history of the manhattan project essay

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Manhattan Project

By: History.com Editors

Updated: July 21, 2023 | Original: July 26, 2017

The Manhattan Project was the code name for the American-led effort to develop a functional atomic weapon during World War II. The controversial creation and eventual use of the atomic bomb engaged some of the world’s leading scientific minds, as well as the U.S. military—and most of the work was done in Los Alamos, New Mexico, not the borough of New York City for which it was originally named.

The Manhattan Project was started in response to fears that German scientists had been working on a weapon using nuclear technology since the 1930s—and that Adolf Hitler was prepared to use it.

America Declares War

The agencies leading up to the Manhattan Project were first formed in 1939 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt after U.S. intelligence operatives reported that scientists working for Adolf Hitler were already working on a nuclear weapon.

At first, Roosevelt set up the Advisory Committee on Uranium, a team of scientists and military officials tasked with researching uranium’s potential role as a weapon. Based on the committee’s findings, the U.S. government started funding research by Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard at Columbia University , which was focused on radioactive isotope separation (also known as uranium enrichment) and nuclear chain reactions.

The Advisory Committee on Uranium’s name was changed in 1940 to the National Defense Research Committee, before finally being renamed the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) in 1941 and adding Fermi to its list of members.

That same year, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor , President Roosevelt declared that the U.S. would enter World War II and align with Great Britain, France and Russia to fight against the Germans in Europe and the Japanese in the Pacific theater.

The Army Corps of Engineers joined the OSRD in 1942 with President Roosevelt’s approval, and the project officially morphed into a military initiative, with scientists serving in a supporting role.

The Manhattan Project Begins

The OSRD formed the Manhattan Engineer District in 1942 and based it in the New York City borough of the same name. U.S. Army Colonel Leslie R. Groves was appointed to lead the project.

Fermi and Szilard were still engaged in research on nuclear chain reactions, the process by which atoms separate and interact, now at the University of Chicago , and successfully enriching uranium to produce uranium-235.

Meanwhile, scientists like Glenn Seaborg were producing microscopic samples of pure plutonium, and Canadian government and military officials were working on nuclear research at several sites in Canada.

On December 28, 1942, President Roosevelt authorized the formation of the Manhattan Project to combine these various research efforts with the goal of weaponizing nuclear energy. Facilities were set up in remote locations in New Mexico , Tennessee and Washington , as well as sites in Canada, for this research and related atomic tests to be performed.

Robert Oppenheimer and Project Y

Theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer was already working on the concept of nuclear fission (along with Edward Teller and others) when he was named director of the Los Alamos Laboratory in northern New Mexico in 1943.

Los Alamos Laboratory—the creation of which was known as Project Y—was formally established on January 1, 1943. The complex is where the first Manhattan Project bombs were built and tested.

On July 16, 1945, in a remote desert location near Alamogordo, New Mexico, the first atomic bomb was successfully detonated—the Trinity Test —creating an enormous mushroom cloud some 40,000 feet high and ushering in the Atomic Age.

Scientists working under Oppenheimer had developed two distinct types of bombs: a uranium-based design called “the Little Boy” and a plutonium-based weapon called “the Fat Man.” With both designs in the works at Los Alamos, they became an important part of U.S. strategy aimed at bringing an end to World War II.

The Potsdam Conference

With the Germans sustaining heavy losses in Europe and nearing surrender, the consensus among U.S. military leaders in 1945 was that the Japanese would fight to the bitter end and force a full-scale invasion of the island nation, resulting in significant casualties on both sides.

On July 26, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference in the Allied-occupied city of Potsdam, Germany, the U.S. delivered an ultimatum to Japan—surrender under the terms outlined in the Potsdam Declaration (which, among other provisions, called for the Japanese to form a new, democratic and peaceful government) or face “prompt and utter destruction.”

As the Potsdam Declaration provided no role for the emperor in Japan’s future, the ruler of the island nation was unwilling to accept its terms.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Meanwhile, the military leaders of the Manhattan Project had identified Hiroshima , Japan, as an ideal target for an atomic bomb, given its size and the fact that there were no known American prisoners of war in the area. A forceful demonstration of the technology developed in New Mexico was deemed necessary to encourage the Japanese to surrender.

With no surrender agreement in place, on August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay bomber plane dropped the as-yet untested “Little Boy” bomb some 1,900 feet above Hiroshima, causing unprecedented destruction and death over an area of five square miles. Three days later, with still no surrender declared, on August 9th, the “Fat Man” bomb was dropped over Nagasaki , the site of a torpedo-building plant, destroying more than three square miles of the city.

The two bombs combined killed more than 100,000 people and leveled the two Japanese cities to the ground.

The Japanese informed Washington, which following Roosevelt’s death was under the new leadership of President Harry Truman , of their intention to surrender on August 10th, and formally surrendered on August 14, 1945.

Legacy of the Manhattan Project

With the development of weapons designed to bring about the end of World War II as its stated mission, it’s easy to think that the story of the Manhattan Project ends in August 1945. However, that’s far from the case.

Following the end of the war, the United States formed the Atomic Energy Commission to oversee research efforts designed to apply the technologies developed under the Manhattan Project to other fields.

Ultimately, in 1964, then-President Lyndon B. Johnson put an end to the U.S. government’s effective monopoly over nuclear energy by allowing for private ownership of nuclear materials.

The nuclear fission technology perfected by the Manhattan Project engineers has since become the basis for the development of nuclear reactors, power generators, as well as other innovations, including medical imaging systems and radiation therapies for various forms of cancer.

Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb. U.S. Army Center of Military History . The Manhattan Project—Its Story. U.S. Department of Energy: Office of Scientific and Technical Information . Leo Szilárd, a traffic light and a slice of nuclear history. Scientific American . J. Robert Oppenheimer (1904—1967). Atomic Archive .

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Course: US history   >   Unit 7

• Beginning of World War II
• 1940 - Axis gains momentum in World War II
• 1941 Axis momentum accelerates in WW2
• Pearl Harbor
• FDR and World War II
• Japanese internment
• American women and World War II
• 1942 Tide turning in World War II in Europe
• World War II in the Pacific in 1942
• 1943 Axis losing in Europe
• American progress in the Pacific in 1944
• 1944 - Allies advance further in Europe
• 1945 - End of World War II

The Manhattan Project and the atomic bomb

• The United Nations
• The Second World War
• Shaping American national identity from 1890 to 1945

• The United States detonated two atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, killing 210,000 people—children, women, and men.
• President Truman authorized the use of the atom bombs in an effort to bring about Japan’s surrender in the Second World War . In the days following the bombings Japan surrendered.
• The Manhattan Project was the US government program during World War II that developed and built these first atomic bombs.
• Detonation of these first nuclear bombs signaled arrival of a frightening new Atomic Age .

