Asa Gray
On this second sense of chance, what seems to make a theory ‘chancy’ is the fact that generation of variation and perpetuation of variation have both been, for some of these theorists, independent of future utility or fitness. As we see from the grid, a contrast on both scores is found in the evolutionary philosophy of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. Lamarck’s is a materialistic argument against the variation in nature being a matter of chance. On the Lamarckian view, variations arise in an organism as a direct response to environmental stress or demand, giving rise to a stimulus, which in turn elicits a physiological response, which finally can be passed on via reproduction to offspring. Variations are not chance or random, since they are an appropriate response to an environmental stress. Here ‘chance’ signals a lack of relation or connection to adaptive needs .
The concept of ‘random variation’ is today often used as a synonym for ‘chance variation’ in precisely this latter sense. Here are two examples of this notion of chance or randomness as used by contemporary Darwinians.
…mutation is a random process with respect to the adaptive needs of the species. Therefore, mutation alone, uncontrolled by natural selection, would result in the breakdown and eventual extinction of life, not in adaptive or progressive evolution. (Dobzhansky 1970, 65)
Thus the production of variations may be a ‘chance’ process in that there are a number of possible outcomes with assignable probabilities, but it is also a ‘chance’ process in the sense that the probability assignments are not biased by ‘adaptive needs’ or ‘fitness’.
Referring now to perpetuation rather than generation of variation, when John Beatty describes ‘random drift’ as ‘changes in frequencies of variations due to chance’ in the following passage, he presumably has something like a contrast with changes in frequencies due to selection in mind.
In Darwin’s scheme of things, recall, chance events and natural selection were consecutive rather than alternative stages of the evolutionary process. There was no question as to which was more important at a particular stage. But now that we have the concept of random drift taking over where random variation leaves off, we are faced with just such a question. That is, given chance variations, are further changes in the frequencies of those variations more a matter of chance or more a matter of natural selection? (Beatty 1984, 196)
Notice that in the above quote we first get a substitution of ‘random’ for ‘chance’ in the phrases ‘random variation’ and ‘chance variation’, and then at least the suggestion that the concept of ‘random drift’ can be characterized as ‘changes in frequencies of variations due to chance’, where the contrast class consists of similar changes due to natural selection.
With respect to the generation of variation, chapter 5 of On the Origin of Species opens with the following apology:
I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations—so common and multiform in organic beings under domestication, and in a lesser degree in those in a state of nature—had been due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation. (Darwin 1859, 131)
Here Darwin is noting that, though to speak of ‘chance variations’ may seem to be citing chance as the cause of the variations, in fact it is simply acknowledging that they ‘appear to have no assignable cause’. But it is important to keep historical context in mind here. Whether Darwin himself ever flirted with the idea of ‘directed’ variation or not, he was acutely aware of two views from which his needed to be distinguished, very different from each other, but both holding to the view that variations arose for a purpose. [ 12 ] The most widely shared alternative was that found in natural theology. To quote the Reverend William Paley’s Natural Theology , regarding a beautiful instance of adaptation: “A conformation so happy was not the gift of chance”. Likewise, among Darwin’s followers, the American botanist Asa Gray, in an essay entitled ‘Natural Selection and Natural Theology’, uses the same contrast to advise Darwin against the notion of ‘chance variation’: “…we should advise Mr. Darwin to assume, in the philosophy of his hypothesis, that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines.”
Gray is here insisting that, since Darwin admits that using the term ‘chance’ merely signals ignorance of the true cause, and since the pervasive adaptations in nature suggest design, Darwin should avoid the suggestion that variations are due to chance in the sense of ‘absence of design’ . This introduces yet a third sense of ‘chance’ that has been instrumental in the interpretation of evolutionary theory (Shanahan 1991, 264).
Darwin, in fact never refers to ‘chance variations’ in the Origin , though occasionally he will note that if a beneficial variation ‘chances [i.e. happens] to appear’, it will be favored by selection (see pp. 37, 82) What Darwin has in mind, however, is clear from his concluding remarks in his chapter on Laws of Variation :
Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the offspring from their parents—and a cause of each must exist—it is the steady accumulation, through natural selection, of such differences, when beneficial to the individual, that gives rise to all the more important modifications of structure… (Darwin 1859, 170)
Whatever the cause of the generation of a variation may be, the role of selection is to accumulate those already present variations that happen to be beneficial, a process that, while probabilistic, is not at all independent of fitness (and hence not ‘chancy’ in our second sense). As Beatty put it, the generation of variations and their selection are ‘consecutive’ processes. But to call the generation of variation a ‘chance’ process is to use ‘chance’ in either the second or the third sense, meaning either that such generation is independent of the future utility of variations for the organism, or that it is not by design, not for some end.
There are, therefore, at least three forms of ‘chance’ at play in contemporary evolutionary theory: an invocation of probabilistic or statistical inferences, an invocation of processes that act independently of current or future fitness, and an invocation of the absence of design. To these we might add, as mentioned above, chance as ignorance of causes, and chance as historical contingency, though we lack the space to discuss either of those notions further here, bringing the total to five (see, e.g., Shanahan 1991, 263–267). Eble (1999, 76) drops the notion of probabilistic or statistical inference and adds the idea, less relevant in evolutionary contexts, that ‘chance’ can refer to uncaused events (see analysis in Millstein 2000, 609–613).
One further example can illustrate how all this interacts in the broader context of contemporary evolutionary theory (for more such examples, see the contributions to Ramsey and Pence 2016). Here, a champion of the neutral theory of molecular evolution characterizes his position:
…the great majority of evolutionary changes at the molecular (DNA) level do not result from Darwinian natural selection acting on advantageous mutants but, rather, from random fixation of selectively neutral or very nearly neutral mutants through random genetic drift, which is caused by random sampling of gametes in finite populations. (Kimura 1992, 225)
Here, it will be noticed, the focus is not on the generation of variations but on the perpetuation of variations. The contrast is between a random sampling of gametes that leads to the fixation of selectively neutral alleles and natural selection favoring advantageous variations. That is, the contrast between ‘chance’ and ‘fitness biased’ processes is now being used to distinguish different means of perpetuating certain variations . We are contrasting two sampling processes. Drift samples without concern for adaptation; selection samples discriminately on the basis of differences in fitness. Both samplings are ‘probabilistic’, of course, but that in no way obviates the above contrast.
