early Christian thinkers used to describe their intellectual work was, more often than not, simply “philosophy” or “Christian philosophy”. Christianity was regarded as the “true philosophy” over against the false philosophical schools associated with pagan thought. (See Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 8.1; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.28.3, 1.28.4 1.80.5,6; Augustine of Hippo, Against Julian , 4.14.72.) This usage is consistent with Pierre Hadot’s (1995) claim that in Greco-Roman antiquity philosophy was understood as a comprehensive way of life. Christianity, on this model, is analogous to a philosophical school, in Hadot’s sense (see also Zachhuber 2020).

The Integration account continued to be the default account of the relationship between philosophy and theology into the early Medieval period. Before the rise of scholasticism in the great Western universities, there was no sharp distinction between philosophy and theology. Anselm of Canterbury, for example, certainly has the concept of a line of inquiry that proceeds using reason alone, without appealing to revelation, but he does not label that inquiry “philosophy” in distinction from “theology”. Moreover, in his own writings, he frequently blurs any such distinction, as he seamlessly moves between rational reflection and argument, on the one hand, to prayers, meditations, and exclamations of thanksgiving, on the other (e.g., Proslogion 1–4). Like many premodern Christian thinkers, Anselm also held that intellectual inquiry and personal holiness are linked, so that the more one grows in Christian virtue, the more rationally one is able to think about God (Adams 2004; Sweeney, 2011). This understanding of inquiry and virtue is also a hallmark of the Integration account.

1.2 Contrast

Unlike the Integration model, the Contrast model insists that philosophy and theology are fundamentally different forms of inquiry. Strictly speaking, there can be many different Contrast models, because the relevant sense of “contrast” comes in degrees. I focus on three: Cooperation, Disjunction, and Conflict. On the Cooperation account, philosophy and theology remain close cousins. When rightly pursued, they cannot really conflict, and they can even overlap in their respective topics of inquiry, sources, and methods. Nevertheless, the Cooperation account holds that the overlap between philosophy and theology is only partial, because they each begin from different intellectual starting points and appeal to different sources of evidence (Baker-Hytch 2016; Chignell 2009: 117; Simmons 2019). On another version of the Contrast model, Disjunction, philosophy and theology are even further apart: although they still do not conflict, and may even consider the same topics in an attenuated sense, their starting assumptions and methods of investigation are different enough that they share no significant conclusions. Finally, Conflict accounts assert that the conclusions of Christian theology are positively irrational from the point of view of philosophy. Although some historically important Christian thinkers might seem to endorse Conflict, closer inspection shows that they do not. Nevertheless, in the popular imagination, a persistent assumption holds that Christianity requires a sharp conflict between theology and philosophy—or at least faith and reason—and so it is worth briefly discussing why Conflict has had few traditional defenders.

On the Cooperation account, philosophy and theology are understood to be different, but mutually supporting, intellectual activities. For Christian thinkers who advocate Cooperation, philosophy and theology form a coherent, mutually supportive whole. They are not in conflict with respect to their conclusions, since truth cannot contradict truth, but they differ with respect to their foundational axioms, goals, and sources of evidence. Philosophy is understood as a preamble to theology, while theology completes and fulfills philosophy. Thomas Aquinas is a foundational advocate of the Cooperation account ( Summa Theologiae 1.1.1–8, Summa Contra Gentiles 1.1.1–9, Hankey 2001). Often the relationship between philosophy and theology is described in hierarchical and instrumental terms: theology draws on philosophy as needed, because philosophy is instrumentally useful to theology. According to a traditional metaphor, philosophy is the servant of theology ( ancilla theologiae , literally “handmaid” of theology; see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae , 1.1.5). In a more contemporary idiom, theology uses conceptual tools provided by philosophy in the pursuit of its own distinctive intellectual task: elucidating the meaning and truth of revealed Christian doctrines.

On the Cooperation account, theology differs from philosophy chiefly because theology assumes the truth of divine revelation, whereas philosophy does not. Philosophy takes its foundational axioms and assumptions from generally available truths of human reason and sensory experience. Philosophy and theology also differ in the way they argue and in the kinds of intellectual appeals that are proper to each. Theologians can appeal to revelation—scripture and authoritative Church tradition—in order to generate new lines of inquiry, and can treat revealed truths as evidence in their investigations. For their part, philosophers must appeal only to premises and evidence that are in principle available to any rational inquirer.

This distinction between “revealed truths” and “truths of reason” implies that at least some revealed truths are not also truths of reason. By hypothesis, such truths would have remained unknown and unknowable had they not been revealed by God. (It therefore follows that without revelation, Christian theology could not exist, on the Cooperation account.) Paradigmatic instances of revealed truths are the doctrine of the Trinity, and the doctrine of the Incarnation. Throughout the centuries, most, though not all, broadly orthodox Christian thinkers have held that human beings could not reason their way to the truth of these doctrines without the aid of divine revelation.

According to Aquinas, theologians use the conceptual tools furnished by philosophy to elucidate the contents of revelation. Just like philosophers, theologians make arguments, and their arguments appeal to common standards of logic and rigor, even though they also draw on theology’s own unique (revealed) axioms and sources of evidence ( Summa Theologiae 1.1.1). Philosophical arguments cannot prove the foundational truths of revelation, according to Aquinas, but at the same time, revelation and reason cannot conflict. (That God exists is a truth of reason, not revelation, for Aquinas—see Summa Theologiae 1.2.2, reply to obj. 1.) Theologians can therefore use common standards of philosophical reasoning to answer any putative objections to their theological claims, by showing that any alleged conflict is only apparent. So, for example, even though it is not possible to establish that God is triune by means of philosophical arguments, it is possible to use philosophical arguments in a defensive mode, to answer objections alleging that the doctrine of the trinity is logically incoherent. When arguing with other Christians, theologians can appeal to revelation to support their claims. When arguing with opponents who do not accept revelation, they cannot ( Summa Theologiae 1.1.8). Yet this restriction is not really a disciplinary maxim designed to oppose philosophy to theology, but a pragmatic admission that one cannot successfully persuade opponents by appealing to premises they deny.

Like Cooperation, the Disjunction view holds that philosophy and theology are different forms of inquiry. Similarly, like Cooperation, the Disjunction view also that agrees that there can be no real conflict between the conclusions of philosophy (when true) and those of theology. But the Disjunction view goes further: Disjunction advocates deny that there is any significant overlap between philosophy and theology at all.

Disjunction does not subordinate philosophy to theology or treat philosophy as an essential tool for theology. Instead, to borrow a term from contemporary science and religion debates, philosophy and theology are “non-overlapping magisteria” (Gould 1997). In particular, Cooperation’s appeal to the distinction between truths of reason and truths of revelation does not suffice to distinguish philosophy from theology, according to Disjunction advocates, who instead appeal to various more fundamental distinctions of method or approach (see discussion below). Of course, even those who explicitly advocate Disjunction will occasionally deploy some methods associated with philosophy: carefully defining terms, making formally valid arguments, uncovering contradictions in opposing views, etc. Yet these methods are found in any form of rational inquiry, and so (presumably) they do not belong to philosophy alone.

Any given thinker’s view of Disjunction will of course depend on their underlying construal of philosophy and theology. Some thinkers—even some Christian thinkers—endorse the Disjunction view because they deny that theology is really a propositional, truth-apt discourse that proceeds by way of arguments and evidence. Instead, theology is something else entirely—poetry, perhaps; or a form of worship, praise, or prayer (Caputo 2015). This view of theology implies a sharp contrast with Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, modern philosophy, and contemporary Anglo-American Analytic philosophy, though perhaps not with philosophy tout court . Philosophers might associate this view with the “expressivist” or “emotivist” critiques of theology that were common in the heyday of logical positivism. But in fact, versions of the “theology as poetry” view are found throughout the history of Christian thought (Beggiani 2014).

Other versions of the Disjunction view figure even more prominently in the Christian tradition. The foundational Protestant reformers, Martin Luther and John Calvin, both advocate Disjunction, in part because they both reject the synthesis of philosophy and theology that characterized late medieval scholasticism. According to Luther, philosophy and theology proceed from entirely different perspectives, with different starting points and different goals (1539 [1966: 244]; Grosshans 2017). Philosophy considers its objects of inquiry from the perspective of common human reason and sense experience, with the goal of trying to understand things as they actually are in the real world. Theology considers its objects of inquiry from a creational and eschatological perspective, with the goal of trying to understand them in relation to God as their creator and final end. Furthermore, for Luther, “creation” and its cognates are properly theological terms whose meaning derives from scripture and revelation, and which should not be identified with any philosophical notion of a first cause or prime mover; mutatis mutandis , the same point hold for creation’s final end in God (1539 [1966: 245, 248]).

Even when philosophy and theology do consider the same object of inquiry—for example, the human being—this difference in perspective ensures that the lines of inquiry remain completely separate. Luther’s 1536 “Disputation Concerning Man”, for example opens with the thesis that “Philosophy or human wisdom defines man as an animal having reason, sensation, and body” and then goes on to explore this definition. But his exploration only serves to contrast this philosophical view of the human being with the perspective of theology. Theology,

from the fulness of its wisdom, defines man as whole and perfect… made in the beginning after the image of God… subject to the power of the devil, sin and death…freed and given eternal life only through the Son of God, Jesus Christ. (1536 [1966: 137–138])

Luther’s theological account of the human being does not contradict the philosophical account, but it also does not complete or augment that account, because (according to Luther) properly theological claims are simply unintelligible to philosophy (1536 [1966: 137–140]; 1539 [1966: 240–241, 242]). They do not belong to the same universe of discourse.

Calvin shares Luther’s basic understanding of the disjunction between philosophy and theology. Like Luther, Calvin holds that the Fall has corrupted the power of human reason, but has not destroyed it altogether ( Institutes 2.2.12–17). When restricted to its proper sphere—matters pertaining to the natural world—philosophy remains valuable. But as a result of the Fall, “heavenly things” are inaccessible to unaided human reason ( Institutes 2.2.13). By “heavenly things”, Calvin means the saving truths of the Gospel.

So far, Calvin’s understanding might seem quite similar to the Cooperation view, which also denies that revealed truths are accessible to human reason. But Calvin further distinguishes philosophy from theology at the level of method, by denying that true theology engages in abstract, speculative reasoning, which he associates with philosophy, and insisting that any legitimate knowledge of God must be practical and affective ( Institutes 1.12.1, 1.5.10). For example, according to Calvin, it would be impious and dangerous to speculate on all the actions that God could possibly do—God’s absolute power. Instead, we should focus our loving attention on what God has actually done, paradigmatically in the person and work of Christ ( Institutes 3.24.2; Helm 2004: 24–26). Theology presupposes Christian faith, which is an affective response to Christ, and which requires “confidence and assurance of heart” ( Institutes 3.2.33). Yet scholastic philosophy, with its “endless labyrinths” and “obscure definitions”, has “drawn a veil over Christ to hide him” ( Institutes 3.2.2).

For Luther and Calvin, then, there can be no genuinely philosophical theology. Even though both agree that philosophical speculation can arrive at some limited truths about, e.g., a first cause, or about the nature of human beings, those truths are of no theological interest; even as bare propositional claims, they are already better and more fully known in theological inquiry. From the other direction, the properly Christian notions of God as creator and of the human being as imago dei , e.g., resist all philosophical speculation. Of course, Luther and Calvin can only hold these views because of the way they understand philosophy and theology. They both identify philosophy with late medieval scholasticism, and they both understand theology as a kind of existential encounter with God and Christ, as revealed in the scriptures. Different accounts of philosophy and theology would yield different construals of the underlying disjunction, or no disjunction at all.

None of the three views considered so far—Integration, Cooperation, and Disjunction—assume any real, essential conflict between philosophy and theology. All three views allow for apparent conflict, due to errors of reasoning or interpretation, or when either discipline departs from its own proper sphere, but they do not assert that Christian theology or Christian faith is irrational from the point of view of philosophy, nor do they hold that any significant Christian doctrinal claims can be falsified by sound philosophical reasoning. Throughout the history of Christian thought, many prominent Christian philosophers and theologians have criticized philosophy, or fulminated against what they regard as philosophical overreach, but few if any have regarded philosophy and theology as essentially incompatible, in the sense just outlined. Popular understandings of “faith” and “reason” often posit a deep and abiding conflict between the two, and so it is important to emphasize just how rare that position has actually been among major Christian philosophers and theologians. Key figures who are often regarded as Conflict advocates, turn out, upon closer inspection, to hold a different view.

For example, the Patristic theologian Tertullian famously asks “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” but he never actually asserted the irrationalist credo “I believe because it is absurd” ( De praescriptione haereticorum 7; De carne Christi 5.4; see also Harrison 2017). Instead, like all the Patristic fathers, Tertullian regarded human reason as one of God’s greatest gifts; ratio (reason) is one of his most frequently used nouns, and his own writing draws heavily on the stoic philosophy of his day (Osborn 1997).

Turning to a putative modern irrationalist, Søren Kierkegaard presents the incarnation as a paradox that offends human reason in his (pseudonymous) 1844 Philosophical Fragments , but close reading shows that “paradox” and “offence” do not equate to “formal contradiction” (1844 [1985: 53, 101]; Evans 1989). Rather, the incarnation seems paradoxical only to fallen, sinful human reason (1844, [1985: 46–47]). So the “offence” of the incarnation resolves into the claim that the doctrine of the incarnation had to be revealed, because its truth exceeds the limits of fallen reason. But, as discussed above, accepting this claim about the incarnation has been the norm throughout the Christian tradition. Moreover, according to Kierkegaard, even though the truth of the incarnation exceeds the limits of human reason, the claim that reason has limits is itself one that can be assessed by human reason (1846 [1992: 580]; Evans 1989: 355).

Finally, the twentieth century theologian Karl Barth’s famous “No!” to philosophical reasoning about God is also best understood as a rejection of philosophical overreach rather than a rejection of philosophy per se (Brunner & Barth 1946). According to Barth, we cannot establish the truth of theological claims using generally persuasive arguments available to any rational enquirer. But Barth had no quarrel with using philosophy in an Anselmian mode, to elucidate and clarify the implications of divine revelation, and in principle he even allows that there could be a genuinely Christian philosophy (1932 [1975: 6]; Diller 2010).

These prominent Christian thinkers all criticize what they see as philosophical hubris, but they do not set philosophy and theology as such in essential opposition, and they do not agree that any belief-worthy Christian doctrines actually are irrational—still less that they can be falsified by sound philosophical reasoning. In a way, this conclusion should be unsurprising. It is a basic claim of Christian orthodoxy that God is the very summit and source of rationality, and that human reason is one of God’s greatest gifts (Turner 2004; A. N. Williams 2007; Crisp et al. 2012). Christian thinkers have differed about the degree to which sin and the Fall have caused human reason to malfunction, but the suggestion that theological truths conflict with properly functioning human reason is alien to the orthodox Christian tradition, and so it is unsurprising that few major Christian thinkers have endorsed it. Far more common is the claim that some theological truths are inaccessible to philosophy because they somehow surpass human reason. On this line, when there is an apparent conflict between a philosophical conclusion and some Christian truth, the conflict is treated as a sign that philosophy has overstepped its own proper boundaries, not a sign that Christian truth actually conflicts with human reason. By and large, even the sharpest Christian critics of philosophy have held this view.

This historical survey has focused on prominent models of the relationship between philosophy and theology in the history of Christian thought. The survey also illuminates some contemporary philosophical and theological debates about how to understand this relationship.