The Manhattan Project

Hiroshima and nagasaki, was the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki necessary, what do you think.

• David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 658-668.
• See Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 658-668.
• See Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and The Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), 349.
• See Katznelson, Fear Itself , 350.
• Katznelson, Fear Itself , 614.

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Encyclopedia of the History of Science

Manhattan project.

• Alex Wellerstein – Stevens Institute of Technology

The Manhattan Project was the Anglo-American effort to build nuclear weapons during World War II. It is commonly regarded as one of the most successful, if controversial, mega-projects of the 20th century, bringing together scientific expertise, industrial production, and military coordination to create an entirely new industry, and new form of weaponry, in an unusually compressed timescale. Within the literature of the history of science and technology, the Manhattan Project has been examined from a number of different vantage points, often centering on the role of the thousands of academic scientists in hundreds of centers who participated in the weaponization of a new scientific discovery to facilitate the mass slaughter of civilians, but also portraying the project as a prototype of future military-industrial-academic collaborations.

Historiographical background

The Manhattan Project per se specifically refers to the overarching weapons-production program begun in late 1942, and not to earlier research and pilot programs. It is related to but not exactly the same as the Manhattan Engineer District, the division of the US Army Corps of Engineers that was in charge of implementing the development of the atomic bomb, and which maintained control over the technology until January 1947, when the civilian US Atomic Energy Commission took over all production operations.

This definitional issue is not an insubstantial one. If one assigns the moniker of the Manhattan Project to the earliest investigations into nuclear fission, it results in a significantly different narrative about the purpose and origins of the weapons project, and obscures the distinct change of direction that took place in late 1942. At times, it was in the interest of government officials involved in making the atomic bomb to stress the continuity with earlier research, as the original motivation for the project (fear of the Nazis) was seen as easier to justify than the later stages of it. 1

The background story of events leading to the Manhattan Project has been told in several different modes. The most common is as the history of physics: the discovery of X-rays in 1895 led directly to new theories and models of the world that, in turn, posed questions about the fundamental nature of atomic structure. These in turn led to the discovery of nuclear fission, through which subatomic neutrons can be made to split heavy atomic nuclei (like uranium) and release extremely large amounts of energy. The discovery of the nuclear chain reaction suggested that this energy release could be exponentially amplified by human intervention. This mode of background story is favored in popular accounts and was also the one preferred by the scientists who crafted the first version of this history, in part because it reflected their institutional interests (the promotion of basic scientific research), but also because it fit in with their historical self-identification as physicists. 2

There have been other ways to frame this story. Historians of technology in particular have tended to look at the continuities with other industrial-governmental operations in the United States, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, and some historians of science have also emphasized the important bureaucratic aspects necessary as a prerequisite for undertaking such an extremely risky project. And several historians of science have also emphasized that the “first” nuclear age, ranging from the discovery of radioactivity and ending with the discovery of fission, was responsible for many of the scientific and cultural frameworks that were later applied to the problem of atomic weapons. 3

An endeavor as large as the Manhattan Project can contain multitudes of historical frameworks simultaneously. It is difficult to overemphasize the scale of the work. Its wartime cost ($2 billion 1945 USD, around $30-50 billion USD today, depending on the conversion factors used) was more impressive at the time than it is in the context of later American military expenditures (for comparison, the most expensive wartime project by the United States was the research and production of the B-29 Superfortress, which cost about $3 billion 1945 USD). Its cost alone does not do justice to its scale, however. At its peak, it employed over 125,000 direct staff members, and probably a larger number of additional people were involved through the subcontracted labor that fed raw resources into the project. Because of the high rate of labor turnover on the project, some 500,000 Americans worked on some aspect of the sprawling Manhattan Project, almost 1% of the entire US civilian labor force during World War II. In 1943, the project was estimated to be consuming approximately over half of all Army construction labor and steel production, and the Oak Ridge site alone used approximately 1% of the electrical power produced for the entire country. The Manhattan Project was responsible for the generation of thousands of new inventions, as represented by patent claims processed in secret by the project, which if filed would have represented some 1% of all patents in force at the end of World War II. And while much attention has been given to the “big three” project production sites (Hanford, Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge), the total project sites across the United States number into the hundreds, including work done at over two dozen universities. It was not merely a scientific research project: it entailed the creation of an entirely new industry as well as the military coordination required to mobilize its byproducts as usable weapons, all under an unusually heavy cloak of military and governmental secrecy. 4

All of this, it should be emphasized, was done on a project that literally emerged in part out of a genre of science fiction and carried a significant risk of failure. 5 As it was, the project just managed to produce three atomic bombs by the summer of 1945; had it been delayed a few months more, it very easily could not have produced nuclear weapons prior to an American invasion of Japan, or the end of the war by some other means. This possibility of failure was acutely felt by those who worked on the project at the time, though knowledge of its outcome has led many narratives about its history to carry an air of inevitability. 6 Most exceptional about the Manhattan Project was its haste: all of its major activity took place within the span of three years (1942-1945), which is still the world-record for any nuclear weapons production program.

