essay about military discipline

Essay on Military Discipline

Students are often asked to write an essay on Military Discipline in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Military Discipline

What is military discipline.

Military discipline is about following rules and showing respect. Soldiers must obey orders, be on time, and wear their uniforms right. This discipline helps them work together and stay safe.

Why It’s Important

Discipline keeps soldiers organized. It makes sure they are ready to protect their country. When everyone follows the same rules, they can trust each other more.

Training for Discipline

Soldiers learn discipline during training. They practice doing things the same way and listening to their leaders. This training prepares them for tough situations.

Discipline in Daily Life

Discipline isn’t just for big missions. It’s also for everyday tasks like cleaning and exercising. Doing these well shows a soldier’s commitment.

250 Words Essay on Military Discipline

Military discipline is a set of rules that people in the army follow. It helps soldiers act correctly and obey orders. This discipline is very important because it can make the difference between success and failure in missions.

Why is Discipline Important?

In the military, discipline means being on time, wearing the right uniform, and respecting leaders. It keeps soldiers safe and helps them work together as a team. When everyone follows the rules, the army can do its job well.

Training and Discipline

Soldiers learn discipline during their training. They practice doing things the same way and at the right time. This training helps them react quickly in tough situations without getting confused or scared.

Following Orders

A big part of military discipline is following orders. When a leader gives an order, soldiers must listen and do what they are told. This is important because, in dangerous situations, there is no time for questions.

Respect and Discipline

Respect is another key part of military discipline. Soldiers must show respect to their leaders and each other. This respect helps maintain order and keeps everyone working together.

500 Words Essay on Military Discipline

Military discipline is the strict and orderly behavior that is a fundamental part of military life. It is what sets the military apart from other groups. This kind of discipline makes sure that soldiers follow orders and act in a professional way at all times. It is essential for the success of military operations and for keeping soldiers safe.

The Importance of Following Orders

One key part of military discipline is following orders. When soldiers are given commands, they must carry them out without question. This is important because in dangerous situations, there is no time for debate. Quick and unquestioning obedience can save lives and complete missions successfully. This also teaches soldiers to trust their leaders and work as a team.

Respect and Hierarchy

Self-control and appearance.

Self-control is another vital aspect of military discipline. Soldiers must control their emotions, especially anger and fear. They must remain calm under pressure and face challenges without panic. Additionally, part of self-control is maintaining a neat appearance. Soldiers wear uniforms that are clean and worn correctly to show their professionalism and unity.

Punctuality and Reliability

Being on time is a must in the military. Punctuality shows reliability and readiness to take on tasks. A disciplined soldier is someone who can be counted on to be where they need to be, when they need to be there. This ensures that the whole unit can work together effectively.

Training and Practice

The benefits of military discipline.

The benefits of military discipline go beyond the battlefield. It can help soldiers in their daily lives by teaching them good habits like being organized and responsible. It also builds character and helps people to handle stress and challenges better.

In conclusion, military discipline is a set of behaviors that are critical to the functioning of the military. It includes following orders, showing respect, having self-control, being punctual, and maintaining a high level of training. These behaviors ensure that the military can operate smoothly and effectively. Even though it is strict, military discipline has many benefits and is a key part of what makes the military successful.

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Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Army Values — Military Respect: The Cornerstone of Discipline and Camaraderie

Military Respect: The Cornerstone of Discipline and Camaraderie

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Table of contents

The essence of military respect, the manifestations of military respect, the importance of military respect.

• Superiors: Respect for higher-ranking officers and leaders is a cornerstone of military discipline. This respect is demonstrated through salutes, adherence to orders, and deference to their authority.
• Subordinates: The military values the dignity and worth of every service member, regardless of rank. Leaders must treat their subordinates with respect, recognizing their contributions and addressing their needs and concerns.
• Peers: Respect among peers fosters a sense of unity and camaraderie. It includes acknowledging each other's expertise, supporting one another in challenging situations, and upholding the honor of the unit.
• Traditions and Values: Military respect extends to the customs, traditions, and core values of the armed forces. These traditions are honored and upheld as a source of pride and identity.
• Rules and Regulations: Military members show respect for the rules and regulations that govern their conduct. Compliance with these standards ensures order and safety within the ranks.
• Saluting: Saluting is a symbol of respect and recognition of higher rank. It is a gesture that signifies acknowledgment of authority.
• Following Orders: Promptly and efficiently executing orders from superiors is a demonstration of respect for their leadership and the chain of command.
• Active Listening: Respectful communication involves active listening, where service members attentively hear and consider the perspectives and concerns of others.
• Mentoring and Training: Senior military members take on mentorship roles, guiding and instructing junior service members to help them grow and succeed.
• Integrity and Honesty: Upholding the military's values of integrity and honesty is a form of respect for the institution and one's comrades.