Notwithstanding its Patristic origins, the Integrationist view has been especially prominent in recent philosophy of religion. For example, Alvin Plantinga’s (1984) programmatic essay “Advice to Christian Philosophers” intentionally blurs the distinction between philosophy and theology. Plantinga argues that Christian philosophers qua philosophers are entitled to base their arguments on revealed truths, and urges them to investigate distinctively Christian questions that may be of no interest to the wider philosophical community. More recent defenders of “analytic theology” have also taken an integrationist line. According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, the demise of Enlightenment-style foundationalism has thoroughly blurred the distinction between philosophy and theology:

What difference does [this distinction] make, now that analytic philosophers no longer believe that for some piece of discourse to be a specimen of philosophy, the writer must base all his arguments on public philosophical reason? Call it what you will. (Wolterstorff 2009: 168; see also Stump 2013: 48–49; Timpe 2015: 13)

Yet this prominent Integrationist line has been strongly criticized by other philosophers of religion, who implicitly endorse some version of the Contrast view, on which philosophy cannot legitimately appeal to theological sources of evidence like revelation and Church authority (Simmons 2019; Schellenberg 2018; Oppy 2018; Draper 2019: 2–4). At the same time, according to many Christian theologians, analytic philosophy as such is almost uniquely unsuitable for investigating properly theological questions (Milbank 2009; Hart 2013: 123–134). On the view of these critics, analytic philosophical theology does not revive the Patristic integration of philosophy and theology at all; rather, it remains a distinctly anti-theological form of modern philosophy.

Contemporary philosophers and theologians continue to debate the proper relationship between philosophy and theology. Before considering these debates in further detail (in Section 3 ), however, it is useful to briefly survey recent work in analytic philosophical theology. The fact that the Integrationist view has been so prominent among contemporary analytic philosophers of religion has helped shape a philosophical climate in which self-identified philosophers, working in departments of philosophy, find it completely natural to investigate explicitly Christian theological questions, from within the framework of normative Christian orthodoxy, in the course of their academic work.

2. Recent Work in Analytic Philosophical Theology

Recent work in analytic philosophical theology has engaged with nearly every major Christian doctrine. But work has focused on the most central doctrines: Trinity, Incarnation and Christology, Salvation and Atonement, and Sin and Original Sin. This section lays out the most significant philosophical problems associated with each doctrine and identifies some of the foundational philosophical responses from contemporary thinkers.

Analytic philosophical theology on the Trinity has focused primarily on the “logical” problem of the Trinity, the problem of how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—construed as three really existing, really distinct divine entities—can also be exactly one God (Cartwright 1987). The Church’s first two ecumenical councils defined the orthodox terminology now used to state the doctrine, but the councils did not attempt a philosophical solution to the logical problem. In the traditional terminology, the Father, Son, and Spirit are three distinct divine persons ( personae in Latin; hypostases in Greek) who share a single divine nature ( substantia in Latin; ousia in Greek; see Tanner 1990: 5, 24, 28). The logical problem then becomes the problem of how three divine persons (whatever we mean by “persons”) can instantiate a single divine nature (whatever we mean by “nature”) while remaining numerically distinct.

Responses to the logical problem can be grouped into several families, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. “Social” trinitarians defend an account of the Trinity on which the Father, Son, and Spirit are three distinct centers of consciousness, with three distinct centers of knowledge, will, and action, who nevertheless count as a single God. Social trinitarians attempt to secure the divine unity by arguing that a single divine nature can support three separate consciousnesses. They may also claim that the three persons necessarily love each other so perfectly and act in such harmony that they are properly regarded as a single God. Prominent social trinitarians include Richard Swinburne (1994), William Lane Craig (2006), Keith Yandell (2009), and William Hasker (2013).

By contrast, “Latin” trinitarians deny that the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct centers of consciousness. On Latin trinitarianism, even though the Father, Son, and Spirit are numerically distinct persons , they are not numerically distinct divine agents . When they act, they do not merely act in perfect harmony (as on social trinitarianism). Rather they are (somehow) a single actor, with a single will, carrying out a single action. The special challenge for Latin trinitarianism is to explain how it can be the case that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so construed, really do exist as concrete, distinct entities, and are not just different names for the same entity, or different phases in the life of a not-essentially triune God. Brian Leftow offers the most well-developed Latin model, which appeals to an extended analogy to a time-travelling chorus-line dancer (2004).

Unsurprisingly, the sharpest critics of Latin trinitarianism are those who advocate a social trinity, and vice-versa: each side insists that the theoretical costs of the opposing view are too great. So Latin trinitarians charge that social trinitarians do not escape tri-theism (Leftow 1999; see also Merricks 2006); social trinitarians argue that their Latin counterparts cannot explain how the Father and Son could have a genuine, “I–you”, personal relationship, as the Biblical account seems to suggest (e.g., Matt 3:17, Mark 14:36; Hasker 2013: 114–118; McCall 2010: 87–88).

Philosophical responses to the logical problem of the Trinity do not divide exhaustively into social models and Latin models. “Relative identity” theorists argue that identity is kind-relative, so the Father can be the same God as the Son without being the same person as the son (van Inwagen 1995). “Constitution” theorists make a similar claim by drawing on the metaphysics of constitution. According to constitution theorists, a lump of bronze can constitute a statue without being identical to it, since we can destroy the statue (by melting it down) without destroying the bronze. So too, they argue, the divine nature can constitute the three divine persons without being identical to them, or without entailing that they are identical to each other (Brower & Rea 2005). The metaphysics of constitution requires a coherent notion of “numerical sameness without identity”. The sharpest criticism of relative identity accounts of the Trinity takes aim at the underlying notion that identity is kind-relative in the relevant sense. Similarly, the sharpest criticism of constitution views expresses doubts about the cogency and usefulness of the metaphysics of constitution (Merricks 2006).

Scott Williams defends a hybrid “Latin social” model of the Trinity on which the Father, Son, and Spirit are each constituted by the single divine nature, without being numerically identical to the divine nature or to any other person (2013, 2017). Unlike other Latin models, on Williams’s account each of the persons is a distinct agent; unlike other social models, they share numerically one set of powers, including one will (2017). Even so, according to Williams, the persons can each token the indexical “I” with different senses. Critics argue that Williams’s model falters at precisely this point (Hasker 2018b; see also S. Williams 2020).

For an extended discussion, see the entry, Trinity .

By the close of the fourth century, the early Church had agreed that God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, is no less divine than God the Father. But this Trinitarian settlement led directly to another, equally vexing question: how could Jesus of Nazareth, a human man, also be identical to God the Son? After another period of intense debate, the Church defined the doctrine of the Incarnation, which asserts that Christ is one person (or one hypostasis ) who exists in two natures, one fully human, the other fully divine (Tanner 1990: 83; Kelly 1978: 338–343). Yet, as with the doctrine of the Trinity, on its own, this conciliar terminology does not attempt to solve the underlying philosophical problem.

In contemporary philosophy, this problem has been called the “fundamental philosophical problem of Christology”. As Richard Cross puts it:

how is it that one and the same thing could be both divine (and thus, on the face of it, necessary, and necessarily omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, immutable, impassible, and impeccable) and human (and thus, on the face of it, have the complements of all these properties)? (Cross 2009: 453)

In other words, the fundamental philosophical problem of Christology is the problem that arises when a single subject bears incompatible properties. Christ seems to be both necessarily omniscient, as the divine Son, the second person of the Trinity, and yet also limited in knowledge, as the human man, Jesus of Nazareth—and so on for other divine and human attributes. Yet Christ is one person, not two: he just is the divine Son and he just is Jesus of Nazareth. On standard interpretations of logical consistency, nothing can have logically incompatible properties at the same time and in the same respect—hence the problem.

A venerable attempted solution to the problem of incompatible properties makes use of grammatical modifiers to index Christological predications to their respective natures: Christ is limited in knowledge qua his human nature, and omniscient qua his divine nature, where “qua” means “with respect to” or “in virtue of”. More simply: Christ qua human is limited in knowledge; Christ qua divine is omniscient. The thought of Thomas Aquinas furnishes a foundational source for this solution ( Summa Theologiae 3.16.1–12; for broader discussion of patristic and medieval uses, see Cross 2002: 192–205). Thomas Senor forcefully argues that this grammatical solution does not work, for it cannot block the relevant entailment: since the one Christ really is human and really is divine, it follows that the one Christ is also limited in knowledge ( qua human) and omniscient ( qua divine), and so the contradiction remains (Senor 2002; see also Morris 1986).

Kenotic Christologies hold that at the point of incarnation, in order to become a human being, God the Son relinquished the divine attributes (Forrest 2000; Evans 2002, 2006). In a way, the kenotic option neatly solves the problem of incompatible properties, since Christ is not omnipotent and omniscient (etc.) at the same time as he is limited in power and knowledge. Kenotic Christologies have a venerable pedigree, as well as some clear Biblical warrant (Philippians 2; for discussion see Evans 2006; McGuckin 1994 [2004: 189]. But if omnipotence and omniscience are essential divine attributes, then it is not possible for God the Son to relinquish them during the incarnation and regain them after the incarnation while remaining self-identical.

Compositional Christologies try to solve the problem of incompatible properties by appealing to the various “parts” that together compose the whole Christ. According to Thomas V. Morris, Christ is composed of the divine mind of God the Son, a human mind, and a human body. On his telling, Christ counts as fully divine, because he has a divine mind, which is the seat of his omnipotence and omniscience; he also counts as fully human because he has a human mind and a human body (Morris 1986). Morris seeks to dispel the contradiction between divine and human attributes by revising our understanding of Christ’s human attributes. Morris denies that human beings as such are essentially limited in power and knowledge (etc.). This move clears the way for attributing omnipotence and omniscience (etc.) even to the human, incarnate Christ, while also denying that the human, incarnate Christ is limited in power and knowledge. Richard Swinburne (1994) defends a similar Christology, but according to Swinburne, Christ is composed only of God the Son and a human body, which together constitute both a human way of thinking and acting and also a divine way of thinking and acting.

Other compositional Christologies appeal to supposed mereological facts about the incarnation to ground a more sophisticated version of the “qua move” (discussed above). If God the Son has human parts and divine parts, then perhaps the whole mereological composite can borrow properties from its constituent parts without violating the law of non-contradiction. Analogously, we might say that an apple is both colored and not colored, since it is red (colored) with respect to its skin, but white (not colored) with respect to its flesh. There is a sense in which the apple as a whole is both colored and not colored because it borrows properties from its parts. Perhaps something similar can be said about Christ, understood as a mereological composite of God the Son, a human body, and a human soul. Leading advocates of this sort of view include Brian Leftow (1992, 2011) and Eleonore Stump (2002).

Timothy Pawl (2014, 2016) seeks to dispel the fundamental problem by revising the truth conditions of Christological predications like “Christ is omniscient” and “Christ is limited in knowledge”. According to Pawl, it is incorrect that “being omniscient” and “being limited in knowledge” are logically contradictory properties at all. In fact, according to Pawl, once we correctly understand their truth conditions, we can see that they can both be true of the same subject after all. On Pawl’s account, “Christ is omniscient” is true just in case Christ has a nature that is omniscient and “Christ is limited in knowledge” is true just in case Christ has a nature that is limited in knowledge. Because Christ, and only Christ (so far as we know) has two natures, only Christ can be both omniscient and limited in knowledge. At first glance, Pawl’s proposed solution might seem to be the “qua move” once again, in different dress. But it is importantly different: Pawl is content to affirm the very entailments (e.g., “Christ is omniscient and limited in knowledge”) that the qua move seeks to block; he simply denies that this entailment is logically contradictory.

Jc Beall goes a step further and argues that some predicates really are both true and false of Christ, because Christ really is a contradictory being (2019, 2021). Beall defends a contradictory Christology because he accepts a non-standard model of logic, one on which some predicates can be neither true nor false of a subject, and other predicates can be both true and false of a subject. According to Beall, logic as such—that is, his favored account of logic—is neutral about whether any given substantive theory contains true contradictions. To determine whether it does, we must examine the theory’s axiomatic statements. When we examine the axioms of orthodox Christology, according to Beall, we find that they include authoritative conciliar statements that are most naturally read as contradictory—e.g., “Christ is passible and impassible” (2019: 415). Rather than revise or reinterpret such statements so that they are not contradictory, we should accept that they are.

Arguably, the deepest and most fundamental Christian affirmation is that Christ saves. In traditional terminology, another way to express the same affirmation is that Christ “atones” for the sins of human beings. Unlike the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, however, the early Church never formally defined a single orthodox account of exactly how Christ saves or what it is about his life, death, and resurrection that accomplishes that saving work. As a result, a variety of theories or models of atonement have proliferated throughout the centuries. Contemporary work in analytic philosophical theology typically builds on these models, reformulates them in contemporary language, and seeks to defend them from criticism.

Satisfaction models argue that as a result of their sinfulness, human beings have a debt or obligation to God that they cannot possibly repay. By becoming incarnate, living a sinless life, and voluntarily dying for the sake of humanity, Christ successfully discharges the debts and obligations that human beings owe to God. Anselm’s “Why God Became Human” ( Cur deus homo ) is the locus classicus for the satisfaction theory, which has more recently been defended by Swinburne (1988). Closely related to satisfaction models, penal substitution models claim that human beings deserve punishment from God as a result of their sinfulness. Christ saves by freely agreeing to be punished in their place. Mark Murphy (2009) proposes a similar model of “vicarious punishment”, on which Christ’s suffering actually counts as the required punishment for guilty human beings, since knowing that a loved one suffers in one’s place is itself a form of punishment.

Satisfaction and penal substitution theorists must explain why a perfectly merciful God would require satisfaction or punishment from human beings at all, and why a perfectly just God would allow an innocent person to play the required role (Porter 2004). Accordingly, satisfaction and penal substitution views have been heavily criticized by modern and contemporary theologians for depicting God as a petty, wrathful tyrant. Adolph von Harnack’s nineteenth-century criticism of Anselm remains representative. According to Harnack, Anselm’s account depends on a

mythological conception of God as the mighty private man, who is incensed at the injury done to His honor and does not forego His wrath till He has received an at least adequately great equivalent. (1899: 77)

More recently, feminist theologians and philosophers have criticized satisfaction and penal substitution views for valorizing suffering (Brown and Parker 1989).

Eleonore Stump (2018) argues that typical satisfaction and penal substitution accounts cannot address the sinner’s persistent dispositions toward wrongdoing and concomitant feelings of shame. She dubs her positive proposal the “Marian” interpretation of atonement, and argues that it can explain how sinners are freed from shame and restored to fellowship with God. The proposal defies easy summary but it advances an account of atonement as union with God that is further explained using second-personal, psychological notions like “mind-reading” and empathy (2018: 138–139). Christ on the cross mind-reads—that is, psychically experiences—the mental states of every human sinner. Sinful human beings are thereby united to Christ, and so to God. When the indwelling Holy Spirit leads sinners to respond to Christ with love, they also will what God wills. The resulting state of union with God also heals the stain on the soul that is the sinner’s shame.

Several other models, also prominent in the Patristic and medieval tradition, have so far received little attention from analytic philosophers of religion. These include “ransom” theories on which human beings are freed from Satan’s grasp, and especially “theosis” or “divinization” accounts of atonement and salvation, on which Christ’s saving work consists in perfecting human beings so that they become as divine as a creature can be. (Jacobs 2009 and Mosser 2021 are important exceptions). Similarly, few contemporary philosophers defend the modern “moral exemplar” model, on which Christ saves by being a perfect moral example for other human beings to imitate. (Quinn 1993 offers a highly qualified defense, but holds that Christ is more than just a moral exemplar).

2.4 Sin, Original Sin, and the Fall

The doctrine of sin and the doctrine of atonement are correlative in the same way that a disease and its remedy are correlative. If sin is that from which Christ saves us, then the strength of the remedy (atonement) must vary according the severity of the disease (sin). As a first approximation, a sinful act can be thought of as a morally bad act for which the sinner is responsible. But the language of “sin” adds something to the language of moral wrongdoing: a sin is a failure or fault with respect to God. Like other Christian doctrines, the doctrine of sin poses tricky philosophical problems. To see those problems more clearly, it is useful to disambiguate the doctrine of sin into several distinct components: the first sin, the Fall, original sin, and personal sin.