The decision to make the atomic bomb

The Manhattan Project, and the atomic bomb itself, could not have been imagined as plausible prior to the discovery of nuclear fission by Otto Hahn, Fritz Strassman, Lise Meitner, and Otto Frisch in the winter of 1938. Nuclear fission — the splitting of heavy nuclei (originally uranium) through the bombardment of neutrons — and the subsequent (early 1939) concept of the nuclear chain reaction provided the first concrete mechanism towards controlling the rate of nuclear reactions and inducing them towards exponential reactions that might cause explosions. For the context of the Manhattan Project, it suffices to note that by the early 1940, scientists in several nations (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with Japan following in 1941 and the Soviet Union in 1942) had petitioned their governments to support further research into the possible military applications of the fissioning of uranium. 7

The early programs of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are of brief note in relation to the later Manhattan Project. In Germany, a Uranverein (“Uranium Club”) was created under the auspices of the Reich Research Council with the blessing of Army Ordnance, and had the goal of exploring whether nuclear reactions could have military application, notably through the use of nuclear reactors. Similar work was undertaken by the Uranium Committee in the United States, created within the National Bureau of Standards in late 1939 by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a result of the urging of a letter signed by Albert Einstein (drafted at the impetus and with the input of Leo Szilard, the Hungarian refugee physicist who had first conceived of the nuclear chain reaction). In the United Kingdom, similarly, a small group of scientists sparked by the concerns of continental refugees, later known as the MAUD Committee, commenced with research at a small scale. 8

None of these efforts started in 1939 constituted a nuclear weapons production program. Their goals were, in essence, to answer the question of feasibility regarding the military application of nuclear fission, whether in terms of nuclear reactors (machines that produced controlled nuclear fission reactions) or weapons (machines that produced explosive reactions). Their work was, by the later standards of the Manhattan Project, extremely small scale. To put it into perspective, the entire budget expended by the US government on nuclear fission research between 1939 and 1941 was around $15 million USD. For the year of 1944, by contrast, the Army spent on average $2.5 million USD per day on the effort. 9

This early work proceeded at a pace not exceptionally different from “normal” scientific research. Innumerable uncertainties, unknowns, and questions existed; it was not at all clear that the technology was weaponizable in the short term. In Germany, in early 1942, the work was reviewed by Army Ordnance with the question of whether it was worth committing to a major effort — whether it would play a favorable role in the war’s outcome. The decision was negative. Though the idea of a nuclear weapon was judged technically feasible, the expense, risks, and time-scale involved, coupled with the German belief that the war would conclude in the near-term in their favor, motivated them to pursue only a relatively small nuclear reactor development program and not an expansive weapons program. (If the nuclear reactor program had been successful in producing a working reactor, it is possible that might have changed their position on the feasibility of nuclear weapons, though even then it is hard to imagine, with the knowledge of the state of Germany in the later portion of the war, that the program would have been successful in producing a weapon in time to be useful.) Though the German program has often been judged negatively (e.g., as “failure” in the “race” for the atomic bomb), considerable careful scholarship has demonstrated that the German understanding of the feasibility of nuclear weapons in 1942 was not a matter of ignorance so much as it was a decision of resource-allocation and risk-assessment. 10

The effort of the United States, left to its own devices, very well could have gone the same way. The early program was not exceptionally well-managed (it was, some participants later argued, plagued by too much secrecy at too early a period of time), and the top American scientist-administrators who controlled the direction of American wartime research and development, such as Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, were skeptical that the effort was worth a great expenditure of resources and scientific manpower. Again, the problem here was not so much a lack of understanding, but perhaps too much understanding: it was felt that the technical difficulties of producing fuel for the weapon (enriched uranium) were extraordinarily high and that the coming war’s requirements for scientific manpower were going to be large even without such a program. 11

The British program, by contrast, came to very different conclusions. Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, two refugee scientists from Europe who especially feared the prospect of Nazis armed with nuclear weapons, concluded through theoretical calculation that the enriched-uranium fuel requirements for a bomb would be considerably smaller than had been believed (they were in retrospect overly optimistic; ironically, the Germans actually made more accurate predictions about this), and that while the effort would be a significantly risky undertaking for the wartime United Kingdom, it would be a feasible undertaking for either the United States or Germany. These conclusions were codified by the MAUD Committee, with the recommendations that they be sent to American scientific authorities, meant both to warn them of the German possibility and encourage them to broader action. This occurred in the spring of 1941, though the report was not given broad circulation. In the summer of 1941, the British sent a scientific emissary to the United States to investigate the lack of action, and this emissary (Mark Oliphant) succeeded in getting the attention and interest of several key American scientists (the aforementioned Bush, along with Ernest Lawrence, Arthur Compton, and Harold Urey). 12

The American program was soon completely re-organized and renamed. Gone was the revealing moniker of the Uranium Committee, and in its place the work was renamed the S-1 Committee, the blandness of the name a sure sign of its newfound perceived importance. This work was not yet a weapon production program: the goal of the S-1 work was to produce proof-of-concept facilities that would demonstrate the means by which uranium could be enriched and a new element, plutonium, could be produced from nuclear reactors. 13

The S-1 work began in the fall of 1941, under the auspices of the Office for Scientific Research and Development, the civilian agency created by Roosevelt at the behest of Vannevar Bush (who would oversee it), to coordinate scientific research and development for defense purposes. By the summer of 1942, Bush was confident enough in the enterprise to recommend to Roosevelt that an all-out “crash” effort to develop an atomic bomb should be put into place, with the majority of the organization taken over by the US Army Corps of Engineers. The initial work had its offices in New York City, near to the headquarters of major industrial contractors and the scientific work being done at Columbia University, and the new organization was thus named the Manhattan Engineer District. The recommendation was based on technical promise, but also on the strong and, at the time authentic, belief that the Germans could be even farther ahead at that point and that they were in a genuine “race” for the bomb. 14

In several reports in the summer and winter of 1942, Bush and Conant recommended Roosevelt increase the effort involved in fission research. Though their optimism was somewhat tempered by the end of the year (in June, they believed weapons would be ready by 1944; in December, they believed that they would have six bombs by the first half of 1945), they recommended an all-out effort that would cost $400 million USD, to be dispensed through secret channels. These funds would be used to construct several plants for the enrichment of uranium, as well as the construction of at least one industrial-sized nuclear reactor and the facilities necessary to create plutonium. Roosevelt approved their initiatives without reservation, and the Army Corps of Engineers was brought in to coordinate the work of constructing the requisite plants; at this point, the American effort was indeed a weapons-production program, with the aim of producing usable weapons within the span of the war, though the specifics of their use had not yet been discussed. 15

To reiterate: The American decision to develop nuclear weapons was hardly straightforward. Despite American scientists’ conclusion that producing nuclear weapons would be extremely difficult, key figures in the conduct of wartime science were convinced by the United Kingdom’s advocacy that it was a risk worth taking. The peculiar structure of American wartime scientific planning also meant that the question was given considerably little oversight — all information on the issue was funneled from Bush to Roosevelt, who himself approved the creation of a sweeping program without apparent consultation with any outside bodies or advisors. Had the overall program been somewhat more bureaucratically controlled, with further stakeholders involved in the decision-making process, it is very easy to imagine that at the very least any initiative would have been delayed or avoided altogether. The development of nuclear weapons during World War II is, in many ways, an unexpected and improbable outcome, and instead of asking why other nations did not develop such weapons, it is more fruitful to look instead at the various contingent and at times even coincidental factors that led to the United States being the only nation to pursue such a program with vigor.