Discipline:

Camaraderie:, moral and ethical foundation:, leadership and mentorship:, unit cohesion:.

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A Historical Overview of Military Discipline

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• Anthony Kellett  

Part of the book series: International Series in Management Science/Operations Research ((ISMS))

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The role of discipline in socializing the recruit and in his subsequent training was mentioned in chapter 6. In essence, military discipline has a threefold purpose. The first and, perhaps, primary purpose is to ensure that the soldier does not give way in times of great danger to his natural instinct for selfpreservation but carries out his orders, even though they may lead to his death. The second purpose is to maintain order within an army so that it may be easily moved and controlled and so that it does not abuse its power. If an army is to fulfill its mission on the battlefield, it must be trained in aggression; however, its aggressive tendencies have to be damped down in peacetime, and the medium for this process is discipline. The third purpose of discipline, as we have already seen, is the assimilation of the recruit and the differentiation of his new environment from his former one. This goal is particularly salient in societies that have rejected many previously accepted forms of discipline. A counterintelligence officer in the U.S. army during the Second World War expressed the last point in the following way: “Even the civilian soldier who finds the military way quite alien and strange can learn to hold fast to the few simple rules. . . . He learns to expect orders from above and to pass them along to those under his control. Thinking tends to become not only painful but more and more unnecessary” (Gray 1959, p. 103).

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Kellett, A. (1982). A Historical Overview of Military Discipline. In: Combat Motivation. International Series in Management Science/Operations Research. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3965-4_7

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Military Discipline

The phrase military discipline in the eighteenth century referred to all aspects of training in the army as opposed to primarily a juridical function. George Washington is generally considered to be conservative in this realm, stretching from his earliest experiences through his years of commanding the Continental Army as well as his time as president. Generally speaking, Washington followed European military models, specifically that of the British.

In learning about military discipline, Washington followed the common practice at the time for those who sought officer status, rigorous study. Under this approach, Washington read broadly from many of the military texts and histories available at the time. He was aided in this endeavor by the fact that the eighteenth century witnessed a massive expansion in the number of military works in print. Washington supplemented the knowledge acquired through reading with discussions of veteran officers. At first these conversations were with his older brother Lawrence, who had served in the siege against Cartagena. Later, it was with Major General Edward Braddock during that officer's ill-fated march to the Monongahela.

Lastly, as President, Washington hoped to create a professional army that could defend the nation. In keeping with this goal, he held to the belief that part-time soldiers were not enough to meet the country’s security needs. What was necessary was a regular army, based on the European model. The difficulty here lay in finding a balance between a force that was professional enough to stand up to the European opponents of the day, while not creating one so divorced from the society it shielded as to become a threat to it.

Jim Mc Intyre Moraine Valley Community College

Bibliography: Cox, Caroline. A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington's Army . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

Martin, James Kirby and Lender, Mark Edward. A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 . Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1982.

Higginbotham, Don. George Washington and the American Military Tradition . Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1985.

______________, "The Military Institutions of Colonial America: The Rhetoric and the Reality," Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-1871 , ed. John A. Lynn. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990.   

No One Should Think the War Will Be Short

It is prudent to consider how a conflict over Taiwan might unfold. Within military circles, there is growing fatalism and an almost dogmatic certainty that China will strike first and target both U.S. and Taiwanese forces simultaneously in a Pearl Harbor–style surprise attack, but is that the most likely or most dangerous possibility? 1  

Chinese revisionism and designs for Taiwan could spur conflict that ranges from economic and political gray zone contests at one end to a massive preemptive conventional assault on the other. 2  

Across the range of possibilities, if conventional war breaks out between the United States and China, any notion of a short war with defined off-ramps fought solely over Taiwan’s independence seems naïve. 3 The Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy on reunification and stated it would “pay any price,” which points to the unlikely availability of off-ramps. 4 Several recent articles have pointedly noted that a fixation among the United States and its allies and partners on a “short, sharp war” could have disastrous consequences. 5 A reflexive desire to immediately surge forces into combat and win a rapid victory also is misaligned with current capabilities, risk tolerances, and escalation management principles. 6 Worse still, short-war thinking encourages misaligned force design decisions prior to conflict and risk management decisions during it. Stunning an enemy and killing him are two different things, and both the United States and China must consider what comes next after a first, violent clash. 7 Ample research suggests surprise attacks and/or large-scale aggression are highly likely to invoke the human psychology for revenge, leaving rational cost-based analysis by the wayside as the desire to strike back at all costs takes the forefront. 8