However, as Beatty has pointed out, it was quite common until fairly recently to characterize natural selection in such a way as to make it almost indistinguishable from random drift (cf. Lennox 1992, Lennox and Wilson 1994). Numerous accounts of fitness characterized the fitness of a genotype as defined by its relative contribution to the gene pool of future generations—the genotype contributing the larger percentage being the fitter. But of course that could easily be the result of a ‘random’—non-fitness biased—sampling process; which organisms would be declared ‘fitter’ by this method might have nothing to do with natural selection. In order to provide a proper characterization of the role of chance in evolutionary change, then, it is critical to provide a more robust and sophisticated account of fitness. (For further information, see the entry on fitness .) This, in turn, requires that we discuss the conceptual network that includes the notions of adaptation and natural selection, to which we will turn shortly.
For now, let us assume that there is a way of characterizing fitness such that there is a substantial empirical question of what role indiscriminate sampling of genotypes (or phenotypes) plays in evolutionary change. This issue was first placed squarely before evolutionary biologists by Sewall Wright in the early 1930s. As Wright pointed out, genes that are neutral with respect to fitness can, due to the stochastic nature of any process of sampling from a population, increase their representation from one generation to the next. The likelihood of this happening goes up as effective population size goes down. Since Wright imagined that a quite typical scenario in evolutionary change was for species to be broken up into relatively small, relatively isolated, populations (or ‘demes’), with significantly more breeding within than between demes, the likelihood that such ‘neutral genotypes’ could become fixed at relatively high levels was significant. Though he gradually toned down this aspect of his work, a significant school of mathematical population geneticists in the 1960s and 70s took these ideas and ran with them, developing a ‘Neutralist’ approach to evolutionary change. This is the position characterized by Kimura (one of its most eloquent defenders) in the passage quoted above. Whether or not such a process plays a significant role in evolution is not a philosophical issue, but it is highly relevant to whether evolutionary biology should be seen as predominantly Darwinian. For if any view is central to Darwinism, it is that the evolutionary process is predominantly guided by the fitness-biasing force of natural selection, acting on variations that arise by chance. It is to natural selection and related concepts that we now turn.
The greatest number of females will, of course, fall to the share of the most vigorous males; and the strongest individuals of both sexes, by driving away the weakest, will enjoy the best food, and the most favourable situations, for themselves and for their offspring. A severe winter, or a scarcity of food, by destroying the weak and the unhealthy, has had all the good effects of the most skilful selection.
The words of Charles Darwin? No; these are the words of John Sebright, penned in The Art of Improving the Breeds of Domestic Animals in 1809, the year of Charles Darwin’s birth and fifty years before On the Origin of Species was published. Darwin refers to this passage in Notebook C of his Species Notebooks. [ 13 ] It will be noticed that Sebright is not discussing domestic selection, but is quite clearly saying that processes leading to differential survival and reproduction in nature will have ‘all the good effects of the most skilful selection’. Darwin, then, did not need to read Malthus to see what is here so plainly and clearly stated—namely, that the struggle for survival in nature will have the same ‘selective’ effects as the actions of the domestic breeder of plants and animals.
As this passage, and the argument of the Origin , shows, ‘natural selection’ began life as the product of analogical reasoning. Sebright sees clearly that the natural processes he is describing will have the same effects as the breeder’s selection, but he is not about to describe those processes as selection processes. Darwin took that step, and Darwinism has followed.
Darwin himself consistently refers to natural selection as a power of preserving advantageous, and eliminating harmful, variations. As noted in the last section, whether a particular variation is advantageous or harmful is, in once sense of that term, a matter of chance; and whether an advantageous variation is actually preserved by selection is, in another sense of the term, also a matter of chance. For Darwinism, selection is the force or power that biases survival and reproduction in favor of advantageous variations, or to look ahead to the next section, of adaptations. It is this that distinguishes selection from drift.
Recent years have seen significant challenges to the idea that this framework is sufficient to explain all evolutionary phenomena, or even to explain an important fraction of evolutionary phenomena of interest. On one side we find partisans of the so-called “extended evolutionary synthesis” (EES), who argue that features like niche construction, developmental bias, phenotypic plasticity, and non-genetic inheritance entail the existence of a theory that at least radically supplements, if not transcends entirely, the Darwinian perspective (for an introduction, see Laland et al. 2014; further references include Pigliucci and Müller 2010; Uller and Laland 2019). On the other side we could put scholars like George C. Williams, who has vigorously defended the explanatory sufficiency of Darwinian selection theory (Williams 1992), or a number of proposals arguing that sufficiently reformulated concepts from “traditional” evolutionary theory can allow it to take on the challenge of the EES without radical changes (e.g., the gene for Lu and Bourrat 2017, or adaptationism for Welch 2017; see also the entries on the gene , adaptationism , and population genetics ).
We can distinguish two broad categories into which we might sort these non-Darwinian amendments: [i] proposed limitations on natural selection as an evolutionary force; and [ii] expansions of the scope of natural selection to include new ‘targets’, ‘processes’ or ‘mechanisms’, and ‘levels’. It will be noted that in neither case is it obvious that the theory itself requires modification in the face of such challenges—in principle these might be nothing more than challenges to the theory’s range of application . However, if it turned out that most evolutionary change could be explained without recourse to natural selection, this would be grounds for arguing that evolutionary biology was no longer Darwinian. And if it turned out that the theory of natural selection could only be integrated with our new understanding of the processes of inheritance and development by a wholesale modification of its foundations, it might be best to see the new theory as a modified descendent of Darwinism, rather than Darwinism itself. Theories may need essences, as Gould claims; but if what is fundamental to the theory has changed, then so has its essence. To borrow a phrase from Paul Griffiths, perhaps it is not that theories need histories and essences—perhaps what they need are historical essences .