The work of the Manhattan Project

In the initial stages of the American fission effort (1939-1942), scientists at a variety of university laboratories — notably Columbia University, the University of Chicago, and the University of California–Berkeley, among many others— identified key processes for the development of the “fissile material” fuel that is necessary for a nuclear weapon to operate.

The first approach considered was the isotopic enrichment of uranium. (Chemical elements can vary in the number of neutrons in their nucleus, and these different forms are known as isotopes.) It was discovered as early as 1939 that only one isotope of uranium was fissionable by neutrons of all energies, and by 1941 it was understood that to make a fission weapon required a reasonably pure amount of material that met this criterion. Less than 1% of the uranium as mined is the fissile uranium-235 isotope, with the other 99% being uranium-238, which inhibits nuclear chain reactions. It was understood by 1941 that to make a weapon the fissile uranium-235 would need to be separated from the non-fissile uranium-238, and that because they were chemically identical this could only be accomplished through physical means that relied on the small (three neutron) mass difference between the atoms. Isotopic separation had been undertaken for other elements (for example, the separation of the hydrogen isotope deuterium from the bulk of natural water), but never on a scale of the sort contemplated for the separation of uranium. 16

Several methods were proposed and explored at small scales at various research sites in the United States. The preferred candidates by the end of the first year of the Manhattan Project (1942) were:

Electromagnetic separation, in which powerful magnetic fields were used to create looping streams of uranium ions that would slightly concentrate the lighter isotope at the fringes. This work was related to the cyclotron concept pioneered by Ernest Lawrence at the University of California, and the bulk of the research took place at his Radiation Laboratory.

Gaseous diffusion, in which a gaseous form of uranium was forced through a porous barrier consisting of extremely fine passageways. The gas molecules containing the lighter isotope would navigate the barrier slightly faster than the gas molecules containing the heavier isotope, although the effect would have to be magnified through many stages before it resulted in significant separation. This work was originally explored primarily at Columbia University under the guidance of Harold Urey and others.

Thermal diffusion, in which extreme heat and cold were applied to opposite sides of a long column of uranium gas, which also resulted in slight separation, with the lighter uranium isotope concentrating at one end. This was initially investigated by Philip Abelson at the Naval Research Laboratory.

Centrifugal enrichment, in which the rapid spinning of a uranium gas allowed for the slight concentration of the lighter element at the center of the whirling mixture, a process that would also require a large number of “stages” to be successful. This was pursued by physicist Jesse W. Beams at the University of Virginia and at the Standard Oil Development Company in New Jersey. 17

Over the course of 1943, centrifugal enrichment proved less promising than the other methods, and by 1944 the method was essentially abandoned (though it would, in the postwar period, be perfected by German and Austrian scientists working in the Soviet Union). Because it was unclear which of the other techniques would be most successful at scale, both the electromagnetic and gaseous diffusion methods were pursued with great gusto, and arguably constituted the most substantial portion of the Manhattan Project. The construction and operation of the two massive facilities required for these methods (the Y-12 facility for the electromagnetic method, and K-25 facility for the gaseous diffusion method) alone made up 52% of the cost of the overall project, and all of the Oak Ridge facilities together totaled 63% of the entire project cost. While thermal diffusion was initially imagined as a competitor process, difficulties in achieving the desired level of enrichment led to all three methods being “chained” together as a sequence: the raw uranium would be enriched from the natural level of 0.72% uranium-235 to 0.86% at the thermal diffusion plant, and its output would then be enriched to 23% at the gaseous diffusion plant, and then finally enriched to an average level of 84% at the electromagnetic plants. 18

The plants for the production of enriched uranium were constructed in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, an isolated site that was chosen primarily for its proximity to the large electrical resources provided by the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Oak Ridge site (Site X) employed over 45,000 people for construction at its peak, and had a similar number of employees on the payroll for managing its continued operations once built. A “secret city,” the facility relied on heavy compartmentalization (“need to know”) so that practically none of its thousands of employees had any real knowledge of what they were producing. Every aspect of life in Oak Ridge was controlled by contractors and the military, in the aim of producing weapons-grade material in maximum haste and with a minimum of security breaches. Situated in the Jim Crow South, the facility was entirely segregated by law, and living conditions between African-Americans and whites varied dramatically. Various industrial contractors managed the different plants (for example, the Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation operated K-25, and the Tennessee Eastman Corporation operated Y-12). 19

In the process of researching the possibility of nuclear fission, another road to a bomb had made itself clear. Nuclear reactors had been contemplated as early as nuclear weapons. Where a nuclear weapon requires high concentrations of fissile material to function, a reactor does not: a controlled nuclear reaction (as opposed to an explosive one) can be developed through natural or slightly-enriched uranium through the use of a substance called a “moderator,” which slows the neutrons released from fission reactions. Under the right conditions, this allows a chain reaction to proceed even in unenriched material, and the reaction is considerably slower, and much more controllable, than the kind of reaction that occurs inside of a bomb.

Nuclear reactors had been explored as possible energy sources, though engineering difficulties would make this use of them more difficult than was anticipated (the first nuclear reactors for power purposes in the United States did not go critical until 1958). More importantly for the wartime planners, it was realized that the plentiful uranium-238 isotope, while not fissile, could still be quite useful. When uranium-238 absorbs a neutron, it does not undergo fission, but instead transmutes into uranium-239. Uranium-239, however, is unstable, and through a series of nuclear decays becomes, in the span of a few days, the artificial element plutonium-239. Isolated for the first time in February 1941, plutonium was calculated and confirmed to have very favorable nuclear properties (it is even more reactive than uranium-235, and thus even less of it is necessary for a chain reaction). 20