For extended discussion, see the entry sin in Christian thought .

The problem of the first sin is the problem of how the very first sinful act is even possible, given various Christian axioms about the goodness and creative power of God, and various philosophical assumptions about the nature of freedom and moral responsibility. The problem of the first sin is sometimes treated as a question about the fall of Satan. It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to explain how Satan—by hypothesis, an angel created by God with a rational intellect, an upright will, and wholly good desires and dispositions—could ever make the sinful choice to reject God. Augustine ( City of God , Book 12), Anselm (“On the Fall of the Devil” De casu diaboli ), and Duns Scotus ( Ordinatio 2, dist. 6, q. 2 ) all wrestle with this problem. Contemporary philosophers who try to improve on their efforts include Barnwell (2009, 2017), MacDonald (1999), Rogers (2008), and Timpe (2012). Their responses all seek to explain how Satan’s choice is metaphysically possible, by appealing to their own favored accounts of human freedom and conscious attention. Wood (2016) further distinguishes between the “hard problem” of how Satan’s sinful choice is metaphysically possible, and the “harder problem” of how it can be subjectively rational—rational from the point of view of Satan himself.

The biblical story of Adam and Eve (Genesis 3) recounts the story of the first human sin and its consequences. The traditional story of the fall of Adam and Eve does not seem consistent with either an evolutionary account of human origins or what we know about human history more generally. On some understandings, questions about the historicity of the Fall are not properly philosophical questions at all. Yet it does seem like a properly philosophical task to articulate a doctrine of the fall that is both internally consistent and consistent with other things we know to be true. Moreover, the doctrine of the Fall is conceptually connected to other aspects of the doctrine of sin as well as to the doctrine of salvation.

Peter van Inwagen presents an account of the Fall that maintains many of its most important elements and, he claims, is consistent with evolutionary theory. Importantly, van Inwagen does not assert that this account is true, but only “true for all we know” (2004). In a similar vein, Hud Hudson (2014) offers an ingenious defense of a literal reading of the Genesis account that appeals to contemporary “growing block” theories of time. Despite initial impressions, neither van Inwagen nor Hudson are really concerned with defending quasi-literal readings of Genesis. Instead, they want to show that objections to those readings presuppose highly contestable philosophical—rather than empirical or scientific—assumptions.

In Christian theology, “original sin” in the strictest sense refers to the human condition after the Fall and not to the first human sin itself. The fall is the cause of the condition of original sin: because of Adam and Eve’s sin, subsequent human beings somehow “inherit” a disposition toward sin and an attraction toward evil that makes it inevitable that they will sin. On some stronger interpretations, all subsequent human beings are also justly regarded as guilty by God from birth, even before they have sinned themselves. Even apart from worries about the historicity of the fall, the philosophical challenges posed by this doctrine are obvious. How can people living now be morally responsible for the sins of the first human beings? What is the mechanism by which sin and guilt are “inherited” from past generations? If it is inevitable that all human beings will sin, can God justly punish them?

Some Christian philosophers have simply rejected the stronger versions of the doctrine of original sin as incoherent. Swinburne, for instance, denies that all human beings are born guilty as a result of the sin of their first parents and argues that the condition of original sin only makes it very likely, rather than inevitable, that they will sin themselves (1989: 141–43). Other philosophers have attempted to show that even a strong doctrine of original sin can be philosophically coherent, given the right metaphysical framework. Michael Rea, for instance, draws on fission theory and the metaphysics of temporal parts to suggest a way that contemporary humans might bear responsibility for the sin of Adam by virtue of being counterparts or stages of Adam himself (2007). He also argues that a Molinist-inspired doctrine of “transworld depravity” might accomplish much of what Christians want from the traditional doctrine of original sin (2007). John Mullen (2007) also constructs a Molinist account of original sin and inherited guilt. On Molinism, God knows all the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, which means that God knows every free choice that every human being would make in every possible situation. According to Mullen, if it were true that every free creature would sin in an ideal, garden of Eden situation, then God could justly punish them in the actual world for what they would have done in that counterfactual world.

“Personal sin” refers to individual sinful acts. Because the philosophical problems associated with personal sin initially seem very similar to the problems associated with moral wrongdoing, there has been comparatively little philosophical work on personal sin. Still, important definitional questions remain about exactly how, if at all, sin should be distinguished from moral wrongdoing, whether there are sinful actions that are not immoral actions, and, conversely, whether there are immoral actions that are not sinful (Mitchell 1984; Dalferth 1984; Adams 1991; Couenhoven 2009).

There are philosophical questions raised by nearly all Christian doctrines and practices, and so there are many fertile areas of inquiry that still remain comparatively underexplored. This brief survey has focused on the most widely treated areas of analytic philosophical theology. But some of the most creative work has branched out into other domains including the Eucharist (Arcadi 2018; Pickup 2015); liturgy, ritual, and worship (Cuneo 2016); bodily resurrection and personal identity (van Inwagen 1978; Merricks 1999; Zimmerman 1999; Rudder Baker 2001); heaven (Walls 2002; Ribeiro 2011), hell (Walls 1992; Adams 1993; Kvanvig 1993; Sider 2002; Buckareff & Plug 2005) and purgatory (Walls 2011; Dumsday 2014).

In 2009 Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea published their edited volume Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology . The volume’s contributors collectively try to make the case that analytic philosophy offers a valuable and neglected resource for Christian theologians. A new research program developed in its wake, and the ensuing years have seen the rise of a self-identified school of “analytic theologians”, who use the tools and methods of analytic philosophy to address Christian theological topics.

At present, it is not clear whether there is any meaningful difference between Christian “analytic theology” and Christian “philosophical theology”, which has been treated as a kind of philosophy. As the discussion above indicates, analytic philosophical theology has been produced largely by Christian philosophers working in philosophy departments, rather than by theologians in departments of theology or divinity schools. Classic works of philosophical theology like Swinburne (1994) and Adams (2000) seem like analytic theology avant la lettre , for example, and much recent work called “analytic theology” seems quite similar to previous work called “philosophical theology” or even “philosophy of religion” (e.g., Mullins 2016). Yet some self-described analytic theologians have also insisted that Christian analytic theology is really a form of theology (Torrance [Alan] 2013; Torrance [Andrew] 2019; Crisp, Arcadi, & Wessling 2019). They emphasize that Christian analytic theology is an internal project of faith seeking understanding that, as theology, holds itself accountable to scripture and Church tradition. Yet whether Christian analytic theology is properly regarded as a kind of philosophy or a kind of theology depends on how we draw the underlying distinction between philosophy and theology—if indeed we draw such a distinction at all.

3. Philosophy of Religion, Philosophical Theology, Christian Theology: Is There A Difference and Does it Matter?

It might seem odd that analytic philosophy of religion (APR) includes explicitly Christian philosophical theology of the sort discussed in Section 2 . Yet most philosophers of religion working in the analytic tradition are Christian theists (Bourget & Chalmers 2014; De Cruz 2017). They avowedly want to explore their faith using analytic philosophical tools, and see no problem in calling their work Christian philosophy, philosophical theology , or more recently, “analytic theology”. Of course, philosophy of religion as such is broader than APR, and APR is broader than Christian APR. There are philosophers of religion whose work is analytic but not Christian (e.g., Lebens 2020; Mizrahi 2020; Steinhart 2020; Oppy 2018; Schellenberg 2018; Draper 2019), Christian but not analytic (e.g., Westphal 2001; Pattison 2011), and neither analytic nor Christian (e.g., Hammerschlag 2016; Burley 2016). Even so, the predominance of Christian philosophical theology—or “Plantinga-style Christian philosophy” (Schellenberg 2018)—within APR has recently reopened some contentious debates about the proper relationship between philosophy and Christian theology.

These debates can be grouped around two different—and opposing—lines of criticism. According to the first line, much APR is too Christian and too theological: not really philosophy at all, but a thinly-disguised form of Christian theology—perhaps even a form of apologetics (Levine 2000; Knepper 2013: 9; Draper 2019: 2). Conversely, according to the second line, advanced by prominent theologians, APR is neither fully Christian nor fully theological. On this line of criticism, APR does not really wrestle with the transcendent God of Christian faith, but tends to construct and examine its own false “God of the philosophers” (Milbank 2009; Hart 2013; Oliver 2010; see also Harris & Insole 2005, 17). Although mutually opposing, both lines of criticism raise an important methodological question: how—if at all—should we distinguish philosophy about Christian topics from Christian theology? Section 1 (above) surveyed important responses to this question in the history of Christian thought. This section addresses the question in the context of contemporary challenges to analytic philosophy of religion.

3.1 Analytic Philosophy of Religion: Too Theological?

The charge that APR is “too theological” can be disambiguated into two distinct worries. The first worry concerns the scope of APR when considered as a whole: APR is too narrow, because it focuses excessively on Christian theological topics, to the exclusion of other equally important matters. The second worry concerns the sources and methods of Christian APR specifically: the sources and methods of Christian APR belong more properly to theology than to philosophy.

The charge that APR as a discipline is “too Christian” or “too theological” could be understood as a worry about its scope: perhaps APR focuses too much on Christian theological topics, or at least on versions of monotheism that are compatible with Christianity, and is therefore too narrow in scope. Critics who advance the narrowness worry include Trakakis 2008, Wildman 2010, Knepper 2013, Schilbrack 2014, Lewis 2015, Jones 2019, Draper 2019, Timpe & Hereth 2019, Mizrahi 2020. Although the narrowness worry has wide currency, it is not always clear how to understand it as a properly philosophical criticism. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the narrowness worry is more often aimed at the field of APR as a whole, rather than at individual instances of APR. After all, the general claim that APR is “too Christian” does not entail that any specific argument of any specific philosopher is unsound. Similarly, even if it is true that APR as a whole should be “less Christian”, it is hard to see why that fact would require any individual philosopher to change her research and teaching focus (Schilbrack 2014: 12).

Still, some versions of the narrowness worry are more philosophical than others. According to more philosophical versions, Christian APR frequently fails as philosophy: as a result of their Christian-theological biases, analytic philosophers of religion inadvertently make bad arguments. On this line, Christian analytic philosophers are especially likely to engage in motivated reasoning and ignore counter-arguments or alternative points of view drawn from other religious traditions. Because APR is so narrow, Christian philosophers unwittingly work in an echo-chamber or an epistemic bubble (Schilbrack 2014: 14; Draper 2019: 5; De Cruz 2020). As a result, according to critics, the conclusions of their putatively philosophical arguments are often unwarranted for anyone outside the Christian community, even when they purport to be generally probative.

Less philosophical versions of the narrowness worry assert the general principle that APR should be more capacious, and should include more non-Christian voices, without explicitly challenging the soundness of specific analytic arguments (Knepper 2013; Carroll 2016; Mizrahi 2020). Here the worry is simply that APR does not—but should—reflect the diversity of religious and non-religious viewpoints that actually obtain in the world. Phrased differently, APR as a field wrongly excludes too much good philosophical work that just happens not to fit into the dominant Christian, monotheistic paradigm. Yet one can hold this view without also agreeing that existing APR fails on its own terms or that any specific philosophers should alter their practices.

The charge that APR is too theological could also be understood as a question about philosophical methodology. On this version of the charge, Christian APR does not begin from generally accessible assumptions and argue toward generally acceptable conclusions, as good philosophy should. Instead, it typically begins from Christian assumptions and argues toward Christian conclusions, like theology.

J.L. Schellenberg, for example, argues that philosophy must seek solutions to philosophical problems that are in principle “shareable” by any member of the philosophical community. Because much Christian APR assumes the truth of Christianity, its solutions cannot satisfy this condition, and should properly count as theology rather than philosophy (Schellenberg 2018). J. Aaron Simmons agrees: even though theology “can and should” appeal to evidence restricted to “determinate communities defined by revelational authorities”, philosophy should appeal to “evidence that is, in principle, accessible by all members of the philosophical community” (2019: 147). According to Simmons, the dominant strand of APR has ignored this criterion, and threatens to “become simply a subset of Christian theological practice” (2019: 149; see also Oppy 2018; Draper 2019: 2).

Analytic philosophers of religion have a variety of ways to respond to the charge that APR is too theological. First, with respect to the narrowness charge, they can accuse critics of mistaking the part for the whole, by denying that the charge applies to APR as such, and by pointing to those analytic philosophers of religion who neither assume nor defend the truth of Christianity. Yet this response is undercut by the fact that non-Christian practitioners of APR often make the narrowness themselves (Schellenberg 2018; Oppy 2018; Draper 2019). Second, its defenders also emphasize that much Christian APR does not actually assume the truth of Christianity at all, but instead argues for that truth. (Hasker 2018a: 90; citing Swinburne is a paradigmatic example). This kind of philosophy would clear even Schellenberg’s “shareable in principle” bar. Similarly, even those philosophical projects that eschew Swinburne-style natural theology might still clear the “sharable in principle” bar so long as they engage only in defensive maneuvers—for example, by answering philosophical objections to the plausibility of Christian claims (e.g., van Inwagen 1995; Pawl 2014).

Others argue that even explicit appeals to Christian revelation could in principle still count as philosophical appeals, albeit indirectly. Suppose we agree that theology can appeal to revelation, while philosophy trades only in “generally accessible” arguments. We still must distinguish between direct, first-order appeals to revelation, and indirect, second-order arguments that it is sometimes permissible to appeal to revelation (Wood 2021: 213–215). The second-order arguments could still be generally accessible philosophical arguments, even though the first-order appeals are not. For example, a first-order “theological” appeal might be: “The New Testament asserts p ; therefore p ”. But a philosopher might offer a general epistemological argument, accessible to anyone in the philosophical community, to defend the rationality of that same first-order appeal. (For example, she might offer a general argument that it is rational to form beliefs based on testimony, and the same general argument might establish that it is rational to treat the New Testament as testimonial evidence.) In a similar vein, Plantinga’s claim that belief in God may be “properly basic” is not itself presented as a Christian assumption or a revealed truth, but as a specific application of his general philosophical theory of warrant, which he has defended at length (1983, 1993a, 1993b).

Finally, because there is no single uncontested way to understand the boundaries between philosophy and theology, it is open to Christian philosophers of religion simply to deny the sharp distinction presupposed by critics like Schellenberg and Simmons (see, for example, Plantinga 1984, Wolterstorff 2009). In so doing, they would implicitly endorse a more Patristic “Integration” model instead of either the Medieval “Cooperation” model or the modern “Disjunction” model (see Section 2 above).

While one set of critics accuse APR of becoming too theological, another set takes the opposite line. According to several prominent theologians and philosophers, something about the analytic style of philosophizing makes APR particularly unsuitable for investigating Christian doctrines. On this line of criticism, far from becoming a species of Christian theology, APR is constitutively opposed to Christian theology, and the problem with analytic philosophical theology is not that it is too theological but that it is too analytic. This criticism takes several forms.

Sometimes, theological objections to APR simply reiterate Barthian objections to natural theology, presumably on the assumption that most APR is really a form of natural theology (Moore 2007). Other critics charge analytic philosophers of religion with historical anachronism and ignorance of the Christian tradition. Perhaps “a-historical” analytic philosophers of religion do not understand pre-modern ways of thinking and reading (so runs the charge), and so they wrongly believe that their own constructive work is congruent with the historic Christian tradition, when it in fact depends modern assumptions that are inimical to the Christian tradition (Hart 2013: 123, 129; Milbank 2009: 320). Other critics press the related worry that APR ignores the real Christian tradition altogether in favor of theorizing its own abstract, self-constructed version of the Christian god. Here APR

does not deal with the God of any tradition or encounter, but with a conceptual construct, a simulacrum or ‘the God of the philosophers’…. (Oliver 2010: 467–468; see also Hyman 2010)

Another multi-faceted line of theological criticism criticizes APR for “idolatry”, “univocity”, and “ontotheology”. This line reflects the general worry that APR does not take divine mystery or transcendence seriously enough. “Ontotheology” is a theological term of opprobrium that, in its current usage, derives from Heidegger (1957; see also Marion 1982 [1995]). It means, roughly, treating God like “a being” or “a thing in the world”. According to its theological critics, APR constitutively assumes that God is a possible object of human knowledge, even apart from revelation, and therefore treats God as fundamentally similar to any other object “out there” passively waiting to be discovered. Yet a God like this (so runs the worry) is not really God at all, but something else—an idol.