Force designs that champion speed and “decision advantage” as primary pillars of victory are custom-tailored to rely on high-risk, high-intensity engagements and small numbers of sophisticated, expensive, and exquisite capabilities. 9 Unfortunately, such an approach is fraught with the potential for disaster. High-risk, high-intensity combat is a double-edged sword: rapid escalation on one hand, and destruction of one’s own means to continue the conflict because of attrition on the other. Even if U.S. forces come out on top in fast-paced head-to-head engagements, their inability to reconstitute losses would give China an advantage and incentive to pursue protraction to “lose the battle, win the war.” If a nation still maintains the capability and will to fight, it is likely to do so. 10  

Similarly, low-number, high-cost exquisite systems only have an advantage if a conflict is either asymmetric, and the enemy has no way to counter such systems, or short, and the systems prove decisive before their complete exhaustion. The inability to mass produce exquisite systems often renders them nearly impotent even before first use. Consider the effect of Russian hypersonic missiles in the war in Ukraine. 11 New technologies are influencing the way the Russia-Ukraine war is being fought, but neither hypersonic missiles nor drones have proved decisive or prevented the war from dragging on. Protraction in any form gives the advantage to a force designed for staying power. 

Rather than focus on fast victory, the U.S. Sea Services should create an alternate strategy and complementary force design around capabilities that enhance strategic deterrence; provide response options that enable manageable escalation; and rely on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) designed to produce sustainable lethality while husbanding forces and minimizing risk. To achieve these outcomes would require investment in capabilities that can:

• Survive or rapidly recover from an initial strike

• Be optimized to support Taiwanese forces

• Create and maintain their own antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) zones

• Emphasize the support and execution of non-attributional kinetic and nonkinetic effects that manage escalation and incorporate allies and partners

• Provide a hedge for enabling and arming for long-term offensive power

The strategic aim of a U.S.-led response to a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan should be broad and play the long game. As a Rand Corporation study, U.S. Military Theories of Victory for a War with the People’s Republic of China , points out, “The more ambitiously the United States defines its war aims, the harder it will be to persuade China to accept defeat.” 12 Strategic objectives following a failure of deterrence should center on turning the catastrophe of war and preemption into a unified commitment to resist China’s revisionist agenda and severely damage its capacity as a global leader. 

Time, after all, is not on China’s side. Its looming demographic collapse should point U.S. strategy toward allowing the Chinese Communist Party to hasten its ultimate failure through its global belligerence. 13 This slower strategy would be preferable to meeting China on its terms, in its preferred battle space, and under its timetables. Instead, there would be no strikes on mainland China, no battles with tens of thousands of service members killed on both sides, and no opportunities for China to land a knock-out blow to the U.S. military, which would reduce the risk of massive conventional or even nuclear escalation. Under such circumstances, it is hard to imagine how China could turn even a total occupation of Taiwan into the fait accompli military writers so often warn of. 

For a country that already spends more on internal security and population-control measures than military defense, old-school realpolitik tactics such as funding and supporting internal and external resistance groups and competitors would yield outsized results. 14 Thinking about future conflict with China through this lens produces a different set of priorities for force structures, tactics, and technology. As Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. has written,  “A strategy designed to convince a rival it cannot win a protracted war entails convincing it that it cannot win a short war.” 15 The objective then, is convincing China that the United States does not accept even the possibility of a fait accompli and that, under any initiating circumstances, China can expect irreversible long-term damage, protracted military resistance, and geopolitical and economic ruin. 

The Tools Required

There are capability gaps that urgently need to be filled to enable this strategy. Fortunately, many options to do so are already funded. 

The cornerstone of a counterstrike and counter-A2/AD strategy is persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coupled with long-range targeting. The development of many capabilities is well underway and organized loosely under the Joint All-Domain Command and Control program, and the United States can achieve this goal, but doing so will require: additional funding—agreed on and spent ; standardization; and training for emerging C5ISRT capabilities. 