Alfred Russell Wallace regularly urged Darwin to jettison the term ‘selection’ as misleadingly anthropomorphic, and substitute Herbert Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’. Darwin went halfway—in later editions he added ‘or Survival of the Fittest’ to ‘Natural Selection’ in the title of chapter 4. As the theory developed in the mid-20 th century, the expression ‘survival of the fittest’ was gradually eliminated from any serious presentation of Darwinian selection theory. On the other hand, the concept of ‘fitness’ has played a prominent, and problematic, role. In the mathematical models used in population genetics, ‘fitness’ refers either to the abilities of the different genotypes in a population to leave descendants, or to the measures of those abilities, represented by the variable W . Here is a rather standard textbook presentation of the relevant concepts:
In the neo-Darwinian approach to natural selection that incorporates consideration of genetics, fitness is attributed to particular genotypes. The genotype that leaves the most descendants is ascribed the fitness value W =1, and all other genotypes have fitnesses, relative to this, that are less than 1. … Fitness measures the relative evolutionary advantage of one genotype over another, but it is often important also to measure the relative penalties incurred by different genotypes subject to natural selection. This relative penalty is the corollary of fitness and is referred to by the term selection coefficient . It is given the symbol s and is simply calculated by subtracting the fitness from 1, so that: s = 1 − W . (Skelton 1993, 164)
The problem lies in the fact that the concept of fitness plays dual roles that are instructively conflated in this quotation. For when fitnesses are viewed as measures of differential abilities of organisms with different genotypes to leave different numbers of offspring, the language of fitness encourages us to suppose that ‘fitness’ refers to the relative selective advantages of genotypes. On the other hand, if ‘fitness’ simply refers to the measure of reproductive success, it is a quantitative representation of small scale evolutionary change in a population, and leaves entirely open the question of the causes of the change. But then the assumed connections among the concepts of fitness, adaptation and natural selection are severed. ‘Selection coefficients’ may have nothing to do with selection; what W represents may have nothing to do with selective advantage.
There is, however, a way of formulating the theory in its modern guise which maintains an essentially Darwinian character. Since there are a number of confirmed ways in which natural populations can evolve in the absence of natural selection, and since balancing selection, i.e. countervailing selection forces, may prevent a population from evolving in its presence, it is clear that establishing, by measuring different reproductive rates among its members, that the genetic make-up of a population has changed does not establish that natural selection was the source of that change; nor does the fact that no change has been measured establish that natural selection is not operative. Population genetics and its associated models should be treated as the ‘kinematics’, not the ‘dynamics’ of evolutionary processes (on this distinction, see also Pence 2021). That is, it is a way of establishing that a population either is or is not in equilibrium, and it provides sophisticated tools for measuring rates of change in a population across generations. Moreover, like the kinematics of any physical theory, if it establishes cross-generational change, it also tells us that there are causes to be found—the detailed contours of those measures may even provide suggestions as to where to look for those causes. What it cannot do on its own is provide knowledge of the forces at work. To use language introduced by Elliott Sober, fitness, unlike natural selection, is causally inert . (For further information, see the entry on population genetics .)
That means that, as valuable as population genetics is, it should not be equated with the theory of natural selection. Too often in both biological presentations of the theory and philosophical discussions of it, this is forgotten. For example:
Most people are familiar with the basic theory of natural selection. Organisms vary in a heritable fashion. Some variants leave more offspring than others; their characteristics, therefore, are represented at a greater frequency in the next generation. (Wilson 1984, 273)
This is a presentation of ‘the basic theory of natural selection’ that makes no reference to natural selection at all!
Natural selection, if it is to resemble the Darwinian concept that bears that name, must be reserved for reference to an interaction between a variable, heritable feature of an organic system and the environment of that system . That interaction may or may not change the proportions of those features across generations, and those proportions may change for reasons other than those interactions. But a plausible natural selection hypothesis must posit some such interaction. (Whether this interaction is accurately described as causal is another much-debated topic in recent years; see Pence 2021 for a high-level summary.) On this issue we will give the last word to Stephen Jay Gould:
…when we consider natural selection as a causal process, we can only wonder why so many people confused a need for measuring the results of natural selection by counting the differential increase of some hereditary attribute (bookkeeping) with the mechanism that produces relative reproductive success (causality). (Gould 2003, 619)
The concept of natural selection has to this point been presented broadly because of the other two critical questions surrounding the contemporary Darwinian concept of natural selection that we mentioned earlier—questions having to do with possible limiting constraints on natural selection and about the sorts of objects that can be viewed as appropriate organismic/environmental ‘interactors’ in the selection process.
If we suppose that for Darwin natural selection was almost exclusively thought of as an interaction between individual organisms and their organic and inorganic environments, then we can see two challenges to Darwinism today with respect to levels of selection. There are those, such as G. C. Williams, Richard Dawkins (1976) and, more recently, J. Arvid Ågren (2021), who argue that selection is always and only of genes. Here is a clear statement:
These complications [those introduced by organism/environment interactions] are best handled by regarding individual [organismic] selection, not as a level of selection in addition to that of the gene, but as the primary mechanism of selection at the genic level. (Williams 1993, 16)
Dawkins’ preferred mode for making the same point is to refer to organisms—or interactors—as the vehicles of their genes, in fact vehicles constructed by the genome for its own perpetuation.
The original impulse for this approach, especially clear in Williams’ classic Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), was philosophical—it was to use a sort of Ockham’s razor strategy against group selection hypotheses, showing that alleged group selection effects could be explained by explanations operating at the level of the genome (an approach more recently taken by the controversial Nowak et al. 2010). Throughout that book, selection is always said to be of individual alleles, regardless of the role environments at various levels may play in the process.