The worry about ontotheology and idolatry is also a worry about univocity—the view that our terms bear the same meaning when applied to God and creatures (Trakakis 2010). According to opponents of theological univocity, precisely because God is not “a being” or a “thing in the world”, God and creatures differ absolutely; they share no properties and so cannot be described by univocal predications. (So, e.g., the word “good” cannot have the same meaning in the statements “God is good”, and “Socrates is good”.) Worries about theological predication and univocity date back to the Patristic period, but in contemporary philosophy of religion, they are best understood as continuations of the late medieval disputes between followers of Duns Scotus, who defends univocal predication, and his Thomist opponents (T. Williams 2005; Burrell 2008; Cross 2008). As a generalization, most contemporary analytic philosophers of religion endorse a univocal account of theological language, whereas contemporary Christian theologians are more likely to deny univocity in favor of analogical or metaphorical predication, or even non-predicative forms of theological language (Pickstock 2005; Marion 1999).

Notwithstanding the sharp rhetoric, there has been very little direct engagement between analytic philosophers of religion and their theological opponents on these questions. T. Williams (2005), Cross (2008) defend univocal predication, and Adams (2014) tries to rehabilitate ontotheology. Other analytic thinkers offer their own positive accounts of divine transcendence (Crisp and Rea [eds.] 2009: 9–11; Rea 2015, 2020; Jacobs 2015). More generally, analytic philosophers and theologians have a variety of strategies for avoiding the deleterious consequences of univocity and ontotheology (Wood 2021: 130–74).

• Adams, Marilyn McCord, 1991, “Sin as Uncleanness”, in special issue Philosophy of Religion of Philosophical Perspectives , 5: 1–27. doi:10.2307/2214089
• –––, 1993, “The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians”, in Stump 1993: 301–327.
• –––, 2000, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• –––, 2004, “Anselm on Faith and Reason”, in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm , Brian Davies and Brian Leftow, (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 32–60. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521807468.003
• –––, 2014, “What’s Wrong with the Ontotheological Error?”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 2: 1–12. doi:10.12978/jat.2014-1.120013000318a
• Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion . Translated in Anselm 2007: 75–98.
• –––, “Why God Became Man” [ Cur deus homo ]. Translated in Anselm 2007: 237–326.
• –––, “On the Fall of the Devil” [ De casu diaboli ]. Translated in Anselm 2007: 167–212.
• –––, 2007, Anselm of Canterbury: Basic Writings , Thomas Williams (tr. and ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
• Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae . Translated in Brian J. Shanley, OP (tr. and ed.), Summa Theologiae: The Treatise on the Divine Nature , Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2006.
• –––, Summa Contra Gentiles . Translated in Antony Pegis (tr.), Summa Contra Gentiles: Book I , New York: Hanover House, 1955.
• Arcadi, James M., 2018, An Incarnational Model of the Eucharist , New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108588560
• Augustine of Hippo, Against Julian [Contra Julianum]. Translated in Matthew A. Schumacher (tr.), Against Julian , Vol. 55, The Fathers of The Church, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1957.
• –––, The City of God [De civitate Dei]. Translated by Henry Bettenson, New York: Penguin Books, 1972.
• Baker-Hytch, Max, 2016, “Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion: What’s the Difference?”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 4: 347–361. doi:10.12978/jat.2016-4.120023010007a
• Barnwell, Michael, 2009, “ De casu diaboli: An Examination of Faith and Reason via a Discussion of the Devil’s Sin”, Saint Anselm Journal , 6(2): art. 5.
• –––, 2017, “The ‘Harder Problem’ of the Devil’s Fall Is Still a Problem: A Reply to Wood”, Religious Studies , 53(4): 521–543. doi:10.1017/S003441251600038X
• Barth, Karl, 1932–1967 [1975], Die Kirchliche Dogmatik , 13 books in 4 volumes, Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag. Translated as Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God , G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (eds.), G. W. Bromiley (trans.), second edition, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975.
• Beall, Jc, 2019, “Christ—A Contradiction: A Defense of Contradictory Christology”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 7: 400–433. doi:10.12978/jat.2019-7.090202010411
• –––, 2021, The Contradictory Christ , Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198852360.001.0001
• Beggiani, Seely J., 2014, Early Syriac Theology: With Special Reference to the Maronite Tradition , revised edition, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. First edition Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983.
• Bourget, David and David J. Chalmers, 2014, “What Do Philosophers Believe?”, Philosophical Studies , 170(3): 465–500. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7
• Brower, Jeffrey E. and Michael C. Rea, 2005, “Material Constitution and the Trinity”, Faith and Philosophy , 22(1): 57–76. doi:10.5840/faithphil200522134
• Brown, Joanne Carlson, and Rebecca Parker, 1989, “For God So Loved the World?”, in Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse , Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (eds.), New York: Pilgrim Press, pp. 1–30.
• Brunner, Emil and Karl Barth, 1946, Natural Theology: Comprising “Nature and Grace” by Professor Emil Brunner and the reply “No!” by Dr. Karl Barth , Peter Fraenkel (trans.), London: Geoffrey Bles.
• Buckareff, Andrei A. and Allen Plug, 2005, “Escaping Hell: Divine Motivation and the Problem of Hell”, Religious Studies , 41(1): 39–54. doi:10.1017/S0034412504007437
• Burley, Mikel, 2016, Rebirth and the Stream of Life: A Philosophical Study of Reincarnation, Karma and Ethics , New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
• Burrell, David B., 2008, “Creator/Creatures Relation: ‘The Distinction’ vs.‘onto-Theology’”, Faith and Philosophy , 25(2): 177–189. doi:10.5840/faithphil200825216
• Calvin, John, Institutio Christianae religionis , 1536, definitive edition 1559. Translated from the 1559 edition as Institutes of the Christian Religion , J. T. MacNeill (ed.) and F. L. Battles (trans.), London: S. C. M. Press, 1961.
• Caputo, John D., 2015, The Folly of God: A Theology of the Unconditional , Salem, OR: Polebridge Press.
• Carroll, Thomas D., 2016, “The Problem of Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Religion”, Metaphilosophy , 47(1): 39–58. doi:10.1111/meta.12168
• Cartwright, Richard, 1987, “On the Logical Problem of the Trinity”, in his Philosophical Essays , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 187–200.
• Chignell, Andrew, 2009, “As Kant has Shown…”, in Crisp and Rea 2009: 117–135.
• Clement of Alexandria, Stromata , translated in Ante-Nicene Fathers , volume 2, Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe (eds.), Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885. [ Stromata available online ]
• Couenhoven, Jesse, 2009, “What Sin Is: A Differential Analysis”, Modern Theology , 25(4): 563–587. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0025.2009.01555.x
• Craig, William Lane, 2006, “Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder”, Philosophia Christi , 8(1): 101–113. doi:10.5840/pc2006817
• Crisp, Oliver D. and Michael C. Rea (eds.), 2009, Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203567.001.0001
• Crisp, Oliver D., James Arcadi, and Jordan Wessling, 2019, The Nature and Promise of Analytic Theology , (Brill Research Perspectives in Theology), Leiden: Brill. doi:10.1163/9789004424333
• Crisp, Oliver, Gavin D’Costa, Mervyn Davies, and Peter Hampson (eds), 2012, Theology and Philosophy: Faith and Reason , London: Bloomsbury.
• Cross, Richard, 2002, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244362.001.0001
• –––, 2008, “Idolatry and Religious Language”, Faith and Philosophy , 25(2): 190–196. doi:10.5840/faithphil200825217
• –––, 2009, “The Incarnation”, in Flint and Rea 2009: 452–475.
• Cuneo, Terrence, 2016, Ritualized Faith: Essays on the Philosophy of Liturgy , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757757.001.0001
• Dalferth, Ingolf, 1984, “How Is the Concept of Sin Related to the Concept of Moral Wrongdoing?”, Religious Studies , 20(2): 175–189. doi:10.1017/S0034412500015961
• Davis, Stephen T., Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins, 2002, The Incarnation:  An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199248451.001.0001
• De Cruz, Helen, 2017, “Religious Disagreement: An Empirical Study among Academic Philosophers”, Episteme , 14(1): 71–87. doi:10.1017/epi.2015.50
• –––, 2020, “Seeking Out Epistemic Friction in the Philosophy of Religion”, in Voices From the Edge: Centering Marginalized Voices in Analytic Theology , Michelle Panchuk and Michael Rea (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 23–46. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198848844.003.0002
• Diller, Kevin, 2010, “Karl Barth and the Relationship between Philosophy and Theology”, The Heythrop Journal , 51(6): 1035–1052. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00521.x
• Draper, Paul, 2019, “Philosophy of Religion: A Vision for the Field”, in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion , Paul Draper (ed.), New York: Routledge, pp. 1–7.
• Dumsday, Travis, 2014, “Purgatory”, Philosophy Compass , 9(10): 732–740. doi:10.1111/phc3.12165
• Duns Scotus, John, Ordinatio II, dist. 6, q. 2. Translated in Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality , Allan B. Wolter, (ed.), Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997, pp. 100–105.
• Evans, C. Stephen, 1989, “Is Kierkegaard an Irrationalist? Reason, Paradox, and Faith”, Religious Studies , 25(3): 347–362. doi:10.1017/S0034412500019892
• –––, 2002, “The Self-Emptying of Love: Some Thoughts on Kenotic Christology”, in Davis, Kendall, and O’Collins 2002: 246–272.
• –––, 2006, “Kenotic Christology and the Nature of God”, in C. Stephen Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God , New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 190–217.
• Flint, Thomas P. and Michael C. Rea (eds.), 2009, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199596539.001.0001
• Forrest, Peter, 2000, “The Incarnation: A Philosophical Case for Kenosis”, Religious Studies , 36(2): 127–140. doi:10.1017/S003441250000514X
• Gould, Stephen J., 1997 [2001], “Nonoverlapping Magisteria”, Natural History 106(2): 16–22 and 60–62. Reprinted in Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics , Robert T. Pennock (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 737–749.
• Grosshans, Hans-Peter, 2017, “Reason and Philosophy in Martin Luther’s Thought”, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion , John Barton (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.343
• Hadot, Pierre, 1995, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault , Malden, MA: Blackwell.
• Hammerschlag, Sarah, 2016, Broken Tablets: Levinas, Derrida and the Literary Afterlife of Religion , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Hankey, Wayne J., 2001, “Why Philosophy Abides for Aquinas”, The Heythrop Journal , 42(3): 329–348. doi:10.1111/1468-2265.00162
• Harnack, Adolf von, 1899, History of Dogma , volume 6 (Part II, Book II, continued), T. K. Cheyne and A. B. Bruce (eds), William McGilchrist (trans.), (Theological Translation Library, 6), London: Williams & Norgate. [ Harnack 1899 available online ]
• Harris, Harriet A. and Christopher J. Insole (eds), 2005, Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion , Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
• Harrison, Peter, 2017, “‘I Believe Because It Is Absurd’: The Enlightenment Invention of Tertullian’s Credo ”, Church History , 86(2): 339–364. doi:10.1017/S0009640717000531
• Hart, David Bentley, 2013, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
• Hasker, William, 2013, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199681518.001.0001
• –––, 2018a, “Responding to Challenges”, in Simmons 2018: 286–304. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198834106.003.0018
• –––, 2018b, “Can a Latin Trinity Be Social? A Response to Scott M. Williams”, Faith and Philosophy , 35(3): 356–366. doi:10.5840/faithphil2018613104
• Heidegger, Martin, 1957, Identität und Differenz , Pfullingen: G. Neske. Translated as Identity and Difference , Joan Stambaugh (trans.), New York: Harper and Row, 1969.
• Helm, Paul, 2004, John Calvin’s Ideas , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199255695.001.0001
• Hudson, Hud, 2014, The Fall and Hypertime , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712695.001.0001
• Hyman, Gavin, 2010, A Short History of Atheism , New York: Tauris.
• Jacobs, Jonathan D., 2009, “An Eastern Orthodox Conception of Theosis and Human Nature”, Faith and Philosophy , 26(5): 615–627. doi:10.5840/faithphil200926560
• –––, 2015, “The Ineffable, Inconceivable, and Incomprehensible God: Fundamentality and Apophatic Theology”, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6 , Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), pp. 158–176. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722335.003.0007
• Jones, Tamsin, 2019, “Is Academic Theology an Answer to the Problem of Philosophy of Religion?”, Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory , 18(3): 415–428. [ Jones 2019 available online ]
• Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho , translated in Ante-Nicene Fathers , volume 1, Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe (eds.), Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885. [ Dialogue with Trypho available online ]
• Kelly, J. N. D., 1978, Early Christian Doctrines , Revised fifth edition, San Francisco: Harper and Row. First edition London: A. & C. Black, 1958.
• Kierkegaard, Søren [Johannes Climacus], 1844 [1985], Philosophiske Smuler eller En Smule Philosophi , Kjøbenhavn: Reitzel. Translated as Philosophical Fragments , Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (trans), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
• –––, 1846 [1992], Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler , Kjøbenhavn: Reitzel. Translated as Concluding Unscientific Postscript , 2 volumes, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (trans), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Page numbers are from volume 1.
• Knepper, Timothy D., 2013, The Ends of Philosophy of Religion: Terminus and Telos , New York: Palgrave. doi:10.1057/9781137324412
• Kvanvig, Jonathan, 1993, The Problem of Hell , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Lebens, Samuel, 2020, The Principles of Judaism , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843252.001.0001
• Leftow, Brian, 1999, “Anti Social Trinitarianism”, in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity , Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 203–249.
• –––, 2002, “A Timeless God Incarnate”, in Davis, Kendall, and O’Collins 2002: 273–299.
• –––, 2004, “A Latin Trinity”, Faith and Philosophy , 21(3): 304–333. doi:10.5840/faithphil200421328
• –––, 2011, “The Humanity of God”, in Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (eds.), The Metaphysics of the Incarnation , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 20–44. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583164.003.0002
• Levine, Michael P., 2000, “Contemporary Christian Analytic Philosophy of Religion: Biblical Fundamentalism, Terrible Solutions to a Horrible Problem, and Hearing God”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 48(2): 89–119. doi:10.1023/A:1004135605676
• Lewis, Thomas A., 2015, Why Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion—and Vice Versa , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744740.001.0001
• Luther, Martin, 1536 [1966], “Disputation Concerning Man”, translated in Luther’s Works , vol. 34, James Atkinson (ed.), Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1966, pp. 133–144.
• –––, 1539 [1966], “Disputation Concerning the Passage: ‘The Word Was Made Flesh’”, translated in Luther’s Works , vol. 38, in James Atkinson (ed.), Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1966, pp. 133–44.
• MacDonald, Scott, 1999, “Primal Sin”, in The Augustinian Tradition , Gareth B. Matthews (ed.), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 110–139.
• Mackie, J.L., 1982, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Marion, Jean-Luc, 1982 [1995], Dieu sans l’être , Paris: Fayard. Translated as God without Being , Thomas A. Carlson (trans.), Chicago: Chicago University Press.
• –––, 1999, “In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’”, Jeffrey L. Kosky (trans.), in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism , John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds), Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, pp. 20–53.
• Mawson, T.J., 2019, The Divine Attributes , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108598101
• McCall, Thomas, 2010, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology , Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
• McGinn, Bernard, 2008, “Regina Quondam…”, Speculum , 83(4): 817–839. doi:10.1017/S0038713400017048
• McGuckin, John Anthony, 1994 [2004], St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy: Its History, Theology, and Texts , (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 23), Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill. Reprinted as Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy , New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004.
• McMartin, Jason, 2013, “Analytic Philosophy and Christian Theology: Analytic Philosophy and Christian Theology”, Religion Compass , 7(9): 361–371. doi:10.1111/rec3.12051
• Merricks, Trenton, 1999 [2009], “The Resurrection of the Body and the Life Everlasting”, in Reason for the Hope Within , Michael J. Murray (ed.), Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 261–286. Reprinted in Rea 2009b: 364–385.
• –––, 2006, “Split Brains and the Godhead”, in Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga , Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson, and David Vander Laan (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 299–326. doi:10.1007/1-4020-4733-9_13
• Milbank, John, 2009, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology , London: SCM Press.
• Mitchell, Basil, 1984, “How Is the Concept of Sin Related to the Concept of Moral Wrongdoing?”, Religious Studies , 20(2): 165–173. doi:10.1017/S003441250001595X
• Mizrahi, Moti, 2020, “If Analytic Philosophy of Religion Is Sick, Can It Be Cured?”, Religious Studies , 56(4): 558–577. doi:10.1017/S0034412518000902
• Moore, Andrew W., 2007, “Reason”, in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology , Kathryn Tanner, John Webster, and Iain Torrance (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 394–412.
• Morris, Thomas V., 1986, The Logic of God Incarnate , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• ––– (ed.), 1988, Philosophy and the Christian Faith , Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Mosser, Carl, 2021, “Deification and Union with God”, in T&T Clark Companion to Analytic Theology , James M. Arcadi and James T. Turner (eds), New York: Bloomsbury, pp. 269–280.
• Mullen, John T., 2007, “Can Evolutionary Psychology Confirm Original Sin?”, Faith and Philosophy , 24(3): 268–283. doi:10.5840/faithphil200724312
• Mullins, R.T., 2016, The End of the Timeless God , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755180.001.0001
• Murphy, Mark C., 2009, “Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious Punishment”, Faith and Philosophy , 26(3): 253–273. doi:10.5840/faithphil200926314
• Murray, Michael J. and Michael Rea, 2008 [2021], “Philosophy and Christian Theology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/christiantheology-philosophy/ >
• Oliver, Simon, 2010, “Analytic Theology”, International Journal of Systematic Theology , 12(4): 464–475. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2400.2010.00522.x
• Oppy, Graham, 2018, “Philosophy, Religion, and Worldview”, in Simmons 2018: 244–259. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198834106.003.0016
• Osborn, Eric, 1997, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511582882
• Pattison, George, 2011, God and Being: An Enquiry , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588688.001.0001
• Pawl, Timothy, 2014, “A Solution to the Fundamental Philosophical Problem of Christology”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 2: 61–85. doi:10.12978/jat.2014-1.190824150011a
• –––, 2016, In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198765929.001.0001
• Philipse, Herman, 2012, God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.001.0001
• Pickup, Martin, 2015, “Real Presence in the Eucharist and Time-Travel”, Religious Studies , 51(3): 379–389. doi:10.1017/S0034412514000444
• Pickstock, Catherine, 2005, “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance”, Modern Theology , 21(4): 543–574. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0025.2005.00297.x
• Plantinga, Alvin, 1983, “Reason and Belief in God”, in Faith and Rationality , Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 16–93.
• –––, 1984, “Advice to Christian Philosophers”, Faith and Philosophy , 1(3): 253–271. doi:10.5840/faithphil19841317
• –––, 1993a, Warrant: The Current Debate , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195078624.001.0001
• –––, 1993b, Warrant and Proper Function , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001
• –––, 2007, “Appendix: Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments”, in Alvin Plantinga , Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 203–228. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511611247.010
• Porter, Stephen L., 2004 [2009], “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution”, Faith and Philosophy , 21(2): 228–241. Reprinted in Rea 2009a: 314–327. doi:10.5840/faithphil20042126
• Quinn, Philip L., 1993 [2009], “Abelard on the Atonement: Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary, Illogical, or Immoral About It”, in Stump 1993. Reprinted in Rea 2009a: 348–365.
• Rea, Michael C., 2007, “The Metaphysics of Original Sin”, in Persons: Human and Divine , Peter Van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 319–356.
• ––– (ed.), 2009a, Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Vol. 1: Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement , New York: Oxford University Press.
• ––– (ed.), 2009b, Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Vol. 2: Providence, Scripture, and Resurrection , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2015, “Theology without Idolatry or Violence”, Scottish Journal of Theology , 68(1): 61–79. doi:10.1017/S0036930614000908
• –––, 2020, “God Beyond Being: Towards a Credible Account of Divine Transcendence”, in Essays in Analytic Theology, Volume 1 , Michael C. Rea (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 120–137. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198866800.003.0007
• Ribeiro, Brian, 2011, “The Problem of Heaven”, Ratio , 24(1): 46–64. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00482.x
• Rogers, Katherin, 2008, Anselm on Freedom , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.001.0001
• Rudder Baker, Lynne, 2001, “Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection”, Faith and Philosophy , 18(2): 151–167. doi:10.5840/faithphil20011821
• Schellenberg, J.L., 2018, “Is Plantinga-Style Christian Philosophy Really Philosophy?”, in Simmons 2018: 229–243. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198834106.003.0015
• Schilbrack, Kevin, 2014, Philosophy and the Study of Religions: A Manifesto , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
• Senor, Thomas D., 2002, “Incarnation, Timelessness, and Leibniz’s Law Problems”, in God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature , Gregory Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 220–235.
• Sider, Theodore, 2002, “Hell and Vagueness”, Faith and Philosophy , 19(1): 58–68. doi:10.5840/faithphil20021918
• Simmons, J. Aaron (ed.), 2018, Christian Philosophy: Conceptions, Continuations, and Challenges , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198834106.001.0001
• –––, 2019, “Living in the Existential Margins: Reflections on the Relationship Between Philosophy and Theology”, Open Theology , 5: 147–157. doi:10.1515/opth-2019-0014
• Steinhart, Eric, 2020, Believing in Dawkins: The New Spiritual Atheism , Cham: Palgrave. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-43052-8
• Stump, Eleonore (ed.), 1993, Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• –––, 2002, “Aquinas’s Metaphysics of the Incarnation”, in Davis, Kendall, O’Collins 2002: 197–220.
• –––, 2013, “Athens and Jerusalem: The Relationship of Philosophy and Theology”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 1(1): 45–59.
• –––, 2018, Atonement , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198813866.001.0001
• Sweeney, Eileen, 2011, “The Problem of Philosophy and Theology in Anselm of Canterbury”, in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown , Kent Emery, Russell Friedman, and Andreas Speer (eds.), Leiden: Brill, pp. 485–514.
• Swinburne, Richard, 1988 [2009], “The Christian Scheme of Salvation”, in Morris 1988: 15–30. Reprinted in Rea 2009a: 294–307.
• –––, 1989, Responsibility and Atonement , New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198248490.001.0001
• –––, 1994, The Christian God , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Tanner, Norman P. (ed.), 1990, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume One: Nicaea I to Lateran V , Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
• Tertullian, ca. 207–208 CE, De carne Christi , translated in Tertullian’s Treatise on the Incarnation , Ernest Evans (ed. and trans.), London: SPCK, 1956.
• –––, ca. 198–206 CE, De praescriptione haereticorum , in Patrologia Cursus Completus: Series Latina , J. P. Migne (ed.), Paris, 1857–1912, vol. 2, col. 20.
• Timpe, Kevin, 2012, “The Arbitrariness of the Primal Sin”, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 5 , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 186–205.
• –––, 2015, “On Analytic Theology”, Scientia et Fides , 3(2): 9–22. doi:10.12775/SetF.2015.013
• Timpe, Kevin and Blake Hereth, 2019, “Introduction”, in The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion: New Perspectives on Disability, Gender, Race, and Animals , Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 1–27.
• Torrance, Alan, 2013, “Analytic Theology and the Reconciled Mind; The Significance of History”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 1: 30–44. doi:10.12978/jat.2013-1.001113191404a
• Torrance, Andrew, 2019, “The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic Theology”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 7: 178–198. doi:10.12978/jat.2019-7.001322191404
• Trakakis, Nick N., 2008, The End of Philosophy of Religion , New York: Continuum.
• –––, 2010, “Does Univocity Entail Idolatry?”, Sophia , 49(4): 535–555. doi:10.1007/s11841-010-0222-4
• Turner, Denys, 2004, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511617317
• van Inwagen, Peter, 1978, “The Possibility of Resurrection”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 9(2): 114–121. doi:10.1007/BF00138364
• –––, 1995, “And Yet They Are Not Three Gods But One God”, in Morris 1988: 241–278. Reprinted in his God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 222–259.
• –––, 2004, “The Argument from Evil”, in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil , Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, pp. 55–73.
• Walls, Jerry L., 1992, Hell: The Logic of Damnation , Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• –––, 2002, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195113020.001.0001
• –––, 2011, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation , New York, Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732296.001.0001
• Westphal, Merold, 2001, Overcoming Ontotheology , New York: Fordham University Press.
• Wildman, Wesley J, 2010, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry: Envisioning a Future for the Philosophy of Religion , Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
• Williams, A.N., 2007, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology , New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511487835
• Williams, Scott M., 2013, “Indexicals and the Trinity: Two Non-Social Models”, Journal of Analytic Theology , 1: 74–94. doi:10.12978/jat.2013-1.180219220818a
• –––, 2017, “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity”, Faith and Philosophy , 34(3): 321–346. doi:10.5840/faithphil20178385
• –––, 2020, “In Defense of a Latin Social Trinity: A Response to William Hasker”, Faith and Philosophy , 37(1): 96–117. doi:10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.5
• Williams, Thomas, 2005, “The Doctrine of Univocity Is True and Salutary”, Modern Theology , 21(4): 575–585. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0025.2005.00298.x
• Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 2009, “How Philosophical Theology Became Possible Within the Analytic Tradition of Philosophy”, in Crisp and Rea 2009: pp. 155–170.
• Wood, William, 2016, “Anselm of Canterbury on the Fall of the Devil: The Hard Problem, the Harder Problem, and a New Formal Model of the First Sin”, Religious Studies , 52(2): 223–245. doi:10.1017/S0034412515000098
• –––, 2021, Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779872.001.0001
• Yandell, Keith, 2009, “How Many Times does Three Go into One?”, in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity , Thomas McCall and Michael Rea (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 151–168. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216215.003.0009
• Zachhuber, Johannes, 2020, “Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity: Some Reflections on Concepts and Terminologies”, in Eastern Christianity and Late Antique Philosophy , Eva Anagnostou-Laoutides and Ken Parry (eds.), Leiden: Brill, 52–77.
• Zimmerman, Dean W., 1999, “The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The ‘Falling Elevator’ Model”, Faith and Philosophy , 16(2): 194–212. doi:10.5840/faithphil199916220