The main deficits in this area are not hardware or software. If anything, the legions of software suites, unmanned systems prototypes, and ISRT tools provide the perfect case study in “too much of a good thing.” Service-specific solutions to strategic problems have produced a barrage of software and systems with few clear leaders, limited standardization, and no time to train or fully implement them. The Department of Defense does not need dozens and dozens of varying versions of the same thing. It needs a few working models and time to get them into the hands of the soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who will employ them in combat. Many amazing capabilities are being tested and fielded in small numbers. Pick the most promising to be iteratively upgraded and improved. Invest heavily in the winners and put all the others on program life support or pull the plug. 

The C5ISRT that is the foundation of the future force ultimately depends on kinetics to operationalize it. Numerous Proceedings articles have argued that the United States needs to prioritize weapons. 16 Production of long-range precision-strike capabilities, torpedoes, and surface-to-air missiles must be kicked into overdrive—starting a decade ago. Vastly more important than another fifth-generation aircraft or new class of warship, massively enlarged stockpiles of these weapons are required, as is immediate funding to maturity and fielding of all the near-future weapons. The containerization of these weapons already being planned and demonstrated would allow them to be more distributed, survivable, and scalable in any protracted conflict and, if such weapons are provided to proxies, would enable additional elements of escalation management through deniability. The combination of a common federated C5ISRT capability and adaptable mobile weapon systems will allow rapid force generation, if required, through existing land- and sea-based platforms. 

For a counter-A2/AD strategy employing concepts such as distributed maritime operations, expeditionary advanced base operations, and littoral operations in a contested environment, the Sea Services also need better enablement at scale. Construction battalions, construction equipment, and mobile versions of all the items required to create, repair, and sustain temporary bases, airfields, and port facilities need to be prioritized, funded, and stockpiled. Current bases in the Pacific also need to be vastly improved and hardened to provide increased survivability and alternate and contingency operational modes. 

The defeatism that often accompanies discussion of the defense of bases and airfields on Guam and Okinawa is too pessimistic. Yes, those locations are within range of enemy fires, but permanently cratering an airfield and destroying facilities is hard. Despite being at the receiving end of the largest missile barrages since World War II, Ukraine’s combination of mobility, deception, and training significantly mitigated the effectiveness of Russian attacks. 17 Hardened expeditionary bases and rapid repair capabilities would provide sustained enablement for a strategy that focuses, first, on strategic deterrence—by reducing the possibility of China being able to deliver a knockout blow—and, second, on maintaining the capability to endure. 

What Is Not Needed (For Now) 

To move out on producing the necessary tools, the Sea Services must free themselves from the burden of unnecessarily exquisite and expensive weapon systems of many types. While the Navy is certainly “divesting to invest,” nascent future capabilities and technology have been overhyped. 18 Hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence–enabled next-generation unmanned loyal wingman platforms may be the future, but they are not the immediate future. To deter or defeat an increasingly revisionist and belligerent China, those programs should be placed on the back burner while more immediate and readily available priorities take the lead. 

Improving the Tools We Have

Last comes the category of forces and capabilities already in place but that perhaps need some innovation and creativity to redefine their purpose in a future great power conflict—the reimagined tools and those that have gotten back to basics. The Navy’s surface forces need to focus less on dramatic, high-risk maneuver offense and more on securing sea lines of communication, prosecuting antisubmarine warfare, and carrying out escort duties, blockades, and maritime interdiction outside China’s primary weapons engagement zones. Risk-managed offensive raids may still be required, but they should be viewed as contingency operations for most conventional surface forces. 

Carrier strike groups need to transform into mobile command-and-control nodes and area air-defense providers that can linger outside most weapons engagement zones indefinitely. The air wings, enabled by expeditionary advanced bases, should plan and practice conducting very-long-range maritime strikes through dynamic multiday missions. Enabling this capability will require innovative thinking on all the small details, such as mobile access to classified networks and communications, mission planning, and prebased maintenance teams. Paired with long-range Air Force fighter and strike aircraft, Navy maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and Air Force strategic lift as long-range maritime-strike multipliers, the joint force would wield a potent ability to strike Chinese forces. 

The remaining strategy must rely on in-place forces and the “hedge force” nearer to the fight, some of which can act in ways that might not be readily attributable—undersea and irregular warfare forces, for example. These more survivable forces will need to stand in for large traditional surface-action groups that cannot—and should not—be expected to close within range to conduct force-on-force naval brawls. 19 Submarines, special forces, multidomain task forces, and Marines will pair with U.S. A2/AD systems and long-range strike capabilities to provide a sting designed to last but unlikely to culminate existentially—in catastrophic escalation. These forces also provide more realistic avenues for allies and partners to support U.S. forces by virtue of their un- or less attributable nature. By avoiding the possibility of a knockout blow, any aggressor would be forced to grapple with another way out of the conflict. If China were to push outside its purpose-built A2/AD zone to force decisive battle, it would instantly find itself playing against the U.S. military’s greatest strengths and outside the support of the A2/AD system it spent decades developing. 