This view has been extensively challenged by philosophers of biology on both methodological and conceptual grounds, though there are, among philosophers, enthusiastic supporters (cf. Dennett 1995). In all the give and take, it is seldom noticed that defenders of this view claim to be carrying the Darwinian flag (Gayon 1998 and Gould 2003 are exceptions). Yet it is certainly not a position that Darwin would recognize—and not merely because he lacked a coherent theory of the units of inheritance. It is not a Darwinian view because for Darwin it was differences in the abilities of organisms at various stages of development to respond to the challenges of life that had causal primacy in the explanation of evolutionary change. Among evolutionary biologists from the ‘neo-Darwinian synthesis’ on, it is those who stress the role of organisms in populations interacting differentially to ever-variable ecological conditions in causing changes in the gene pools of those populations who are the card-carrying Darwinians. Such a “return of the organism” (Nicholson 2014) in evolutionary explanations marks a profound link between proponents of an extended evolutionary synthesis (e.g., Walsh 2015) and Darwin himself.
Darwinism also has challenges from the opposite direction. In the 1970s a number of biologists working in the fields of paleontology and systematics challenged the Neo-Darwinian dogma that you could account for ‘macro-evolution’ by means of long term extrapolation from micro-evolution. Gould, in particular, opens Part II of The Structure of Evolutionary Theory ( Towards a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory ), with a chapter entitled ‘Species as Individuals in the Hierarchical Theory of Selection’. That chapter title combines two conceptually distinct theses that connect debates about the fundamentals of natural selection to patterns in macroevolution: first, the thesis defended by Michael Ghiselin (Ghiselin 1997) and championed and refined by David Hull (Hull 2001), that species are, in a robust sense of the term, ‘individuals’; and second, that there may well be selection among groups of organisms, qua groups (see section 3.6 ). These debates over the importance of selective and non-selective processes and the relationship between these mechanisms of biological change and broader patterns of diversification and adaptation comprise some of the most important and heated discussions currently underway in evolutionary theory.
Early in the Introduction to On the Origin of Species , Darwin observes that the conclusion that each species had descended from others “even if well founded, would be unsatisfactory, until it could be shown how the innumerable species inhabiting this world have been modified so as to acquire that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which most justly excites our admiration” (Darwin 1859, 3). One might say this was the central promise of Darwinism—to account for both phylogenic continuity and adaptive differentiation by means of the same principles; or as Darwin puts it, to integrate in one theory the supposed opposition between Unity of Type and Conditions of Existence.
But it is here that even the most sympathetic of Darwin’s theistic supporters were forced to qualify their support for the theory of descent with modification by means of natural selection. In Darwin’s day the reactions of Asa Gray and John Herschel are perhaps the most interesting in this respect. Both men saw in Darwin’s theory a way to account for ‘that mystery of mysteries,’ the regular appearance of new species by means of natural, or as they might say, ‘intermediate’ causes. However both instinctively recoiled from the irreducible and central role of ‘chance’ in the theory. They did not, but easily could have, said ‘God does not play dice with the universe.’ But as Darwin stated repeatedly, if gently, to Gray—if God ordained that variations should be along beneficial lines, natural selection would be redundant. Moreover, the evidence from the study of variation in domestic and natural populations put the lie to any claim that God directs all or most variation along beneficial lines. Darwinian selection theory is a two-step process—the production of variation unrelated to the adaptive requirements of the organism, and differential perpetuation of those variations that serve adaptive needs. Again, a theory of evolution that could not be so described would not be a Darwinian theory.
The nature of ‘selection explanations’ is a topic to which much philosophical attention has been devoted in recent years. Here we want to focus on only one important question—to what extent is the teleological appearance of such explanations simply that, an appearance masking a causal process in which goals play no role?
The appearance of teleology is certainly present in Darwinian explanations, and has been since Darwin spoke of natural selection working solely for the good of each being. The appearance of teleology stems from the ease with which both evolutionary biology and common sense take it for granted that animals and plants have the adaptations they do because of some benefit or advantage to the organism provided by those adaptations.
This is a hotly contested question, and we will here simply sketch a case that selective explanations of adaptations are robustly teleological. The interested reader may want to refer to the literature on this question referred to in the discussion and listed in the list of readings provided at the end of this entry. The serious philosophical issue can be put simply and directly: in selection explanations of adaptations, are the functions served by adaptations a central and irreducible feature of the explanans in such explanations? If the answer is yes, the explanations are teleological. [ 14 ]
A good place to begin is with a simple, yet realistic, example. In research carried out over many years and combining painstaking field work and laboratory experimentation, John Endler was able to demonstrate that the color patterns of males in the guppy populations he was studying in rivers feeding into the southern Caribbean were a consequence of a balance between mate selection and predator selection. To take one startling example, he was able to test and confirm a hypothesis that a group of males, with a color pattern that matched that of the pebbles on the bottoms of the streams and ponds they populated except for bright red spots, have that pattern because a common predator in those populations, a prawn, is color blind for red. Red spots did not put their possessors at a selective disadvantage, and were attractors for mates (Endler 1983, 173–190). We may refer to this pattern of coloration as a complex adaptation that serves the functions of predator avoidance and mate attraction. But what role do those functions play in explaining why it is that the males in this population have the coloration they do?
This color pattern is an adaptation, as that term is used in Darwinism, only if it is a product of natural selection (Williams 1966, 261; Brandon 1985; Burian 1983). In order for this to be true, there must be an array of color variation available in the genetic/developmental resources of the species wider than this particular pattern but including this pattern. Which factors are critical, then, in producing differential survival and reproduction of guppies with this particular pattern? The answer would seem to be the value-consequences this pattern has compared to others available in promoting viability and reproduction. In popular parlance (and the parlance favored by Darwin), this color pattern is good for the male guppies that have it, and for their male offspring, and that is why they have it (Binswanger 1990; Brandon 1985; Lennox 2002). This answer strengthens the ‘selected effects’ or ‘consequence etiology’ accounts of selection explanations by stressing that selection ranges over value differences. The reason for one among a number of color patterns having a higher fitness value has to do with the value of that pattern relative to the survival and reproductive success of its possessors.
Selection explanations are, then, a particular kind of teleological explanation, an explanation in which that for the sake of which a trait is possessed, its valuable consequence , accounts for the trait’s differential perpetuation and maintenance in the population.