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Murray, Michael and Michael Rea, “Philosophy and Christian Theology”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/christiantheology-philosophy/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see the version history .]

-->atonement --> | Anselm of Canterbury [Anselm of Bec] | Aquinas, Thomas | Augustine of Hippo | faith | heaven and hell in Christian thought | Kierkegaard, Søren | Luther, Martin | medieval philosophy | religion: epistemology of | religion: philosophy of | sin, in Christian thought | theology, natural and natural religion | trinity

Copyright © 2021 by William Wood < william . wood @ theology . ox . ac . uk >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

What Is Theology & Why Is it Important?

Theology is studying God. Christian theology is knowing God through Jesus Christ our Lord. Theology is “the queen of the sciences.” 1  This was not only the opinion of the great Middle Ages scholar, Thomas Aquinas but was held as truth all the way through the 20 th century. After the infamous influence of higher criticism, following Darwinism metastasized and infected every school of learning including metaphysics or divinity, theology was relegated to a specialized study. This would have been surprising if not abhorrent to both faculty and students of familiar institutions like Harvard, Yale, Oxford, Cambridge, and even our state universities, like the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill — the oldest state university in America — where the teaching of theology was central to higher education.

The reason for theology’s decline in higher education and its compartmentalization to Bible schools and seminaries has a lot to do with the cultural degradation and the onset of postmodernism, which deconstructed Western civilization, including the centrality of Christianity to our ideas about self, others, and, especially, God our Creator. As these bad ideas made their way into the vital organs of theological higher education, the cancerous growth of denying God’s Word made its way into the full bloodstream of the Church, in virtually every denomination and tradition. In fact, evangelicalism, is in large part, a response to this philosophical and social pandemic.

So, it is rather unusual for some Bible-believing Christians to complain that “theology has crept into the Church,” as if theology, “knowing God,” had never been central. Influenced by the airborne spiritual pathologies of a post-Christian culture, such muddle-headed assertions from the mouths of believers unwittingly support the ungodly ideas in the “world,” which they would otherwise oppose. It is right to ask again: What is theology and is it important?  Why was theology important in the early Church (and it most unquestionably was important)? Why was it important in the Middle Ages? In the Reformation? In the 18 th , 19 th , and 20 th centuries? The answers to those questions are nothing short of life or death for biblical Christianity.

Let’s explore the meaning of theology and its effects on the soul, the Church, and the very world in which we live.

Theology Is Knowing God

The definition of theology is simply “the study of God.” Two Greek words—“Theos” (θεός)— God — and  “logos”(λόγος)—combine to create the word “theology.” The emminant scholar, Louis Berkhof , asserted with brevity and precision: “The New Testament has the Greek equivalents of the Old Testament names. For ’El, ’Elohim, and ‘Elyon it has Theos, which is the most common name applied to God . ”

Jeremiah called Israel to recall the priority of theology, that is, of “knowing God:”

“Thus says the Lord: ‘Let not the wise man boast in his wisdom, let not the mighty man boast in his might, let not the rich man boast in his riches, but let him who boasts boast in this, that he understands and knows me,  that I am the Lord who practices steadfast love, justice, and righteousness in the earth. For in these things I delight, declares the Lord’” ( Jer. 9:23-24 , emphasis added)

The Apostle Paul joined the chorus of voices, divine and human, to emphasize the necessity of theology, that is, of “knowing God:”

“Formerly, when you did not know God,  you were enslaved to those that by nature are not gods. But now that you have come to know God,  or rather to be known by God,  how can you turn back again to the weak and worthless elementary principles of the world, whose slaves you want to be once more?” ( Gal. 4:8-9 , emphasis added).

 The Apostle Paul is saying that the Galatian Christians not only knew about God, but they had an intimate knowledge of God in their own lives. Such intimacy not only opened their consciousness to their Creator but also to themselves. This is quite different from someone saying that they know about God. I think of the great J. I. Packer in his book, Knowing God. Dr. Packer wrote of a sadly familiar spiritual pathology, which remains a constant toxic threat for all of us:

“A little knowledge of God is worth more than a great deal of knowledge about him.”

Theology is knowing God. Indeed, this kind of knowing God is filled with love, gratitude, and the “communicable” attributes of God impressed into our lives. Theology is not incompatible with love. Theology, the thirst for knowledge of God in our lives, is equated with love by the Apostle John:

“We are from God. Whoever knows God listens to us; whoever is not from God does not listen to us. By this we know the Spirit of truth and the spirit of error. Beloved, let us love one another, for love is from God, and whoever loves has been born of God and knows God” ( 1 John 4:6-7 , ESV).