The Evolution in Military Affairs

These concepts are evolutionary, not particularly novel. They prioritize risk management, husband conventional forces for protraction, and slow the potential for escalation by avoiding large-scale destruction on either side. This is the strategy version of “no fast hands in the cockpit,” a saying among aviators that highlights that, during an in-flight emergency, often the worst thing an aviator can do is overreact by moving too quickly. 

Few nations would willingly start a war they knew would soon descend into protraction. Casting doubt on even the possibility of a short war for Taiwan would have an outsized deterrent effect. To accomplish this, the United States must strengthen and diversify presence, protect its forces, and display a credible offensive and defensive capability. This slower, more measured strategy is complemented by the ticking clock of geopolitical danger for China and helps ensure the United States does not risk more than it should in the early stages of a fight. 

Achieving the right mix of capabilities, forces, and posture to maximize strategic deterrence and prevail in any potential conflict is the most urgent challenge the U.S. military faces. Most of the necessary tools are available now, and dedicated leaders and policy-makers are making headway unifying the joint force. Military leaders must guard against preparing only for the perceived worst-case scenario or the siren call of a short war and instead design a force mindful of escalation and protraction and prepared to excel across the continuum of conflict. Many of the tools needed are neither flashy nor expensive, but they must be prioritized. Details such as data standards and TTPs should be better defined and enforced across the future-looking tools the joint force needs, and innovative TTP development and better enablement should continue rapidly to help reimagine the tools the Sea Services already have.

1. Seth Cropsey, “Pearl Harbor Redux: U.S. Risks Repeating Strategic Errors,” Asia Times , 7 December 2022.

2. Charity S. Jacobs and Kathleen M. Carley, “Taiwan: China’s Gray Zone Doctrine in Action,” Small Wars Journal , 11 February 2022; and CDR Paul Giarra and CAPTs Bill Hamblet and Gerard Roncolato, USN (Ret.), “ The War of 2026: Phase III Scenario ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 12 (December 2023).

3. Raphael S. Cohen, “America’s Dangerous Short War Fixation,” Foreign Policy , 28 March 2023.

4. Denny Roy, “China Struggles to Repurpose the Lessons of the Pearl Harbor Attack,” Asia Times , 28 December 2023.

5. Hal Brands, “Getting Ready for a Long War with China: Dynamics of Protracted Conflict in the Western Pacific,” American Enterprise Institute, 25 July 2022.

6. Ryan T. Easterday, “The Fallacy of the Short, Sharp War: Optimism Bias and the Abuse of History,” The Strategy Bridge, 16 March 2023.

7. Iskander Rehman, “Planning for Protraction,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 9 November 2023.

8. Rose McDermott, Anthony C. Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi, “‘Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It’: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 1 (December 2017).

9. Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2022).

10. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “Protracted Great-Power War: A Preliminary Assessment,” Center for New American Security, February 2020.

11. John Grady, “ Russian Hypersonic Missiles Underperforming in Ukraine Conflict, NORTHCOM Says ,” USNI News , 20 May 2022.

12. Jacob L. Heim, Zachary Burdette, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “U.S. Military Theories of Victory for a War with the People’s Republic of China,” RAND Corporation, 21 February 2024.

13. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “China’s Shrinking Population and Constraints on Its Future Power,” Brookings Institution, 24 April 2023.

14. Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” The Jamestown Foundation, 12 March 2018.

15. Krepinevich, “Protracted Great-Power War: A Preliminary Assessment.”

16. For example, CDR Graham Scarbro, USN, “ Strike Warfare’s Inventory Problem ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 12 (December 2023); LCDR Patrick Rawlinson, “ Torpedoes: Get Smaller to Think Bigger ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 150, no. 3 (March 2024); and CAPT Sam Tangredi, USN (Ret.), “ Replicate Ordnance, Not Cheap Drones ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 150, no. 3 (March 2024).

17. Jaganath Sankaran, “How Ukraine Fought against Russia’s Air War,” The Lawfare Institute, 22 January 2023.

18. Mallory Shelbourne, “ SECNAV, CNO Pushing Plans to Decommission 11 Warships in Fiscal Year 2024 ,” USNI News , 20 March 2023.

19. Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “Hedging Bets: Rethinking Force Design for a Post-Dominance Era,” Hudson Institute, February 2024.

Commander Justin Cobb, U.S. Navy

Commander Cobb is the maritime fires officer with Carrier Strike Group 11. A rotary-wing aviator, he previously served as the commanding officer of the Helicopter Training Squadron 18 Vigilant Eagles at Naval Air Station Whiting Field, Florida. A graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College, he conducted his joint tour at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, where he was the lead action officer on the NATO joint command-and-control concept. 

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Opinion: For Sweden, Russian aggression is a daily worry

By Jay Evensen

For most Americans, the war in Ukraine takes on a distant hue that makes it easy to talk about in broad terms. For some, distance makes the war easier to dismiss.

To many people in Europe, however, it’s a much more vivid and constant worry.

I just returned from another two-week stay in Sweden, my third within the past 12 months. My wife and her siblings are inheriting property there.

Each time I have visited, Ukraine has been top-of-mind in the media and in casual conversation, in ways that conveyed an emotion Americans have a hard time feeling thousands of miles away. This time was no different.

“Russian plot: ‘Gotland target for nuclear weapons’” was a blaring headline less than a week ago in Expressen , a national daily newspaper I bought off the stand. Gotland is Sweden’s largest island, located in the middle of the Baltic Sea. It has been a tourist destination for many years, and it contains some of the nation’s most intriguing archeological finds (in 1999, the world’s largest collection of Viking silver treasure was discovered in a farmer’s field).

It’s also important militarily, and even more so since Sweden joined NATO earlier this year. Sweden has plans to put more advanced missile defense systems and military equipment on the island.

So when Russian military expert Vladimir Prochvatilov wrote on a Russian website that Gotland would become “target number one” for a Russian nuclear attack in the event of a war with NATO, it got people’s attention.

“It would be better for Sweden to remain a neutral country and for the island of Gotland to remain a tourist mecca, a historical museum and a nature reserve, than to become the number one target for Russian nuclear missiles,” Prochvatilov wrote.

More jarringly, he said, “The hopes of the Swedish authorities that in the event of a direct military conflict with Russia this small country will be able to avoid the total destruction of its mainland infrastructure and mass deaths of the population are illusory.”

At the start of such a war, Russia would launch nuclear weapons at Sweden “to prevent NATO cruise missile strikes on ships of the Baltic and Northern Fleets.”

In response to this, Expressen quoted an associate professor of war science at the Norwegian Defense University, who labeled it a scare tactic, or “diplomacy of intimidation,” aimed at getting Sweden to rethink its plans to militarize the island.

Reports such as these are jarring to a nation that managed to escape any conflict in either world war, and that hasn’t fought a war at all since 1814. But they also are evidence that Sweden’s decision to join NATO, and its plans for Gotland, are the right tactics.

Russia is clearly concerned. A separate story in Expressen said a Russian TV station had devoted considerable time to the militarization of Aland, a Finnish island not far from Gotland.

But perhaps more jarring than these reports are the recent statements of Sweden’s own government and military leaders.

At a conference earlier this year, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson urged people to prepare to defend themselves “with weapons in hand and our lives on the line.”

The nation’s supreme military commander, Gen. Micael Byden , showed photos of destruction and death in Ukraine that were projected against the backdrop of a snowy Swedish field. He asked, “Do you think this could be Sweden?”

Once again, as in earlier visits, the people I spoke with expressed strong support for Sweden joining NATO.

They also expressed worries over whether Americans, and especially politicians, were as committed to keeping Europe free as they are.

On that score, recent opinion polls, such as one by the University of Maryland and SSRS, showed that support for the U.S. staying the course in its support for Ukraine is surprisingly strong. A report on the poll by the Brookings Institution said that, when asked how long the U.S. should continue military aid, 48% said as long as necessary, with another 39% saying one to two years.

When broken out by political persuasion, the poll found 37% of Republicans saying as long as necessary, with 53% saying one to two years.

This, despite statements by former President Donald Trump and Sen. J.D. Vance in opposition to further military aid.

For those who inevitably will ask, Sweden already spends 2.2% of its annual budget on its military, including an air force that has long been one of the strongest in Europe. That qualifies as exceeding the NATO target level of 2%.

Swedes no doubt would be comforted by the poll results. As I said after earlier visits, defense against Russian President Vladimir Putin is not a theoretical exercise for them, as it often seems to be in this country.

From what I know of history, the same could have been said for the way many Americans felt about belligerent countries before the outbreak of World War II.