In listing the topics we would discuss under the heading of neo-Darwinism, we distinguished the question of the ontological status of species from the epistemological status of the species concept . Though they are closely related questions, it is important to keep them distinct. As will become clear as we proceed, this distinction is rarely honored. Moreover, it is equally important to distinguish the species concept from the categories of features that belong in a definition of species (Rheins 2011). Advances in our theoretical understanding may lead us to reconsider the sorts of attributes that are most important for determining whether a group of organisms is a species, and thus whether it deserves to be assigned a name at that taxonomic level. It should not be assumed that such changes constitute a change in the species concept, though at least some such changes may lead us to restrict or expand the range of taxa that are designated as species. In his contribution to the Neo-Darwinian Synthesis, Systematics and the Origin of Species , Ernst Mayr titled chapter five ‘The Systematic Categories and the New Species Concept’. Recall that Darwin made a point of treating the species category as continuous with ‘well-marked variety’ and ‘sub-species’, and made the radical suggestion that its boundaries would be just as fluid. Without explicitly acknowledging Darwin, Mayr takes the same tack, discussing ‘individual variants’ and ‘sub-species’ as a preliminary to discussing the species concept. Mayr notes that for someone studying the evolutionary process, speciation is a critical juncture; “…his interpretation of the speciation process depends largely on what he considers to be the final stage of this process, the species.” (Mayr 1942/1982, 113) With this in mind, he offers the following definition, the so-called ‘biological species concept’ (BSC):
Species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups (Mayr 1942/1982, 120; 1976, 518)
Mayr was well aware of the limitations of this definition, and treated it somewhat as a ‘regulative ideal’. Dobzhansky in 1937 gave what he claimed to be a definition of species, but which seems, as Mayr noted (Mayr 1976, 481), much more a definition of speciation :
…that stage of evolutionary process, “at which the once actually or potentially interbreeding array of forms becomes segregated in two or more separate arrays which are physiologically incapable of interbreeding.” (312)
Simpson (1943) and others built even more historicity into the concept. These are all, of course, intended as definitions of the species category , and they attempt to provide a test (or a ‘yardstick’: Mayr 1976, 479) that in principle will permit a researcher to decide whether a group of individuals should all be identified by a single species-level concept such as ‘homo sapiens’. The test for species membership is the capacity to interbreed; the test distinguishing two species is incapacity to interbreed. Dobzhansky makes the importance of this test transparent—the transition from a single interbreeding population to two reproductively isolated ones is the process of speciation.
Now in each of these definitions, little attention is paid to the actual methods used by taxonomists and systematists in differentiating between varieties of a species and distinct species, something to which Darwin gave a great deal of attention. Darwin’s apparent nominalism regarding the species concept likely stemmed from his close attention to his own taxonomic practices and those of other specialists.
Mayr, on the contrary, relates different approaches to the species concept to the philosophical distinction between essentialism and nominalism (for the history of this argumentative move, see Witteveen 2015; 2016). He associates what he calls essentialism (and what we called above “realism” about species) with the view that a species concept refers to a universal or type. This view of the referent of the concept leads to the Typological Species Concept, which he traces from Linnaeus back to Plato and Aristotle, and which he claims ‘is now universally abandoned’ (1976, 516). It is worth noting that serious doubt has been cast both on the historical and the philosophical credentials of Mayr’s ‘Typological Species Concept’ (see, e.g. Lennox, 1987; repr. in Lennox 2001b; Winsor 2001, 2006; Walsh 2006; Wilkins 2009). At the opposite extreme is nominalism, which combines the view that only individuals exist in nature and that species are concepts invented for the purpose of grouping these individuals collectively.
Mayr claims that his Biological Species Concept (BSC) is an advance on both; individual species members are objectively related to one another not by a shared relation to a type but by causal and historical relationships to one another. He can thus be understood as arguing for a new, objective way of understanding the epistemological grounds for grouping individuals into species. This new way of grouping stresses historical, genetic and various ecological relationships among the individuals as the grounds for determining species membership. His claim is that this is more reliable and objective than similarities of phenotypic characteristics. This makes sense of the importance he eventually places on the fact the BSC defines species relationally:
…species are relationally defined. The word species corresponds very closely to other relational terms such as, for instance, the word brother . … To be a different species is not a matter of degree of difference but of relational distinctness. (Mayr 1976, 518)
Mayr has in mind that brothers may or may not look alike; the question of whether two people are brothers is determined by their historical and genetic ties to a common ancestry. Notice, however, that this is a claim about which characteristics, among the many that they have, should be taken most seriously in determining the applicability to them of the concept ‘brother’. That is, it is a defense of a sort of essentialism.
A number of critics have pointed out that essentialism need not be committed to ‘types’ understood as universalia in re ; and on certain accounts of essences any species taxon that meets the standards of BSC does so in virtue of certain essential (though relational and historical) properties. At one extreme, Michael Ghiselin and David Hull have argued that this causal/historical structure of species provides grounds, at least within evolutionary biology, for considering species to be individuals. [ 15 ] Organisms are not members of a class or set, but ‘parts’ of a phylogenetic unit. Taking a very different tack, Denis Walsh has recently argued that a form of ‘evolutionary essentialism,’ bearing a striking resemblance to the essentialism of Aristotle’s zoological work, is implicit in the work of a number of evolutionary developmental theorists (Walsh, 2006).
A critical issue in this debate over the account of the species concept most appropriate for Darwinism is the extent to which the process of biological classification—taxonomy—should be informed by advances in biological theory. Besides those already discussed, the moderate pluralism associated with Robert Brandon and Brent Mischler or the more radical pluralism defended by Philip Kitcher, argues that different explanatory aims within the biological sciences will require different criteria for determining whether a group constitutes a species (perhaps, controversially, including non-epistemic value commitments; see Garnett and Christidis 2017; Conix 2019). Cladists, on the other hand, employ strictly defined phylogenetic tests to determine species rank (see Rheins 2011).