Theology Is the Divine Drama of the Ages

Theology is more than merely a definition of a word. Theology that is biblical, Christ-centered, and comprehensive is the very plan of God revealed in His Word. The great twentieth century English professor and essayist, Dorothy Sayers (1893-1957), wrote of theology as the “divine drama.” In her remearkable book, Letters to a Diminished Church: Passionate Arguments for the Relevance of Christian Doctrine ,  the Oxford scholar asserted:

 “. . . for the cry today is: “Away with the tedious complexities of dogma—let us have the simple spirit of worship; just worship, no matter of what!” The only drawback to this demand for a generalized and undirected worship is the practical difficulty of arousing any sort of enthusiasm for the worship of nothing in particular. (P. 14) Surely it is not the business of the Church to adapt Christ to men, but to adapt men to Christ. It is the dogma that is the drama—not beautiful phrases, nor comforting sentiments, nor vague aspirations to loving-kindness and uplift, nor the promise of something nice after death—but the terrifying assertion that the same God who made the world, lived in the world and passed through the grave and gate of death. (P. 20) The Church’s answer [to the great existential questions of life and death, the meaning of life, and life after death] is categorical and uncompromising, and it is this: That Jesus Bar-Joseph, the carpenter of Nazareth, was in fact and in truth, and in the most exact and literal sense of the words, the God ‘by whom all things were made.’” (P. 2)

I cannot imagine a more credible, concise, and convicting definition of the theology and its importance. For Sayers, the Church in trying to reach the world without theology was impossible. Theology is the drama that attracts. Theology, knowing God through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, is the essence of the Christian religion. It cannot be otherwise.

Theology Is the Answer to Our Deepest Needs

All theology is pastoral. I mean to to say that after we have studied “knowing God” in the Old Testament, New Testament, and have catalogued our findings into a systematic theology, as we have observed God’s Word and ways in historical theology, we come to see that theology is “knowing God” for the purpose of living (and dying, which is, for the believer, a continuation of life). Thus, there is a beauty about theology that transcends, even resists, categorical truths that remains unapplied in the human soul. Dr. Craig Barnes, President of Princeton Theological Seminary put it so memorably in his work, The Pastor as Minor Poet: Texts and Subtexts in the Ministerial Life :

“The primary symptom of a soul that has become sick is that it becomes blind to the poetry of life.”

Theology, the pursuit of knowing God in Christ, is the poetry of life.

Why Wouldn’t Theology Be Important?

I believe it is right to reflect the question on the mind of some that says, “theology is simply not that important.” Now I might ask myself, “why would anyone say such a thing?” But, in fact, people do say this. Why? I have heard from people that “theology is . . .”

 Some believe that theology is dull. I generally don’t hold the student responsible for a boring subject but rather the teacher. I’ve heard it said that the greatest sin of a history teacher is to make history boring. That is quite right. We should also say, “the greatest insult to the doctrine of knowing God — that is, theology — is to make the subject boring. I guess it is possible for one to make child-rearing a very boring subject. I guess it is possible to talk about the relationships of men and women, courtship and marriage , and to come off as quite dull. However, you and I both know that neither of the subjects are dull whatsoever!

We must not judge theology as dull if we are so unfortunate as to have a dull preacher! Is there anything dull about the divine drama of the life and ministry of the Lord Jesus Christ? Let us zoom out from the life of Jesus to see the plan of redemption running from Genesis to the last verse of Revelation! What is dull or boring about the plan of God to redeem fallen humankind by making a covenant that God will provide what God requires?

Theology that cannot be preached in theology that cannot be applied to the life of a child is very likely a theology that is brittle, dour, dull, and . . . wrong.  But I have heard that theology is . . .

2. Divisive

Another criticism about theology is that dogma is divisive. When I say “dogma,” I’m using the word in the same way that Dorothy Sayers did in her essay. Dogma is merely an English word based on the Greek word for teaching. So the teachings that flow from the theological system that is revealed in the Word of God or of prime importance in faith and life. It should not surprise us that human beings who have been infected with original sin and its dark consequences, even after they have been saved and they are putting on Christ, yet battling “the old self” that still resides within them and must be mortified throughout all of their life of sanctification, would have conflicting opinions about the most important things — the things of primary importance. This is a human quality, which is seen in every aspect of life. The Word of God is divine. The Bible is inspired, inerrant, and infallible. Those who read the Bible must be filled with the Holy Spirit so that the Spirit that recorded God’s Word through mortal men and women will recognize the Spirit in the reader and the two shall become one. However, theological dogma such as baptism, communion, how one is sanctified or grows in the Christian life, and a few others — not many — is so important than human beings form “communities of conviction” that are based upon their opinions of one or more of these vital matters.

Men and women of good will, therefore, may disagree. Their inability to express a perfect unity in every single aspect of Christianity neither invalidates their faith nor the veracity of the Word of God. It merely shows that we are human. The Apostle Paul said that one day we will know even as we are known. For now we see through the dark glass, not always able to discern every single truth with unquestionable precision. Thankfully, God has left us with a kind word,

“The secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law" ( Deut. 29:29 ).

True theology that is revealed to us from God’s Word can divide: truth from error.   Yet, some have said that theology is . . .

3. Esoteric

This criticism of theology is that it is merely too esoteric — that is, the doctrines of the Bible may have philosophical, metaphysical, or intellectual merit, but they are simply impractical. Someone might even say, “stick to the simple things.” Actually, I would agree with that. But the thing is, the “simple things” of the Bible are also “deep things” revealed from God to humankind.

I sometimes hear about “pie in the sky by and by.” Those who have said this to me wanted to stress that Christianity — that is biblical theology — offers nothing for the here and now. It is all about heaven. It is all about another world. It is all about another kingdom. I sometimes respond to them as I would like to do in this little article by quoting CS Lewis, who wrote in response to the charge that Christians are just too heavenly minded to be any earthly good:

“If you read history you will find that the Christians who did most for the present world were just those who thought most of the next… It is since Christians have largely ceased to think of the other world that they have become so ineffective in this. Aim at Heaven and you will get earth ‘thrown in’: aim at earth and you will get neither.”  ( Mere Christianity )

Why Theology is Vital to the Christian Faith

It Is the Study of God

Firstly, remembering that theology is truly knowing God by personally knowing His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ,  we must assert that theology is absolutely vital to Christianity. The study of God and of His Word leads us to the glorious doctrines that change lives. Even as St. Paul admonished young pastor Timothy to rightly divide the truth of the Word of God and to teach it, withholding nothing, so, also, we must pursue the knowledge of God through His general revelation — creation – and His special revelation — the Bible.

Karl Barth wrote in his The Epistle to the Romans an essential theological cornerstone of Christianity and why it must be studied,

“The Gospel is not a truth among other truths. Rather, it sets a question-mark against all truths.”

It Is the Story of Ourselves

Theology, the pursuit of God, is an extraordinary inquiry into not only the Creator but of necessity the creation. That creation includes every one of us. A theology that is built upon study of God’s revelation—in creation and in Scripture—leads us to see that God is God and we are not. But we are His image-bearers. We are without Christ image-bearers with a marred image, a distorted spiritual framework inherited from our first parents that touches everything we do, all that we are, all that we want to be. The unquenchable thirst after knowledge of God will bring us to Jesus Christ, His Son, our Lord. Knowing Him and following Him restores our humanity, removes the “birth mark” of a sinful nature, and places us on an ever-expanding experience of God’s remodeling of our lives from the inside out.

Theology proper is to know God. And to know God is to know what it is be fully human.

It Is the Greatest Story Ever Told

Theology is a narrative of God’s pursuit of His own joy and communion in the relationship, lost and found, of His People. It is Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained. The culminating truth of Christian theology is the Person of Jesus. He lived the life we could never live and died the death that should have been ours. He was crucified for our sins. He rose again on the third day. He appeared to over 500 at once, many of whom lived into the last years of the first century. Witnesses saw Jesus the Christ ascend into heaven with angelic presence and celestial voice that He would also return in like manner.

This is the Greatest Story ever told. How did one theologian put it?

“The Gospel of the Resurrection is the—power of God, His virtus, the disclosing and apprehending of His meaning, His effective pre-eminence over all gods. The Gospel of the Resurrection is the action, the supreme miracle, by which God, the unknown God dwelling in light unapproachable, the Holy One, Creator, and Redeemer, makes Himself known: ‘What therefore ye worship in ignorance, this set I forth unto you ( Acts 27:23 )."

Theology must always lead to doctrine on fire in the pulpit. Theology must always culminate in lives transformed by the power of the Gospel. Theology is intended to awaken, to heal, to encourage, to admonish, to correct, but more than anything to know love. To know the love of God. The eminent Catholic theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar wrote in his classic theology, “ Love Alone is Credible ,” these words:

“But if we view creation with the eyes of love, then we will understand it, despite all the evidence that seems to point to the absence of love in the world. We will understand the ultimate purpose of creation: not only the purpose of its essence, which we seem to make some sense of through the various intelligible relationships among individual natures, but the purpose of its existence in general, for which no philosophy can otherwise find a sufficient reason.”

For Balthasar, our humanity is realized as we receive “the love offered …by the divine heart that breaks for us upon the Cross.” And this theological message is a powerful conduit to the human heart, “for the world, love alone is credible.” And God is love. And to know Him is to know pure love. To receive His eternal gift of life in Christ Jesus is to not only know but experience this divine love. Out of the fullness of this love we are able to express His love to another.

What Theology Must Never Be

For as much as we have talked about what theology is, we must be careful to assert what it is not.

Theology is not Speculation

We were told throughout the Scriptures that we should not be speculating about the meaning of a mystery not revealed. Indeed, one of the features of a maturing believer is to be able to live in the tension of the ministry. The Apostle Paul warns Timothy about the disastrous consequences of wrangling over words. We must, therefore, be careful and precise in our statements about what the Bible says. Going beyond that is theological speculation. This will surely lead not only to strife within that particular Christian community but will lead to heartache by the one who is espousing it.

Theology cannot be Weaponized

We have no doubt seen how some people use Scripture as a weapon to hurt other people. Yet even the prophets, like Jeremiah, who warned of judgement, wept exceedingly when their prophecies at length became judgement. There is nothing so heinous as twisting the very Word of Almighty God to become an arsenal to use against another human being made in God’s image.

If someone reading these words has born the brutality of a verbal attack on the conscience by misuse of God’s Word or a theological Molotov cocktail thrown to maime the conscience of another, then it is no wonder that one would have a distaste for “theology.” But theology is about knowing God, not taking His name in vain to hurt another. But there is another thing that theology must never be.

Theology must never be Ignored

Theology, the knowledge of our Creator, must not be neglected. How do we do that? Well, one way is to allow the misuse of theology by another our excuse to avoid knowing God. The reasons that I have named are real. As a pastor, I have seen the damage that abuse of theology can do to a person. To neglect the true knowledge of your God is to ignore the healing salve of grace that is needed to cure your pain.

Others ignore theology because of less complicated reasons: they just don’t have time. Can you imagine that? One would say, “I am too busy in life to come to know the Giver of my life?” It really is quite ludicrous, isn’t it? We have seen that theology is not mere philosophical speculation. Theology is not an esoteric inquiry into metaphysical ideas that are disconnected from living (and dying). Theology is always personal, always accessible, always about knowing God.

Our Lord Jesus was the Great Theologian who taught us about God and, thus, about ourselves. Our Savior once told some who had trusted in Him that conversion was not the end, but the beginning:

“So Jesus said to the Jews who had believed him, ‘ If you abide in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free" ( John 8:31-32 ).

And that, dear friend, is the wondrous, unfathomable glory of true biblical theology: God is truth. To know Him, to follow Him, to pursue Him with all of your heart, soul, and mind is to increasingly shed the darkness of a fallen world and walk into the soft golden beams of celestial light; a light that warms, illumines, and guides you into the perfect freedom you have dreamed of for so long.

1. Leo J. Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective(Brill, 1992).

Photo credit: ©GettyImages/ freedom007

The Unity of Faith and Reason in Christian Theology

• October 22, 2023

Thomas Holman

• Philosophy Reviews , Religion , Reviews

Grant Kaplan begins his theological essay with a seemingly innocuous postulate: the meaning of the terms “faith” and “reason,” he asserts, have shifted throughout the 2,000 or so years since Christ walked among us. Demonstrating their relation through such an extended period, Kaplan explains, is like building a bridge between two shifting landmasses.   