The first controlled nuclear reaction was achieved in December 1942 at the University of Chicago, by a team led by Enrico Fermi. The first reactor, Chicago Pile-1, used purified graphite as its moderator and 47 tons of natural (unenriched) uranium in the form of metal ingots. Even while the pilot Chicago Pile-1 reactor was still being constructed, plans were being made for the creation of considerably larger, industrial-sized nuclear reactors at a remote site in Hanford, Washington, constructed and operated by E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co. (DuPont). The Hanford site (Site W) was chosen largely for its proximity to the Columbia River, whose water would be used for cooling purposes. On dusty land near the river, three large graphite-moderated reactors were constructed starting in 1943, with the first reactor going critical in September 1944. A massive chemical facility known as a “canyon” was constructed nearby, by which, largely through automation and remote control, the irradiated fuel of the reactors was chemically stripped of its plutonium. This process involved dangerously radioactive materials, chemically noxious substances (powerful acids), and was fairly inefficient (every ton of uranium fuel that was processed yielded 225 grams of plutonium). 21

The labor conditions at Hanford varied considerably from Oak Ridge. Where Oak Ridge was imagined as a cohesive community, Hanford was not, and employed an abundance of cheap labor in far inferior work conditions (and those at Oak Ridge were not so great to begin with). The radioactive and chemical wastes at the site were treated in an expedient, temporary fashion, with the idea that in the less-hurried future they would be more properly eliminated. Subsequent administrations continued this approach for decades. Hanford became regarded as the most radioactively contaminated site in the United States, and since the end of the Cold War has been involved in expensive cleanup and remediation efforts. The Hanford project constituted about 21% of the total cost of the Manhattan Project. 22

The work of these two sites — Oak Ridge and Hanford — constituted the vast bulk of the labor and expense of the Manhattan Project (roughly 80% of both). Without fuel, there could be no atomic bomb: it was and remains a key chokepoint in the development of nuclear weapons. As a result, it is important to conceptualize the Manhattan Project as much more than just basic science alone: without an all-out military-industrial effort, the United States would not have had an atomic bomb by the end of World War II.

The head of the Manhattan Project’s entire operation was Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves, a West-Point trained engineer who had previously been instrumental in the construction of the Pentagon building. Groves had accepted the assignment reluctantly, liking neither the risk of failure nor the fact that it was a home-front assignment. But once he accepted the job, he was determined to see it through to success. His unrelenting drive resulted in the Manhattan Project being given the top level of priority of all wartime projects in the United States, which allowed him nearly unfettered access to the resources and labor necessary to build a new atomic empire. Groves amplified the degree of secrecy surrounding the project through his application of compartmentalization (which he considered “the very heart of security”), and his own autonomous domestic and even foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, making the Manhattan Project a virtual government agency of its own. (Despite these precautions, the project was, it later was discovered, compromised to the Soviet Union by several well-placed spies.) While it is uncharacteristic to associate the success or failure of massive projects with single individuals, it has been plausibly argued that Groves was perhaps the most “indispensable” individual to the project’s success, and that his willingness to accelerate and amplify the work being done in the face of setbacks, and to bully his way through military and civilian resistance, was essential to the project achieving its results when it did. 23

Though the scientific research on the project was initially dispersed among several American universities, as the work moved further into the production phase civilian and military advisors to the project concurred that the most sensitive research work, specifically that on the design of the bomb itself, should be located somewhere more secure than a university campus in a major city. Bush, Conant, and Arthur Compton had all come to the conclusion that a separate, isolated laboratory should be created for this final phase of the work. In late 1942, Groves identified Berkeley theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer as his preferred candidate for leading the as-yet-created laboratory, and on Oppenheimer’s recommendation identified a remote boys’ school in Los Alamos, New Mexico, as the location for the work. Initially imagined to be fairly small, the Los Alamos laboratory (Site Y) soon became a sprawling operation that took on a wide variety of research projects in the service of developing the atomic bomb, ending the war with over 2,500 people working at the site. 24

Though the work of the bomb was even at the time most associated with physicists, it is worth noting that at Los Alamos, there were roughly equal numbers of physicists, chemists, metallurgists, and engineers. The physics-centric narrative, promulgated in part by the physicists themselves after the war (in part because the physics of the atomic bomb was easier to declassify than other aspects), obscures the multidisciplinary research work that was required to turn table-top laboratory science into a working weapon. 25

It is not exceptionally hyperbolic to say that the Los Alamos laboratory brought together the greatest concentration of scientific luminaries working on a single project that the world had ever seen. It was also highly international in its composition, with a significant number of the top-tier scientists having been refugees from war-torn Europe. This included a significant British delegation of scientists, part of an Anglo-American alliance negotiated by Winston Churchill and Roosevelt. For the scientists who went to the laboratory, especially the junior scientists who were able to work and mingle with their heroes, the endeavor took on the air of a focused and intensive scientific summer camp, and the numerous memoirs about the period at times underemphasize that the goal was to produce weapons of mass destruction for military purposes. 26

Los Alamos grew because the difficulty and scope of the work grew. Notably a key setback motivated a massive reorganization of the laboratory in the summer of 1944, when it was found that plutonium produced by nuclear reactors (as opposed to the small samples of plutonium that had been produced in particle accelerators) could not be easily used in a weapon. The original plan for an atomic bomb design was relatively simple: two pieces of fissile material would be brought together rapidly as a “critical mass” (the amount of material necessary to sustain an uncontrolled chain reaction) by simply shooting one piece into the other through a gun barrel using conventional explosives. This “gun-type” design still involved significant engineering considerations, but compared to the rest of the difficulties of the project it was considered relatively straightforward. 27

The first reactor-bred samples of plutonium, however, led to the realization that the new element could not be used in such a configuration. The presence of a contaminating isotope (plutonium-240) increased the background neutron rate of reactor-bred plutonium to levels that would pre-detonate the weapon were two pieces of material to be shot together, leading to a significantly reduced explosion (designated a “fizzle”). Only a much faster method of achieving a critical mass could be used. A promising, though ambitious, method had been previously proposed, known as “implosion.” This required the creation of specialized “lenses” of high explosives, arranged as a sphere around a subcritical ball of plutonium, that upon simultaneous detonation would symmetrically squeeze the fuel to over twice its original density. If executed correctly, this increase in density would mean that the plutonium in question would have achieved a critical mass and also explode. But the degree of simultaneity necessary to compress a bare sphere of metal symmetrically is incredibly high, a form of explosives engineering that had scarcely any precedent. Oppenheimer reorganized Los Alamos around the implosion problem, in a desperate attempt to render the plutonium method a worthwhile investment. Modeling the compressive forces, much less achieving them (and the levels of electrical simultaneity necessary) required yet another massive multidisciplinary effort. 28