Unlike many of the other topics that define the history of Darwinism, there is no clear-cut position on this question that can be identified as ‘Darwinian’ or ‘neo-Darwinian’. In a recent collection of papers defending most of the alternatives currently being advanced (Ereshefsky 1992), our suspicion is that virtually every author in that collection would identify himself as Darwinian. This may be because, as different as they are, a number of positions currently being defended have their roots in Darwin’s own theory and practice (see Beatty 1985; reprinted in Ereshefsky 1992).
Contemporary debates over the tempo and mode of evolutionary change often travel with those concerning the role of “non-Darwinian” processes in evolutionary biology, as discussed in section 3.2 . As was argued above, the classical Darwinist position on questions of tempo and mode is usually taken to be a strict gradualism, with natural selection slowly pushing populations toward adaptive peaks (see the entry on adaptationism ). From Darwin’s day to our own, a number of processes other than natural selection that significantly impact the speed and direction of population change have been increasingly emphasized. The oldest among them was genetic drift , which draws our attention toward selectively neutral (sometimes, as we saw above, described as “random”) change in populations. If one emphasizes processes of this sort, evolution might still be gradual, but it would not necessarily, or even not usually, be adaptively directed.
The same is true for the increasing interaction between evolution and developmental biology , or evo-devo. If processes like phenotypic plasticity, in which an organism with a static genotype may exhibit radically different phenotypes as a developmental response to environmental influences, are extremely prevalent, then the kind of gradual walk toward an adaptive peak which it is clear Darwin had in mind would be regularly punctuated by fits and starts of various kinds, as new portions of evolutionary space became available as a result of developmental novelty. In turn, this could lead to the non-gradual (potentially even non-Darwinian) pattern of punctuated equilibrium , Stephen Jay Gould’s term for this oscillation between periods of stasis and rapid change across the history of the tree of life (see the entry on macroevolution ). Examples of this sort could be multiplied (e.g., biased mutation, epigenetics), though we lack the space to do so here.
To be sure, it is not clear that Darwin himself would have considered any of these to be “anti-Darwinian” approaches. As counter-examples to Darwin’s gradualism accumulated in his own day, especially those driven by (misplaced, we now know) concerns about the age of the earth like those raised by William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, Darwin began to increase the importance of “sports” in later revisions of his works, large variations that could cause brief periods of rapid phenotypic change. That said, when a reference is made in contemporary work to the “Darwinian” position on tempo and mode, it is clearly his early, extreme gradualism that authors have in mind.
In-depth discussions of the contemporary state of the field on evolutionary ethics and biological altruism would take us too far afield for our purposes here, and each is the subject of a separate article in this encyclopedia (see morality and evolutionary biology ; biological altruism ). In short, ethical behavior seems to pose at least two prima facie challenges for evolutionary explanations. First, how could genuinely altruistic behavior, which seems to involve organisms making sacrifices for others, evolve under the strict optimizing regime of natural selection? And second, what is the relationship between evolutionary explanations of our mental and perceptual capacities and our understanding of moral knowledge? Must evolutionary theory undermine or “debunk” any claims to true moral beliefs (see the entry on moral epistemology )?
It is worth underlining here, however, that debate around Darwin’s own position on these issues has turned on whether or not Darwin was genuinely offering us a “group-selection” explanation for moral traits in human beings (e.g., Ruse and Richards 2016). This question, in addition to testing the limits of our ability to interpret precious little source material found in Darwin’s own writings, is difficult also because of the host of issues that might be implicated in the effort to explicate just what we mean by “a group-selection explanation” of a particular phenomenon.
As we mentioned in section 3.2 above, in linking the question of species’ metaphysical individuality to the hierarchy of natural selection, Stephen Jay Gould offers us a window onto the conceptual complexity to which this debate can lead. His title exemplifies one approach to group selection—the unit of selection is always the individual, but there are individuals other than individual organisms that are subject to selection. A very different result emerges if one assumes that groups of organisms such as demes, kin-groups, or species, though not individuals, are nevertheless subject to selection. Adding to the conceptual complexity, some researchers propose that the term ‘group selection’ be restricted to the process whereby group-level traits provide advantages to one group over another, in which case there are strict conditions delimiting cases of group selection. Others define group selection primarily in terms of group level effects . Thus a debate analogous to that earlier discussed regarding the definitions of ‘fitness’ emerges here—by group selection do we mean a distinct type of causal process that needs to be conceptually distinguished from selection at the level of individual organism or gene, or do we merely mean a tendency within certain populations for some well-defined groups to displace others over time? (For further discussion, see Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 151–179; Hull 2001, 49–90; and see the entry on levels and units of selection .)
We hope that this survey has demonstrated, first and foremost, the rich past and present of philosophical reflections both about and inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. Furthermore, as we have seen, Darwin’s own positions and works remain touchstones for such reflections, not only because he was the theory’s first proponent, but also because his positions still offer us a useful frame of reference as well as a host of sophisticated insights. To be sure, the philosophy and practice of biology have advanced significantly in the intervening nearly two hundred years since Darwin’s first notebooks on natural selection. But if history is any guide, considering whether and how these innovations depart from Darwin’s own views on the subject will be a fruitful enterprise well into the theory’s next century.
How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.
Though there are an abundance of web sites on Darwinism, the three most useful sites meeting the highest of academic standards are listed below. The first is the official site for the publication of material in the extensive Darwin Archives at Cambridge University, but has grown to become the default site for Darwin texts and related literature as well. The second is the official site for on-line publication of Darwin’s extensive correspondence. The third site is a very good starting point amd links to sites related to Charles Darwin’s historical context.
adaptationism | biology: philosophy of | creationism | developmental biology: evolution and development | essential vs. accidental properties | evolution | fitness | -->individuals and individuation --> | laws of nature | natural selection | natural selection: units and levels of | scientific explanation | Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century | Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century | species | teleology: teleological notions in biology | Whewell, William
Copyright © 2024 by James Lennox < jglennox+ @ pitt . edu > Charles H. Pence < charles @ charlespence . net >
Mirror sites.