On one level, it is a manifestly obvious observation, which may cause the reader to pass it by without much thought. the meaning of faith and reason have, throughout the history of christian theology, moved with the contours of the times, from tertullian’s famous dictum “what has athens to do with jerusalem” to gotthold lessing’s declaration that “revelation . . . gives the human race nothing which human reason, left to itself, could not also arrive at.” but as kaplan’s work unfolds, it becomes clear that this insight informs the entire work. to his great credit, kaplan avoids the temptation to adopt a single notion of the relation and dogmatically analyzes the history of this topic through his own lens. in fact, if anything, his study is marked by a singular ability to handle each topic with equanimity and balance. he gives nearly every theologian or philosopher a fair reading, knitting together an analysis that invites his reader to engage in the age-old project of determining how these two most fundamental concepts relate., yet kaplan’s analysis is not without a center. he writes as a catholic, who is nevertheless aware of the “shamefully parochial” limits of his inquiry. this comes out most obviously in his exploration of the meaning of faith as presented in the bible. there, faith is “both the content of things believed . . . and the mode of knowing by which one acquires this knowledge.” this means that “the matter of reconciling faith and reason involves taking up both the content of faith, the things believed, and the mode by which one knows these things.”, all this makes for an exceptionally balanced journey through christian intellectual history which is yet further improved by its eminent readability. though he is constrained to brevity because of the introductory nature of the book, kaplan cuts to the core of each thinker’s approach to the problem of faith and reason with concision. he provides his readers with a clear and fair statement on where each lies, and he sticks to these methodological commitments with admirable tenacity throughout the work. since the book touches on many of the central figures of western christian theology through the ages, i cannot possibly hope to provide anything resembling a comprehensive overview here. instead, i will provide some highlights that demonstrate the flavor and merits of kaplan’s work., kaplan begins with a chapter briefly covering the early christians down to augustine. he carefully highlights the tensions between these thinkers while still conveying a sense of what binds them together. justin, on trial for his life, faced the unique problem of trying to persuade roman authorities that anyone using right reason could see that christ was reason personified: “for these errors were not only condemned among the greeks by reason, through socrates, but among the barbarians, by reason ( logos ) himself, who took form and became man and was called jesus christ.” but within this capacity for all to use reason as a route to the gospel, there arose the problem of dealing with error. early heresies and questions of right practice for spreading the gospel to the masses demanded the attention of the leading thinkers of the time. irenaeus of lyon’s appeal to tradition and authority, origen’s appeal to proper exegesis, and athanasius’s hagiography provided the most influential responses to these problems., but it is in the work of augustine that one finds the “formative seedbed” for medieval thinking on faith and reason. augustine “accepted and even exalted the use of reason in order to experience god as being.” yet reason in its discursive or autonomous form is hopelessly marred by the fall. so to know the greatest truths, to achieve in some sense knowledge of god, one is wholly reliant on grace. in augustine’s words: “i entered and with my soul’s eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind—not the light of every day, obvious to anyone nor a larger version of the same kind . . . it was superior because it made me, and i was inferior because i was made by it.” yet experiences like these must be complemented by a trusting relation with the historical truths and scriptural interpretation., augustine’s influence flowed into medieval thought, yet in the eleventh century, anselm of canterbury breaks the norm in his monologion and proslogion : a defense of the teachings of scripture with no reference to scripture itself. this radical new approach still moved within the framework of anselm’s famous definition of theology: fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding). it is only a short jump, however, from here to peter abelard, viewed by many as the logic-chopping herald of a spiritually destitute scholastic theology. yet for kaplan, abelard’s approach has value insofar as he exhibits a profound intellectual openness and highlights the limits of appeals to authority in argument., kaplan’s chapter on the high medieval period focuses on the work of thomas aquinas, bonaventure, and duns scotus. he steps up to the daunting task of summarizing this nuanced and subtle period with characteristic elegance. for kaplan’s aquinas, the articles of christian faith are “principles, not conclusions.” kaplan explains that “the process of reasoning from these principles produces understanding that does not provide greater certainty . . . though it does give rise to greater comprehension.” consequently, the truths of faith and those of reason by nature cannot contradict one another. the same goes for the work of bonaventure, who brings this approach into a more neo-platonist framework. in kaplan’s formulation, bonaventure holds that “what rational philosophy does, by conveying the intelligibility of truths from speaker to hearer, from author to reader, can be reduced to the incarnational pattern of all of created reality, for the world is a sacrament of god.” this results in a symphonic integration of the arts, sciences, and theology as a hierarchically integrated illumination of the fullness of truth as god himself., a key turning point comes in the figure of john duns scotus, whose reflections on the foundational importance of the divine will (what would later be called the ordained will, the voluntas ordinata ), called into question the elegant syntheses of aquinas and bonaventure. this leads to “an impression” that “god’s freedom might be an arbitrary freedom.” once again in his evenhanded style, kaplan sums up the importance these thinkers would have moving forward: “one finds both in aquinas and in scotus arguments and frameworks that seem to lead toward a backdrop in which theology and philosophy occupy realms that become easier to imagine as sharply divided from one another.” the opening left by these two allows ockham to propose that “‘god cannot be known in himself’ through natural reasoning.”, jumping ahead to martin luther, kaplan again provides his characteristically balanced analysis: while luther, following the humanistic tendencies of the renaissance, certainly revolted against the view of the relation between faith and reason put forth by the scholastics, such views “do not do justice to the complexity of luther’s thought.” instead, for kaplan “as his theology developed, luther came to place greater emphasis on the proper order between faith and reason than focusing on affirming the inherent incompatibility between the two.” luther was addressing what he saw as the central problem of his age: the squelching of personal faith under the wet blanket of reason. for kaplan, luther actually aimed, through his admittedly hyperbolic methods, to bring the two back into a healthier balance. this is shown by the copresence of the two movements spawned by lutheran’s thought after his death: lutheran scholasticism and pietism. similarly, john calvin’s “total depravity” which supposedly makes unredeemed reason ultimately useless for the soul’s ascent to god masks later manifestations of reformed christianity’s more equitable synthesis., in his helpful chapter on early modernity, kaplan argues that, rather than some generalization of protestant theology, it was a wave of science and philosophy that increasingly led to the divorce of reason and faith. in the wake of the saga of galileo (which kaplan argues was an “anomaly” in the history of the church) and the work of rené descartes and baruch spinoza, reason was increasingly seen as “instrumental” or “autonomous.” hence “modern philosophy forged its identity in large part by distinguishing its method and first principles from those of theology.” herein lies the real source of the distinctly modern conception of faith and reason as opposed modes of knowing., if there is one section where kaplan’s normally equitable approach lapses ever so slightly, it is in his treatment of immanuel kant. he seemingly accepts at face value the conventional view on kant’s epistemological dualism, which “made the conflict with faith and reason inevitable.” this is because “kant allowed a place for god in his system, but it was through ethics, not metaphysics. this, of course, represented a drastic departure from the mainstream tradition [of augustine and aquinas].” according to kaplan, kant’s radical emphasis on universality leads him to discount the historical truths of christianity as mere parochialisms. to be sure, for the christian, kant cannot be considered an authoritative thinker on faith and reason. but as kant scholars like richard velkley have shown, kant’s early meditations on the ends of reason seem to indicate that kant was actually more concerned with the unified moral telos of speculative and practical reason than has been traditionally thought. in other words, like pascal before him, kant aimed to demonstrate the limits of pure speculative reason, thereby exhibiting the reality of mankind’s existential search for something which it can never fully grasp., kaplan’s investigation turns in the succeeding chapters to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. his analyses of the tübingen school of theologians in the nineteenth century and john henry newman particularly shine through, as these seem to be his central areas of expertise. as usual, each thinker is presented with facility and penetrating insight; i reluctantly pass over them here for the sake of brevity., in his section on the postmodern “a/theology,” kaplan’s equipoised method is perhaps on its fullest display. quoting graham ward, he identifies the rejection of the “transcendental signifier” and the notion of any possibility of universal truth as the central insight of postmodern theology: “the death of god is the death of a transcendental signifier stabilizing identity and truth. it is the death of identity, telos , and therefore meaning in anything but a local and pragmatic sense.” such universalizing tendencies in the christian tradition “penetrate the social, political and economic realms” leading to the perpetuation of “poverty, racism, sexism, and ableism.”, kaplan takes postmodern theological arguments seriously and responds to them by asserting that “if certain groups, can on the basis of class, ethnicity, or gender, be dismissed as epistemologically insufficient, then must one not say the same of traditions, especially those that tilt heavily toward a certain gender class or ethnicity” kaplan interprets this as the “[elimination of] any path for relating faith and reason because reason itself [is] to be jettisoned for its universalizing tendencies.” these approaches therefore “necessitate a wholesale dismissal of almost any canonical account of christianity.”, thus, “feminist and liberationist hermeneutic practices and acts of retrieval are involved in their own project of faith seeking moral legitimacy, rather than faith seeking understanding.” in other words, they amount to a wholesale repudiation of the faith/reason paradigm., perhaps in response to these currents in recent theology, the book ends with an examination of pope john paul ii’s fides et ratio and pope benedict xvi’s “regensburg address.” for benedict, this dialogue between faith and reason is baked into the tradition, going back to the greek appropriation of the hebrew bible in the work of the translation of the greek old testament. according to john paul ii, the crisis of meaning in the modern world is irretrievably linked to the abandonment of the search for the one truth as manifested in christ as logos or reason himself. taking the two together, one gets a sense of where kaplan ends his analysis of the nature of faith/reason debate: we cannot simply stop asking how the two relate. they are always essentially bound up with the christian religion. to stop asking the question is to no longer be christian in an important sense., accordingly, kaplan closes with the assertion that “the premodern tradition frequently presumed a participatory notion of human cognition. in this model reason itself was already a graced, supernatural activity in which the human participated in the divine mind.” thus, “there can be no question of definitively solving the relation of faith and reason.” kaplan’s book as a whole shows that to abandon the search, assert final answers, or create artificial barriers in this ever-unfolding aspect of the human story is the only definitively wrong answer. kaplan’s book is a valuable and admirable contribution to that story., faith and reason through christian history: a theological essay by grant kaplan washington, d.c.: catholic university of america press, 2022; 336pp.

Thomas Holman is a military veteran pursuing graduate studies in political theory at the Catholic University of America. More of his work can be found at his personal site: mobtruth.net .

Share this:

• Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Telegram (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window)

Related Posts

• previous post: How Far Do I Reach? Utilitarianism Through Another Lens
• next post: The Repressed Spirit of a Modern Monster: Understanding Horror in Japan

Subscribe to VoegelinView via Email

Stay informed with the best in arts and humanities criticism, political analysis, reviews, and poetry. Just enter your email to receive every new publication delivered to your inbox.

Email Address

• Featured Essay The Love of God An essay by Sam Storms Read Now
• Faithfulness of God
• Saving Grace
• Adoption by God

Most Popular

• Gender Identity
• Trusting God
• The Holiness of God
• See All Essays

• Best Commentaries
• Featured Essay Resurrection of Jesus An essay by Benjamin Shaw Read Now
• Death of Christ
• Resurrection of Jesus
• Church and State
• Sovereignty of God
• Faith and Works
• The Carson Center
• The Keller Center
• New City Catechism
• Publications
• Read the Bible
• TGC Pastors

U.S. Edition

• Arts & Culture
• Bible & Theology
• Christian Living
• Current Events
• Faith & Work
• As In Heaven
• Gospelbound
• Post-Christianity?
• TGC Podcast
• You're Not Crazy
• Churches Planting Churches
• Help Me Teach The Bible
• Word Of The Week
• Upcoming Events
• Past Conference Media
• Foundation Documents
• Church Directory
• Global Resourcing
• Donate to TGC

To All The World

The world is a confusing place right now. We believe that faithful proclamation of the gospel is what our hostile and disoriented world needs. Do you believe that too? Help TGC bring biblical wisdom to the confusing issues across the world by making a gift to our international work.

Introducing TGC Essays: Theology for the Global Church

More By Phil Thompson

For more than a decade, The Gospel Coalition has been publishing a wide range of articles, podcasts, videos, books, and more. This work is driven by an observation in our Foundation Documents :

We have become deeply concerned about some movements within traditional evangelicalism that seem to be diminishing the church’s life and leading us away from our historic beliefs and practices. On the one hand, we are troubled by the idolatry of personal consumerism and the politicization of faith; on the other hand, we are distressed by the unchallenged acceptance of theological and moral relativism. These movements have led to the easy abandonment of both biblical truth and the transformed living mandated by our historic faith.

Over the years, our resources have targeted each of the concerns outlined in that statement, and these challenges continue to drive our expansion of new content formats such as a catechism , free online courses , and devotionals . We’re excited to announce our latest offering––a series of 250 theological essays .

• Expansive . The essays fall into 12 major categories––the Bible, the Christian life, the church, creation, end times, God, the Holy Spirit, humanity, Jesus Christ, salvation, sin, and systems and methods of theology.
• Free . They’re not hidden behind a paywall. You can access, share, print, and distribute them.
• Non – technical . They are intentionally written to be understandable and accessible to those without formal theological education, yet are still a helpful resource for the seminary-trained. Most of the essays contain few footnotes, and all Greek and Hebrew references are transliterated and explained.
• Translatable . So many rich theological resources are locked away under copyright. We want to do our part to change that reality. Each of the essays is made available under a Creative Commons License (CC BY-SA), instantly allowing Christians the world over to begin translating the resources without needing our permission. Under this license, local translators may even bind and sell these translations to help sustain their local businesses.
• Multi-authored . In a typical systematic theology textbook, you read perhaps 1,000 pages of a single author’s treatment of various doctrines and issues. In these essays, you will have access to around 2,000 pages worth of theological reflection from 102 different authors.
• Far – reaching . One of the most exciting aspects of launching this series is that people far from Christ all over the world are now able to interact with excellent, orthodox theological resources. If you google phrases like “ divine revelation ” or “ priesthood of the believer ,” chances are you’ll find one of these essays on the first page. Even more exciting is the implications for a “ God the Father ” search—a glance at the competing websites gives a clear sense of the importance of this effort.
• Growing . Today’s list of essays  is just the beginning. In the coming years, we plan to keep expanding this collection to cover additional doctrines and issues. Unlike a systematic theology textbook, we have the ability to continue scaling, updating, and localizing these resources for years to come.

In a list of resources this large, it’s hard to identify favorites. But here are my top 10:

• Don Carson’s essay on “ Contemporary Challenges to Inerrancy ” wades into issues of the Bible’s Author/authors, certainty of interpretation, and moral objections to the text.
• Jeremy Treat’s handling of “ Kingdom and Cross ” functions as a shorter version of his excellent book on the same subject.
• When it comes to canonicity, it’s hard to beat Michael Kruger’s insights. In this essay series, Kruger tackles “ The Biblical Canon ” and “ The Apocrypha .”
• I enjoyed the practical warmth and theological depth of “ The Love of God ” by Sam Storms.
• Some essays wade into contested issues. A great example is Tom Schreiner on the topic of “ The Miraculous Gifts and the Question of Cessationism .”
• Jonathan Leeman on “ The Relationship of Church and State ” is a must-read in the lead-up to a passionate national election.
• If you’re looking for a simple resource for deacon training, Matt Smethurst’s essay on “ Deacons ” will be particularly helpful.
• The issue of a “ Historical Adam and Eve ” is insightfully addressed by John Collins.
• Andy Naselli’s explanation of apostasy is salient as recent years have included many stories of “deconversions” of prominent Christian leaders.
• Ligon Duncan penned excellent essays on “ Redemption ” and “ Propitiation .”

Partner with Us

The Gospel Coalition seeks to provide resources that are trusted and timely, winsome and wise, to strengthen the global church. Even as we make this new content freely available to the world online, we are trusting that the Lord would provide resources so we can continue these efforts.

For example, one of our next projects—to complement the essay series—will be a series of commentaries on the whole Bible. As it is prepared, it will also be released into the Creative Commons and be available for free on our website.

As we step out in faith in these endeavors, we would be honored to have your support .

Is the digital age making us foolish?

It doesn’t have to be this way. With intentionality and the discipline to cultivate healthier media consumption habits, we can resist the foolishness of the age and instead become wise and spiritually mature. Brett McCracken’s The Wisdom Pyramid: Feeding Your Soul in a Post-Truth World shows us the way.

To start cultivating a diet more conducive to wisdom, click below to access a FREE ebook of The Wisdom Pyramid .

Phil Thompson (PhD, Columbia International University) serves as program director for The Carson Center at TGC. He is a teaching pastor at Christ Fellowship Eastside , a recent church plant, and an adjunct professor at Columbia International University . Over the past decade, Phil has traveled to train pastors in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. He and his wife, Laurel, live in Greenville, South Carolina, with their daughters Lane, Kately, Harper, and Darcy.

Now Trending

1 transgender meds for kids 4 findings from new report, 2 biden’s new regulation reinforces transgender ‘orthodoxy’, 3 the 11 beliefs you should know about jehovah’s witnesses when they knock at the door, 4 5 principles for reading herman bavinck, 5 quick guide to christian denominations.

Resurrected Saints and Matthew’s Weirdest Passage

Jesus’s tomb wasn’t the only empty one on Easter morning.

Does 1 Peter 3:19 Teach That Jesus Preached in Hell?

Why Gentile Inclusion Doesn’t Affirm Same-Sex Marriage

The FAQs: Southern Baptists Debate Designation of Women in Ministry

8 Edifying Films to Watch This Spring

Can I Tell an Unbeliever ‘Jesus Died for You’?

The Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnipresence of God

Latest Episodes

Abraham lincoln and today’s trials for democracy.

Welcome and Witness: How to Reach Out in a Secular Age

How to Build Gospel Culture: A Q&A Conversation

Examining the Current and Future State of the Global Church

Trevin Wax on Reconstructing Faith

Gaming Alone: Helping the Generation of Young Men Captivated and Isolated by Video Games

How to Persevere in Life’s Wilderness

Faith & Work: How Do I Glorify God Even When My Work Seems Meaningless?

Let’s Talk (Live): Growing in Gratitude

Getting Rid of Your Fear of the Book of Revelation

Looking for Love in All the Wrong Places: A Sermon from Julius Kim

Introducing The Acts 29 Podcast

• Search Menu
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Language Acquisition
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Media
• Music and Culture
• Music and Religion
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Society
• Law and Politics
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Ethics
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Games
• Computer Security
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Ethics
• Business History
• Business Strategy
• Business and Technology
• Business and Government
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic History
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Systems
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Theory
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Politics and Law
• Public Policy
• Public Administration
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Developmental and Physical Disabilities Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity

Author Webpage

• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

Classical Christian orthodoxy insists that God is Triune: there is only one God, but there are three divine Persons — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — who are somehow of one substance with one another. But what does this doctrine mean? How can we coherently believe that there is only one God if we also believe that there are three divine Persons? This problem, sometimes called the ‘threeness-oneness problem’ or the ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, is the focus of this interdisciplinary volume. It includes a selection of recent philosophical work on this topic, accompanied by a variety of essays by philosophers and theologians to further the discussion. The book is divided into four parts, the first three dealing in turn with the three most prominent models for understanding the relations between the Persons of the Trinity: Social Trinitarianism, Latin Trinitarianism, and Relative Trinitarianism. Each section includes essays by both proponents and critics of the relevant model. The volume concludes with a section containing essays by theologians reflecting on the current state of the debate.

Signed in as

Institutional accounts.

• Google Scholar Indexing
• GoogleCrawler [DO NOT DELETE]

Personal account

• Sign in with email/username & password
• Get email alerts
• Save searches
• Purchase content
• Activate your purchase/trial code

Institutional access

• Sign in with a library card Sign in with username/password Recommend to your librarian
• Institutional account management
• Get help with access

Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:

IP based access

Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.