As of summer 1944, there were two designs considered feasible: the “gun-type” bomb which relied upon enriched uranium from Oak Ridge, and the “implosion” bomb which relied upon separated plutonium from Hanford. The manufacture of the factories that produced this fuel required raw materials, equipment, and logistics from many dozens of sites, and together with the facilities that were involved with producing the other components of the bomb, there were several hundred discrete locations involved in the Manhattan Project itself, differing dramatically in size, location, and character. To choose a few interesting examples: a former playhouse in Dayton, Ohio, was converted into the site for the production of the highly-radioactive and highly-toxic substance polonium, which was to be used as a neutron source in the bombs, without any knowledge of the residents who lived around it; most of the uranium for the project was procured from the Congo; and a major reactor research site was created in Quebec, Canada, as part of the British contribution to the work. 29

The uncertainties involved in the implosion design meant that the scientists were not confident that it would work and, if it did work, how efficient, and thus explosive, it would be. A full-scale test of the implosion design was decided upon, at a remote site at the White Sands Proving Ground, 60 miles from Alamogordo, New Mexico. On July 16, 1945, the test, dubbed “Trinity” by Oppenheimer, was even more successful than expected, exploding with the violence of 20,000 tons of TNT equivalent (20 kilotons, in the new standard of explosive power developed by the project participants). 30 (They had considerably more confidence in the gun-type bomb, and in any case, lacked enough enriched uranium to contemplate a test of it.)

Along with the work of the creation of the key materials for the bombs and the weapons designs themselves, additional thought was put into the question of “delivery,” the effort that would be required to detonate the bomb over a target. This aspect of the project, more a concern of engineering than science per se, was itself nontrivial: the atomic bombs were exceptionally heavy by the standards of the time, and the implosion bomb in particular had an ungainly egg-like shape. The “Silverplate” program created modified versions of the B-29 Superfortress long-range heavy bombers (most of their armaments and all of their armor were removed so that they could fly higher and faster with the heavy bombs), while Project Alberta, headquartered at Wendover Army Air Field in Utah, developed the ballistic cases of the weapons while training crews in the practice of delivering such weapons with relative accuracy. 31

The use of the bombs and the legacy of the project

All of the above has been told with a minimum of attention to the ultimate questions of the Manhattan Project: whether and how to use the bombs. Indeed, from late 1944 through mid-1945, as the notion of the atomic bomb moved from the possible to the real, a large amount of policy and military planning began to go into effect. Notably, this project that had been ostensibly created to counter the threat of a German atomic bomb shifted almost imperceptibly into one dedicated to the first use of such a weapon onto Japan. By the time that serious planning for use of the weapon was beginning, in late 1944, Manhattan Project officials were more or less convinced that Germany was no longer a possible target, and posed no atomic threat.

Two committees were particularly important. The first was the Interim Committee, created by the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, at the request of Bush and Conant in late 1944. This committee was ostensibly concerned with matters affecting the “interim” period that would exist between the use of the bombs as a weapon (or some other revelation of their existence to the world) and the creation of permanent peacetime authorities (both domestic and international) for the future control of nuclear weapons. This “interim” remit however proved extremely expansive, covering everything from the consideration of the use of the bombs in war (because that would presumably affect what came afterwards) to the preparation of press releases and plans for both domestic legislation and for the introduction of proposals to the nascent United Nations for the international regulation of nuclear technology. A Scientific Panel composed of Oppenheimer, Compton, Fermi, and Lawrence were consulted on several topics, including the postwar priorities for new nuclear research, as well as the question (sparked by a committee of scientists at the University of Chicago headed by physicist James Franck) of whether the United States would be better served by first demonstrating their new weapon in a non-violent way to Japan, rather than by using it militarily (the Scientific Panel ruled against the demonstration idea). 32

The second committee, the Target Committee, consisted of military and scientific representatives who met three times in the spring of 1945 to make the final recommendations as to exactly how the weapons ought to be used. While the initial idea of the atomic bomb was flexible enough to imagine a variety of uses (for example, against a naval base such as Japan’s Harbor of Truk), the weapon as developed, through a multitude of small and seemingly inconsequential technical decisions, was one whose idealized use could only really be against a large urban target — a city. The scientists on the Target Committee, including Oppenheimer, were themselves enthusiastic about the possibility, and agreed that the weapon could not be effectively used against a small or purely military target. In the meeting notes, it is evident that they regarded the destruction of a large urban area containing at least one “military” (their scare quotes) facility to be the real marker of success for the weapon, apt to produce an awed and terrified reaction not only among the Japanese, but the rest of the world. The Target Committee recommended that the cities of Kyoto, Yokohama, Hiroshima, and Kokura be considered as possible targets (the final target list of Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki was not agreed upon until late summer). 33 (No systematic consideration was made of using the weapon in the European theatre of the war, because it was clear that the war in Germany would be over by the time the bombs were ready for use. 34 )

Between these two committees, one can see both that the planning involved in the “use of the bombs” was much more than the short-term, and that several key scientists were themselves involved in some of these determinations. Bush, Conant, and Oppenheimer are in particular marked by their concern with the question of the postwar situation: all foresaw a world in which secret nuclear arms races would abound, and in which new weapons (like the hydrogen bomb and the ballistic missile) would greatly multiply the power of the weapons and their threat. Stimson was particularly convinced by such overtures, regarding the bomb as not merely a new weapon, but “as a new relationship of man to the universe,” as he opined at one Interim Committee meeting. These particular, well-connected historical actors addressed this fear with a hope for future international control of atomic energy, and believed that the best means of effecting this was to make the first use of the bomb particularly horrific, a wake-up call to the rest of the world. 35

One should not get the impression, however, that scientific perspectives were in general consulted on such policy matters. At Los Alamos, Oppenheimer worked to explicitly discourage discussions of long-term policy or even the question of the use of bombs, arguing that such matters were for political authorities to decide and not the scientific participants. (That he himself felt free to violate this notion repeatedly was, after the war, noted by several of his critics.) The high-intensity work at Los Alamos in the spring and summer of 1945 very nearly precluded such discussions in any event.