View this site from another server:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2024 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University
Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054
Charles Robert Darwin, the English naturalist, published On the Origin of Species in 1859 and the follow-up work The Descent of Man in 1871. In these works, he argued for his theory of evolution through natural selection, applying it to all organisms, living and dead, including our own species, Homo sapiens . Although controversial from the start, Darwin’s thinking was deeply embedded in the culture of his day, that of a middle-class Englishman. Evolution as such was an immediate success in scientific circles, but although the mechanism of selection had supporters in the scientific community (especially among those working with fast-breeding organisms), its real success was in the popular domain. Natural selection, and particularly the side mechanism of sexual selection, were known to all and popular themes in fiction and elsewhere.
Sign in with a library card.
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Month: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 2 |
November 2022 | 2 |
December 2022 | 1 |
January 2023 | 1 |
March 2023 | 2 |
May 2023 | 4 |
June 2023 | 3 |
July 2023 | 3 |
August 2023 | 1 |
November 2023 | 1 |
December 2023 | 4 |
June 2024 | 2 |
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide
Sign In or Create an Account
This PDF is available to Subscribers Only
For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.
🏆 best social darwinism topic ideas & essay examples, 📌 good essay topics on social darwinism, 🔎 simple & easy social darwinism essay titles, ❓ questions about social darwinism.
IvyPanda. (2024, February 29). 78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/social-darwinism-essay-topics/
"78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." IvyPanda , 29 Feb. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/topic/social-darwinism-essay-topics/.
IvyPanda . (2024) '78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples'. 29 February.
IvyPanda . 2024. "78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." February 29, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/social-darwinism-essay-topics/.
1. IvyPanda . "78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." February 29, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/social-darwinism-essay-topics/.
Bibliography
IvyPanda . "78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." February 29, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/social-darwinism-essay-topics/.
Home — Essay Samples — Sociology — Sociological Theories — Social Darwinism
The importance of writing an essay on social darwinism.
Writing an essay on Social Darwinism is important because it helps to understand the historical and social implications of this controversial theory. Social Darwinism, which emerged in the 19th century, applied Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection to human society, suggesting that certain races or social classes were inherently superior to others. This ideology had a significant impact on politics, economics, and social policies, contributing to the justification of imperialism, colonialism, and discrimination.
By writing an essay on Social Darwinism, students can delve into the complexities of this theory and its repercussions on society. It provides an opportunity to critically analyze the ethical and moral implications of Social Darwinism, as well as its lasting effects on contemporary issues such as racism, inequality, and social injustice.
When writing an essay on Social Darwinism, it is important to conduct thorough research to understand the historical context and various interpretations of the theory. It is crucial to present a balanced argument, acknowledging both the proponents and critics of Social Darwinism, and to provide evidence to support your claims. Additionally, it is essential to articulate the connections between Social Darwinism and modern-day societal issues, demonstrating the relevance of the topic.
To effectively convey your ideas, it is important to use clear and concise language, and to organize your essay in a logical manner. Utilize proper citations and references to support your arguments and to give credit to the sources of your information. Finally, proofread and edit your essay to ensure coherence and accuracy in your writing.
Writing an essay on Social Darwinism is important for gaining insight into the historical and contemporary implications of this theory. It allows for critical analysis and reflection on the societal impacts of Social Darwinism, and provides an opportunity to engage in meaningful discourse on ethical and moral issues.
Social Darwinism is a complex and controversial concept that has had a profound impact on the development of modern societies. It has been used to justify a wide range of ideologies and policies, from colonialism and imperialism to eugenics and social welfare. Understanding the origins and implications of Social Darwinism is essential for grappling with the complex legacies of this concept in contemporary society.
One of the key aspects of Social Darwinism is its influence on political and social ideologies in the 19th and 20th centuries. The concept of "survival of the fittest" was often used to justify the unequal distribution of resources and power within societies, as well as the expansion of empires and the subjugation of indigenous peoples. This justification of inequality and exploitation has had lasting implications for global power dynamics and the distribution of wealth and resources.
Social Darwinism has also played a significant role in shaping ideas about race and eugenics. The concept of "natural selection" was often used to justify discriminatory policies and practices against marginalized racial and ethnic groups, as well as to promote ideas about the "improvement" of the human gene pool through selective breeding. These ideas have had lasting implications for ideas about race and genetics, as well as for the development of racist and eugenicist policies.
The ethical implications of Social Darwinism are also significant, as the concept has been used to justify a wide range of discriminatory and exploitative practices. The idea that competition and inequality are natural and inevitable has often been used to justify the exclusion of marginalized groups from access to resources and opportunities, as well as to promote ideologies of individualism and self-interest over collective welfare. These ideas have had lasting implications for social and economic inequality, as well as for the development of policies that prioritize the interests of the powerful over those of the marginalized.
Criticism and opposition to Social Darwinism have also been significant within intellectual and academic circles. Many scholars and activists have challenged the concept on both ethical and scientific grounds, arguing that it is based on flawed assumptions about human nature and the natural world. These critiques have played a significant role in shaping contemporary understandings of inequality and exploitation, as well as in promoting alternative visions of social and economic justice.
The legacy of Social Darwinism in contemporary society is also significant, as the concept continues to shape ideas about competition, success, and individual responsibility in the modern world. The influence of Social Darwinism can be seen in a wide range of social and political ideologies, from neoliberalism and libertarianism to nationalist and xenophobic movements. Understanding the ways in which Social Darwinism continues to shape contemporary society is essential for grappling with the complex legacies of this concept in the modern world.
The social darwinism and the development of the humanity, made-to-order essay as fast as you need it.
Each essay is customized to cater to your unique preferences
+ experts online
Eugenics and social darwinism in american society, the misinterpretations of social darwinism, the role of social darwinism in the construction of nazi ideology, let us write you an essay from scratch.
An example of social darwinism in our world history, andrew carnegie's social darwinism principles, a debate over social darwinism and reform in the gilded era and modern time, get a personalized essay in under 3 hours.
Expert-written essays crafted with your exact needs in mind
Social darwinism and white man's burden, relevant topics.
By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email
No need to pay just yet!
We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .
COMMENTS
The term "Darwinism" refers to the theory of evolution that originated with the work of Englishman Charles Robert Darwin, especially as expressed in his book "On the Origin of Species", published in 1859. Charles Darwin theory argues that the true cause of change is the natural selection of certain species over others: more organisms are ...
Darwin had the following ideas regarding the theory of natural selection: Species keep on evolving or changing with time. As the environment changes, the requirements of an organism also change and they adapt to the new environment. This phenomenon of changing over a period of time as per the natural requirements is called adaptation.
neo-Darwinism. struggle for existence. Darwinism, theory of the evolutionary mechanism propounded by Charles Darwin as an explanation of organic change. It denotes Darwin's specific view that evolution is driven mainly by natural selection. Beginning in 1837, Darwin proceeded to work on the now well-understood concept that evolution is ...
Charles Darwin was a British naturalist who proposed the theory of biological evolution by natural selection. Darwin defined evolution as "descent with modification," the idea that species change over time, give rise to new species, and share a common ancestor. The mechanism that Darwin proposed for evolution is natural selection.
Charles Darwin: Evolution Theory Essay. Exclusively available on IvyPanda®. Evolution theory explains about the history and origin of life. Scientists of the early age tried to explain the origin of life but they did not have any theories that could support their thoughts. The reigning paradigm at that time was the, "Natural theology".
This theory was later on explained by Darwin in his book 'On the origin of species by means of Natural Selection' (1859). Basic concepts of Darwinism: Branching Descent and Natural Selection are the two key concepts of Darwinian Theory of evolution. Natural selection is based on certain observations which are factual.
Conclusion. In conclusion, Darwinism and Social Darwinism offer two distinct perspectives on the process of evolution and its implications for the natural world and human society. Darwinism, with its emphasis on adaptation and natural selection, provides a framework for understanding the incredible diversity of life on Earth.
Write an essay on Darwinism. More from this Exercise. 3 videos. ... Class 9, Class 10, Class 11 and Class 12, IIT JEE prep, NEET preparation and CBSE, UP Board, Bihar Board, Rajasthan Board, MP Board, Telangana Board etc NCERT solutions for CBSE and other state boards is a key requirement for students. Doubtnut helps with homework, doubts and ...
Charles Robert Darwin, was an English naturalist, geologist and biologist, best known for his contributions to the science of evolution. He established that all species of life have descended over time from common ancestors and, in a joint publication with Alfred Russel Wallace, introduced his scientific theory that this branching pattern of ...
June 18, 2020 by Rajkumar. In this article we will discuss about Darwinism:- Concepts of Darwinism, Evidences in Favor of Natural Selection and Criticism of the Natural Selection Theory. Evolutionary idea contributed by Darwin is called Darwinism. In 1831 Darwin got an opportunity to travel on H.M.S. Beagle for a voyage of world exploration.
This page titled 5.14: Influences on Darwin is shared under a CK-12 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by CK-12 Foundation via source content that was edited to the style and standards of the LibreTexts platform; a detailed edit history is available upon request.
Write an essay on Darwinism. ← Prev Question Next Question →. 0 votes . 388 views. asked Dec 23, 2019 in Biology by Kajal01 (24.5k points) Write an essay on Darwinism. class-12; Share It On Facebook Twitter Email
This entry offers a broad historical review of the origin and development of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection through the initial Darwinian phase of the "Darwinian Revolution" up to the publication of the Descent of Man in 1871. The development of evolutionary ideas before Darwin's work has been treated in the separate entry evolutionary thought before Darwin.
On the Origin of Species. The modern concept of evolution was proposed by Charles Darwin and was made renowned worldwide through his book, " On the Origin of Species " in 1859. The highlight of his work was that organisms, over a period of time, change as a result of behavioural or physical traits which are passed down from generation to ...
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) Charles Darwin is primarily known as the architect of the theory of evolution by natural selection. With the publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859, he advanced a view of the development of life on earth that profoundly shaped nearly all biological and much philosophical thought which followed. A number of prior authors had proposed that species were not ...
Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is the foundation upon which modern evolutionary theory is built. The theory was outlined in Darwin's seminal work On the Origin of Species, published in 1859.Although Victorian England (and the rest of the world) was slow to embrace natural selection as the mechanism that drives evolution, the concept of evolution itself gained ...
Darwinism designates a distinctive form of evolutionary explanation for the history and diversity of life on earth. Its original formulation is provided in the first edition of On the Origin of Species in 1859. This entry first formulates 'Darwin's Darwinism' in terms of six philosophically distinctive themes: (i) probability and chance, (ii) the nature, power and scope of selection ...
The article was the first announcement of the Darwin-Wallace theory of evolution by natural selection; and appeared in print on 20 August 1858. The presentation of the papers spurred Darwin to write a condensed "abstract" of his "big book", Natural Selection. This was published in November 1859 as On the Origin of Species.
the primary focus of evolutionary research ever since. One tree of life A sketch Darwin made soon after returning from his voyage on HMS Beagle (1831-36) showed his think- ing about the ...
3. Darwinism in New Zealand, 1859-1900 John Stenhouse 61 4. Environment, culture, and the reception of Darwin in Canada, 1859-1909 Suzanne Zeller 91 5. Darwinism in the American South Ronald L. Numbers and Lester D. Stephens 123 6. Darwinism, American Protestant thinkers, and the puzzle of motivation Ton H. Roberts 145 7.
Abstract. Charles Robert Darwin, the English naturalist, published On the Origin of Species in 1859 and the follow-up work The Descent of Man in 1871. In these works, he argued for his theory of evolution through natural selection, applying it to all organisms, living and dead, including our own species, Homo sapiens.Although controversial from the start, Darwin's thinking was deeply ...
Darwinism, in general, is a biological theory describing the appearance of new species and extinction of the existing ones defining species through the process of natural selection1 that is the core of Darwin's theory and […] We will write. a custom essay specifically for you by our professional experts.
By writing an essay on Social Darwinism, students can delve into the complexities of this theory and its repercussions on society. It provides an opportunity to critically analyze the ethical and moral implications of Social Darwinism, as well as its lasting effects on contemporary issues such as racism, inequality, and social injustice.