Sign in through your institution

Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.

• Click Sign in through your institution.
• Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
• When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
• Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.

If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.

Sign in with a library card

Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.

Society Members

Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:

Sign in through society site

Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:

• Click Sign in through society site.
• When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.

If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.

Sign in using a personal account

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.

A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.

Viewing your signed in accounts

Click the account icon in the top right to:

• View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
• View the institutional accounts that are providing access.

Signed in but can't access content

Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.

For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.

Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Rights and permissions
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology

Overview Essay

Christianity and Ecology

Heather Eaton, St. Paul University

See also Ernst Conradie's article on Christianity and ecology in the Routledge Handbook of Religion and Ecology

Christians have been grappling with the ecological crisis for several decades, in many ways and in distinct contexts and traditions. Ecological issues have seeped into all aspects of Christian theologies, church leadership and practices, noting that Christianity must always be understood as diverse, with multiple historical and existing cultural traditions and challenges. The overall aims are to orient Christianity towards ecological sustainability, and to transform the traditions and practices. An ecological influence on Christian traditions is now worldwide and growing and is considered here under the rubric of ecotheology. There are countless people developing ecotheology across traditions and theological disciplines. A few will be mentioned throughout, noting there are many more.

Ecotheology is prominent in theological studies, seminaries, workshops, conferences and parishes. This work represents a significant range of perspectives, traditions and topics, as well as differing emphases on interpretation, ethics, leadership, ritual and social practices. Ecotheology, while confessional, provides critiques of Christianity as well as comprehensive reforms, generating constructive and creative transformations. These include assessments of biblical and other texts and teachings, and revisions of meaning on such themes as creation, revelation, redemption and soteriology. There are three prevalent methods: retrieval, such as the Earth Bible Project, (Norman Habel, Elaine Wainright, Vicky Balabanski); reinterpretation, such as expanding the precept of a ‘preferential option for the poor’ to include the Earth (Ivone Gebara, Leonardo Boff), and; reconstruction, such as with Process theology (John Cobb, Catherine Keller), ecological sin (Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople) and the renewal of creation theologies (Sallie MdFague, Jürgen Moltmann, John Haught, Elizabeth Johnson, Celia Deane-Drummond). There are deliberations on ecological hermeneutics (Ernst Conradie, Kim Yong Bok), ethics (James Nash, Larry Rasmussen, Sigurd Bergmann) ecojustice (Dieter Hessel, Cynthia Moe-Lobeda, Mary Grey, John Hart) and ecofeminism (Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gebara, Heather Eaton).  Rituals, symbols, and spiritual practices are being revised (Paul Santmire, Denis Edwards, Nancy Wright). There are reflections on cosmology, science and worldviews (Thomas Berry, Ian Barbour, Charles Birch, Anne Primavesi, Ilia Delio), as well as religiously motivated activism against local ecological deterioration. Ecotheology crosses into systematics, ethics, history, biblical studies, rituals and liturgies, and spirituality, and spans the diversity of Christianities. Ecotheology is a fertile field of study in theology and Process thought, feminist analyses, Black, Mujerista and Ecowomanist theologies, postcolonial and animal studies, and other topics and approaches.  Ecotheology is vast in scope and includes revitalizations of all these aspects, and often has an emphasis on justice, and social, political and ecological ethics.

Ecotheologies may accentuate either the ecological or theological aspects, and unites around goals of connecting Christianity with nature, promoting constructive human-Earth relations, and resisting ecological decline.  As a whole ecotheology represents significant developments in, and renewal of, Christian thought, worldviews, and practices. The consequences are both comprehensive reforms of Christianity, as well as new expressions, noting that experiences and interpretations of adherents vary widely as does the variance between beliefs and actions, and principles and practices. Distinct approaches have been developed in Catholic, Anglican, Reformed, United, Evangelical, Eastern and Greek Orthodox, Methodist, Lutheran and more, and these are further differentiated in countries and contexts.  In fact, within the spectrum of Christianity all the major ecclesial traditions are involved. In addition, there is a range of traditionalist, reformist, progressive and radical.  Regardless of the diversity, from the 1970’s to the present, the force and flourishing of ecotheology is astounding. 

Challenges and contributions

Several challenges and contributions occur at the intersection of Christianity and ecology. These can be internal to theology, on how theology engages with other religions and disciplines, or how to relate to global diversity, or respond to the complexity of ecological issues.  Examples of each are given, noting that work in ecotheology is extensive, and is making contributions to all of these topics.

Early publications stressed an urgency to respond to ecological issues  as well as to address prevalent, albeit simplistic, claims against Christianity, such as the in infamous essay by Lynn White suggesting that Christianity’s devaluation of nature is a cause of the ecological crisis. [i]    Of course, there is no direct cause and effect between Christianity and ecological disregard.  Also, many other factors, such as economics and capitalism, and the lack of ecological literacy, have created the cultural conditions for ecological crises to develop.  Nonetheless, ecotheologians reexamined the worldview and basic values ingrained in Eurowestern consciousness and Christian theological presuppositions. They engaged in extensive ideological excavation of the ideals and theories embedded in the worldview(s) that have led to pervasive and unfettered ecological decline in Christian-influenced cultures. For example, they had to address the historical, and contemporary, Christian anthropocentrism, an emphasis on humanity’s transcendence over the natural world, and the claims nature was void of divine presence. Throughout much of Christian history is the idea that the natural world is fallen, corrupt, imperfect or irrelevant. The result is death. Humans must then be saved, redeemed or restored from nature, with a promise of eternal life.  Although each religious worldview has some perception that life does not end with death, the Christian tradition has potent otherworldly imagery that has both depreciated Earth life and supported notions that salvation means from this world . This led ecotheologians to criticize otherworldly interpretations of redemption, salvation, and resurrection. Dualist imagery, which was operative across all Christian traditions -  heaven/earth, spirit/matter, culture/nature, mind/body, men/women, divine/demonic – was excavated and exposed, and assessed as neither accurate nor informative. Christian worldviews were rethought at a foundational level.

Other challenges concerning beliefs around Christologies, a closed canon, biblical inerrancy, and Christian imperialism and colonialism also had to be addressed. It became clear that Christianity, as with all religious views, must remain fluid, attentive to presuppositions, values, orientation and impact. Religions should be supple, receptive to new insights, and able to abandon out-dated or unworkable beliefs, interpretations and dogmas in order to be relevant to the exigences of the era.

All this work is part of the critique and internal reformation of aspects of the Christian traditions.  It sparked intense re-evaluations of Christian thought, with different emphases according to the tradition, context and operative beliefs. These intro- and retrospections have resulted in the retrieval of texts and teachings that connect the natural world to divine presence, and in multiple ways. Revising elements of Christianity, and encouraging Christians to participate, should be seen as a rapid yet deep and ongoing transformation, in response to increasing and complex ecological issues. 

Developments in Christian ethics also represents both challenges and contributions. The challenges are how to include ecological concerns in customary approaches to ethics, and/or to expand approaches to ethics to be responsive. For example, feminist ethics became influenced by ecofeminism, and social justice discourses were transformed by global efforts in ecojustice, environmental racism, climate justice and ecological activism. Issues and analyses of inequality, discriminations, economic exploitation, structural violence and systemic domination were expanded to include ecological aspects, and in turn influenced a range of Christian ethics and appeals for ecological and social justice.  

It is important to note that Christian ecotheology is developing as other disciplines are being pressured to be ecologically relevant. New knowledge from sciences, reports about climate instability, the state of ocean life, deforestations, extinctions, water quality, plastics, and myriad ecological deteriorations is emerging constantly, and requiring responses. Christianity, among other disciplines and religions, had to undergo an ecological conversion.

Other challenges and contributions come from collaborations with the emerging field of religion and ecology, which is occurring in tandem with Christian ecotheology. Today, the alliance of religion and ecology is a multifaceted global agenda, and countless programs. The Forum on Religion and Ecology has been a leader and supporter of many initiatives. Most religions have engaged in similar reconstructions as has Christianity. The collaborative efforts across religious traditions evokes questions about the nature of religion, religious epistemologies, sensibilities, orientation and sources, and the importance of theories of lived and critical religions. Challenges exist, at times, when ecotheologians enter the field of religion and ecology, as theology tends to overlook other religions, including the histories, diversities and complexities. In general, theology operates with deficient theories of religion and epistemology.  Thus, at times there is an uneasy placement of ecotheology within academic spheres of religion and ecology.  However, while some streams of eco-Christianity remain in traditional boundaries, others venture into the field of religion and ecology and embrace new questions and insights. The dialogues between ecotheology and the field of religion and ecology are important, albeit distinct depending on competence, experience and interest in these more comprehensive frameworks.

For example, every religion and culture present a creation or origin story which provides meaning and orientation to human life and fulfills the need to grapple with the perennial questions of time, space, origins and destiny. Such stories are usually longstanding and may have lost their relevance or effectiveness in the face of new knowledge, global exchanges, or the plurality of viewpoints. Christianity has examined the biblical origin story and reflected on various meanings of the role of humanity as ecological steward, gardener, or Earth-keeper rather than as having dominion. Religious traditions have been challenged by discoveries from sciences about Earth origins, biospheric development, and the evolution of life, as well as the processes of the universe out of which emerged the solar system and planet Earth.  Some Christian traditions have integrated evolutionary biology and cosmology into a new understanding of ‘origins’.  

There are several other noteworthy challenges that pertain to religions engaging on ecological issues.  One is the radical diversity and plurality of cultures, views, values and beliefs.  How do we assess these? For example, the social construction of nature is contested.  Is a forest a sacred grove, an ecosystem, animal habitat, lumber, real estate, or an eco-tourism destination? Is the natural world a set of resources with instrumental value or a living community with intrinsic value?  A great deal depends on the answer, and yet an ecological sustainable vision is imperative. However, which vision? In whose interests?  How can a community decide which vision to embrace?  What vision will inspire? There are diverse and competing visions, and the processes of change from one to another are not straightforward.  It is crucial to embrace radical diversity and plurality and unity: an ecological vision with agreed values, ethical principles and cooperative actions.

A connected challenge is that some problems cannot be grappled with contextually, as they are global in scope and/or the administrators are trans or multinational.  Some pertinent concerns are climate change, international land grabs, corporate rights on fresh water sources or icebergs, energy (transnational pipelines), mining privileges, food insecurities, corporate ownership of food, environmental refugees (who surpass political refugees), environmental illnesses, and more. These issues require several disciplines to understand and cross many contexts.  They are global, local and contextual realities. The term ‘global issues’ is too vague, and contextual is inaccurate, resulting in additional challenges for a robust ecotheology to address. 

The last challenge to be mentioned is that a correlation between Christian-influenced cultures and ecological exploitation, extractive economies, extreme consumption, and climate emissions is evident. In tandem, Christian bodies have done little to restrain deforestation, species extinction, water contamination, and so on. There are tensions between ecotheology from the global South, where poverty, ecological decline, and often political instability are intense, and that of the affluent post-industrialized, high consumer and waste production regions. Questions arise as to the key priorities, and the fundamental global inequities around ecological resources, access, ownership and decline. These cultural, denominational and theological divergences can be a call to greater equality and justice and cooperation, and/or a distraction to an overall agreement that Christians need to address ecological issues locally, nationally and internationally.  Planetary solidarity is becoming a prophetic call.

Countless contributions around Christianity and ecology are effective and active in their communities. At the local levels there are innumerable contributions of conferences, workshops, retreat centres, and church groups addressing everything from the range of ecotheology topics to public policy on waste, water, transportation, and climate activism.  At the national level, many denominations and theological organizations have incorporated forms of Earth ministries, Earth-keeping, stewardship, climate justice and more into their national policies.

Internationally, The World Council of Churches and their initiative of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation (JPIC), has provided leadership and sustained programs in many Christian traditions, countless contexts and on multiple issues for decades. The importance of connecting Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation has been recognized worldwide, and has opened possibilities of working locally, with Indigenous peoples for example, of opening national offices, and devising international campaigns on climate justice, nonviolence, and poverty. Another important contribution is the document, Laudato Si: On Care of Our Common Home, from the Catholic Institutional church, released in 2015, as part of the Catholic social teaching encyclicals.  It is a comprehensive overview of the need to connect integral ecology to peace, justice, education and governance, as well as to understand the mechanisms that create poverty, ecological ruin and social injustices.  This document has resonance around the world, within multiple Christian traditions and with other religions. These speak to the need for programs and visions that are sufficiently clear yet open-ended to encourage creativity, participation and action. There are multiple robust efforts addressing religion and ecology from diverse organizations, such as The Earth Charter, Alliance of Religion and Conservation, the National Religious Partnership for the Environment, The Parliament of Religions of the World, United Nations Environment Program, World Wildlife Fund, Earth Democracy, Global Peace Initiative of Women, and more, and each encourages collaboration.

There is no doubt that the field of Christianity and ecology, representing efforts of all kinds, is a much-needed response to the ecological challenges of this era and for the future.  The internal challenges to Christianity have been somewhat replaced with an engagement with ecological issues. This means that Christianity - adherents, churches, theological schools, retreat centres, national offices – has many options, and places of transformation. While some issues are local, others relate to ecosystems and bioregions, or are planetary, such as climate instability. This supports the need to collaborate across regions, religions and disciplines. Christianity is a religion: a worldview offering meaning and orientation, as well as a political, economic and ethical force. Christian themes of revelation, liberation and solidarity are compelling for ecological concerns.  Human experiences of wonder, humility, grace and gratitude are of utmost importance, as are the ethics of equality, resistance and sacrifice.  The commitments of justice, flourishing, equality, preferential option for the Earth, and the goodness of creation can be integrated deeply, and be a transformative power. It can take the form of ritual, education, persuasion, policymaking, activism and resistance. Prophetic voices are needed. The conviction of the centrality of love, hope, faith, and an ever-renewing spirit provide energy and inspiration, and at times consolation.

Some consider this era to be a new religious moment.  Not only is the ecological crisis provoking concern, new thinking, social engagement and cross-sector collaboration.  It is evident that there is a need for global commitments to ecologically sustainable communities, and ones that will preserve the elegance and beauty of the whole Earth community. Thomas Berry, a Catholic priest and historian of religions, addressed the question of vision.  Much of his work was an inquiry into what could be an adequate, ecological, and spiritual vision.  For Berry, it must comprise a sufficiently broad horizon commensurate with scientific knowledge of the emergent universe, of time, space and Earth dynamics, incorporate a suitable grasp of the histories and complexities of religions, be ecologically literate, and deeply inspiring.  Such a vision must give humanity a way to live within the rhythms and limits of the natural world, and as a member of this Earth community.  The insights about the origins and developments of the universe, the emergence and dynamics of evolution, and Earth’s integrated and entangled processes reveal how embedded humans are in what Christians can refer to as the deep incarnation.  For some this knowledge, perspective and vision offers the most power and promise for an overall orientation for a viable future.

Lynn White,(1967), The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” Science (155: 1203-1207.

Lutheran Quarterly

Common Places in Christian Theology – Essays from Lutheran Quarterly

Lutheran Quarterly is pleased to announce the publication of  Common Places in Christian Theology: A Curated Collection of Articles from Lutheran Quarterly, from 1517 Publishing, edited by Mark Mattes. The volume is available for purchase now,.

The essays within, written by some of the finest contemporary Lutheran theologians, are designed to help Christian teachers know the most important themes for explicating the faith, along with the inner logic which binds these themes together and situates them within a comprehensive and satisfying framework. These essays tackle the most important topics of the faith, including theological principles, scriptural authority, the doctrine of God and creation, human nature and sin, Christ’s person and work, salvation and justification, the Holy Spirit’s work and the church, theological ethics, prayer, and the last things. They will provoke readers to engage their faith thoughtfully so that they can better understand their own relationship with God and commend the faith to others.