Other scientists, particularly Franck and colleagues at the University of Chicago, organized several committees for the discussion of “postwar problems,” as they put it, including the continued application of secrecy after the war (they were against it), and the need for funding postwar peaceful nuclear research (they were for it). One of these committees, on “Political and Social Problems,” penned a carefully-argued plea against the first use of the atomic bomb against a city. The Franck Report, as it was called, was considered by the Interim Committee, but opposed by Oppenheimer and several other high-ranking scientists who were consulted on the matter.

Leo Szilard, who had initially proposed the nuclear fission chain reaction and was involved in the creation of the first reactors, attempted in vain to raise substantive policy questions and was actively inhibited by the military chain of command. In short, the scientists who were in positions of influence lobbied strongly along lines that were acceptable to the military and political authorities, and the handful of others who were motivated to influence authorities in a different direction were deliberately blocked. 36

News of the successful results of the “Trinity” test was conveyed to Secretary of War Stimson and President Truman, both attending the Potsdam Conference, immediately after its detonation. By late July 1945, a strike order was drafted (by Groves) and approved (by Stimson) which specified that the “first special bomb” could be dropped “after about 3 August 1945” on one of the four approved targets. Another clause specified that, “additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff.” The weapon components were shipped to the island of Tinian in the South Pacific, along with a team of scientists and engineers who were necessary to assemble them. The 20th Air Force, led by Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay, the architect of the firebombing campaign against Japan, aided in the logistics of “delivering” the weapons. 37

Weather conditions delayed the dropping of the first bomb, the gun-type weapon code-named “Little Boy,” over the city of Hiroshima until August 6, 1945. The mission was a success by the standards of the project: the city was completely disabled and about half of its occupants were killed, around 90% of them civilians. A coordinated “publicity” campaign was immediately launched by Manhattan Project officials to inform the world about the new weapon, including a Presidential press release and numerous newspaper stories written by a New York Times science journalist, William L. Laurence, who was “embedded” in (or co-opted by) the project. With no immediate response from the Japanese (they were, it was later discovered, verifying the truth of said statements, which was a difficult thing to do given the disruption of infrastructure caused by the bombing), and weather conditions increasingly unfavorable, the date of the second bombing attack was moved up by the forces on Tinian to August 9, 1945. This effort, using the implosion weapon code-named “Fat Man,” was more problematic: numerous errors and mishaps characterized the bombing run, with the bomb being detonated somewhat off-target on the secondary target city, Nagasaki. On August 10, 1945, Groves reported to his superiors that a third bomb would be ready for use by August 17, which resulted in the immediate order by Truman to halt further bombing until explicit Presidential authorization was given. Japan attempted to surrender with a condition (preservation of the Emperor) on August 10, which was rejected by the United States. After continued conventional bombing and a failed coup attempt, Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 14. The exact cause of surrender remains controversial: another “shocking” event, from the perspective of the Japanese high command, took place in that time period, namely the declaration of war against Japan by the previously-neutral Soviet Union, and the overwhelming Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Historians have long debated whether the atomic bombings, the Soviet invasion, or some combination of the two were responsible for the final decision to surrender, but in the Anglo-American sphere it has been common since 1945 to attribute it almost exclusively to the atomic bomb attacks, in part as an explicit justification of said attacks. 38

There have been many historical interpretations and arguments, both scholarly and popular, regarding the political decisions behind the use of the atomic bombs. Briefly, the crafters of the “orthodox” interpretation argued that the bombs were dropped exclusively to end the war as soon as possible, and were the product of a rational, deliberative process that took into account a delicate moral calculus, and had, on balance, a positive effect. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this interpretation was created very deliberately by a small group of Americans directly involved in the high-level atomic policymaking — Conant, Compton, Groves, Stimson, and Truman, among others — and was mobilized only in late 1946, when criticisms of the bombings were beginning to mount. The most important American critics from the time of the necessity of the bombings were, interestingly, high-ranking members of the US military, who felt their accomplishments were being overshadowed by a technological marvel. The various alternative (“revisionist”) positions have argued that the bombs were dropped to satisfy geopolitical concerns (e.g., to “scare Russia”), were unnecessary (e.g., the Japanese were “on the verge of surrender”), or were inhumane to the point of being war crimes (e.g., the deliberate massacre of tens of thousands of non-combatants). These debates have continued in various forms, and with various degrees of vehemence, over the decades, with a peak around the 50th anniversary of the bombings (1995), symbolized by the controversy over the Smithsonian Museum exhibit of the Enola Gay , the B-29 which dropped the bomb over Hiroshima. Both versions of the story have evidence in their favor, though both also have a tendency to “over-rationalize” a process that was in many ways quite haphazard. In general, historians of science and technology have tended to downplay the importance of high-level political deliberation, and instead emphasize the momentum that the project developed and the inordinate amount of resources consumed as it moved towards completion, making the use of the weapons almost inevitable. 39

The Manhattan Engineer District continued to exist, as an organizational entity, into the immediate postwar period. Despite the wartime attempts to streamline the question of transition into peacetime, there were significant delays. Some of these were inherent to the questions of broader nuclear policy: what should the peacetime footing of the new nuclear industry be? Should the United States proceed on a program to create more atomic bombs, and should it pursue greater innovation in their designs, or should it be angling for a world where atomic weapon development was intentionally limited through international agreements? Other delays, notably over legislation governing the domestic regulation and control of nuclear technology, were encouraged by former project scientists: a “Scientists’ Movement” formed specifically to derail the legislation proposed by the military which would, in the scientists’ eyes, maintain an undue degree of military control over atomic energy research and production. Organizations of scientists, such as the Federation of Atomic Scientists (later renamed Federation of American Scientists), composed largely of Manhattan Project veterans, engaged in lobbying Congress and the American people in favor of policies they considered crucial to avoiding a future arms race and future nuclear weapons use. Their policies were boiled down to a simple marketing mantra: “No secret, no defense, international control.” In short, an American monopoly on the atomic bomb could not be kept indefinitely in a world with arms races, no technology was likely to emerge that would render the threat of nuclear weapons impotent, and the only solution was an international treaty controlling the spread of the weapons.

The Scientists’ Movement had its one major success in pushing for the McMahon Bill, which in its initial form more closely followed their positions (but in its final form as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 undermined many of them). The Act established a wholly civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), in deliberate contrast to the military-run wartime operation. The AEC would take over all Manhattan Project operations starting in January of 1947, officially ending the Project. 40

The scientists involved in the Manhattan Project had mixed feelings about the legacy of their work. They had, in their eyes, opened up entirely new questions about the role of science in society. Even during the war, scientists at Los Alamos began to contemplate scenarios that would have previously been almost unthinkable: the ability, through the application of basic scientific discoveries, for civilization to render itself extinct. The Super, or hydrogen bomb, which had been envisioned as a possibility as early as 1941, put this in the starkest terms. At the end of the war, Los Alamos scientists calculated that while it might take the detonation of 10,000-100,000 implosion-style weapons “to bring the radioactive content of the Earth’s atmosphere to a dangerously high level,” it might require only “10 to 100 Supers” to do the same. When both the hydrogen bomb and the general question of proliferation became hot topics of debate only a few years after the war, the high level of engagement by scientists in questions of policy was seen by many as an explicit referendum on their seeming lack of concern when designing and making the first atomic bombs. The ethical questions of the “social responsibility of scientists” raised by the Manhattan Project—as well as the groundwork laid for close integration of universities and corporations in developing science useful for military applications—would resonate throughout the Cold War. 41

The Manhattan Project remains one of the prototypical examples of a massive and resource-intensive scientific-industrial-military-governmental collaboration that produced world-shattering results in an unusually short amount of time (the production phase of the project ran only 2.5 years, which is still the record for any national nuclear weapons program). As a result, there have been many invocations of the Manhattan Project as a symbol of technoscientific success: there are frequently calls for “Manhattan Projects” for things as diverse as solar power, cybersecurity, and cancer. But invoking the Manhattan Project as a symbol of intensive resource investment ignores many important factors, notably its decidedly undemocratic nature, its extensive use of militarized secrecy, its vast budget overruns, and the deep, difficult questions raised in its wake about whether it had resulted in a better or worse world.

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In particular, a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed by Albert Einstein and warning of potential German development of atomic bombs has been central to the official histories, to the point of distorting both the letter’s contents (which do not argue for building, much less using, an atomic bomb) and its impact (it was less directly important to the making of the bomb than is often implied). To put the reasons for its prominence simply, if Einstein was in favor of something, who would dare oppose it? That Einstein was deliberately excluded from the Manhattan Project as a security risk makes for a somewhat bitter irony. See Jerome, The Einstein File . ↩

For examples of a physics-driven narrative, see Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb ; De Groot, The Bomb ; Badash, Scientists and the Development of Nuclear Weapons ; Kevles, The Physicists ; and Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes . See also Kragh, Quantum Generations , esp. ch. 18. ↩

E.g., Hughes, American Genesis , ch. 5; Hounshell, Science and Corporate Strategy , ch. 16; Reed, The History and Science of the Manhattan Project ; Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission ; Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear ; Campos, Radium and the Secret of Life . ↩

The recently-declassified Manhattan District History is the source of immensely useful details on the operation of the project; see Wellerstein, “General Groves’ Secret History” for contextual notes and copies of the files. Personnel figures come from Manhattan District History , Book 1, Volume 8 (“Personnel”), notably figures in Appendix A (charts 1, 1.1, and 6). The figures for 1943 were cited by a skeptical James Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization, in an attempt to learn more about the project: James Byrnes to Henry Stimson (11 September 1943), Harrison-Bundy File, Roll 1, Target 8, Folder 8, “Manhattan (District) Project.” On the electrical supply, see Reed, The History and Science of the Manhattan Project , 203; on patents, see Wellerstein, “Patenting the Bomb,” 78-79; on secrecy, see Wellerstein, “Knowledge and the Bomb.” ↩

On the influence of science fiction imagery for early advocates of the effort, notably the work of H.G. Wells, which influenced both scientists and politicians, see Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb ; Farmelo, Churchill’s Bomb and Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear . ↩

Goldberg, “General Groves”; Groves, Now It Can Be Told . ↩

Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb ; Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission ; Weart, “Scientists with a Secret”; Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear ; Kragh, Quantum Generations . ↩

Walker, German National Socialism; Walker, Nazi Science ; Weart, “Scientists with a Secret”; Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb ; Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy ; Farmelo, Churchill’s Bomb . ↩

Manhattan District History , Book 1, Volume 5 (“Fiscal Procedures”), Appendix B, table 3. ↩

Walker, German National Socialism , esp. ch. 2. ↩

Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission ; Goldberg, “Inventing a Climate.” ↩

Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb ; Farmelo, Churchill’s Bomb . ↩

Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission ; Reed, The History and Science of the Manhattan Project . ↩

Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission ; Reed, The History and Science of the Manhattan Project . On the creation of the Manhattan Engineer District, see Jones, Manhattan , and Norris, Racing for the Bomb . The project had several code-names in the early days, including the Development of Substitute Materials, but in the end the blandness of the geographic nomenclature was appealing from a security standpoint. ↩

Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission ; Reed, The History and Science of the Atomic Bomb . ↩

Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan Project . ↩

On the various methods, see Jones, Manhattan , chs. 6-8. ↩

On centrifuges, see Kemp, “The End of Manhattan.” On the other enrichment, see Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan Project , ch. 5. For cost breakdowns of specific programs (here and elsewhere), see Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission , Appendix 2. ↩

Jones, Manhattan , chs. 6-8; Kiernan, The Girls of Atomic City . ↩

Jones, Manhattan , ch. 9. Reed, The History and Science of the Manhattan Project also contains an excellent overview of the technical processes, and Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan Project goes into even more depth. Personnel figures come from Manhattan District History , Book 1, Volume 8 (“Personnel”), notably figures in Appendix A (charts 1, 1.1, and 6). ↩

The 225-gram figure comes from Hanford Site History of Operations, 1 January 1944-20 March 1945, Book 4, Nuclear Testing Archive, Las Vegas, Nevada, document NV0716547. The Nuclear Testing Archive, available through the Department of Energy’s OpenNet website, is an immensely useful collection of records related to the American wartime and Cold War nuclear program. ↩

Findlay and Hevly 2011; Brown, Plutopia . ↩

Norris, Racing for the Bomb ; quoted in Groves, Now It Can Be Told , 140. ↩

Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus ; Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb ; Thorpe, Oppenheimer ; data on staff at Los Alamos comes from Hawkins et al., Project Y , 484. ↩

Hoddeson et al., Critical Assembly ; Schwartz, “The Making of the History of the Atomic Bomb”; Galison, Image and Logic , ch. 4; on the distribution of scientists by discipline, see the division graph in Hawkins et al., Project Y , 487. ↩

Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission . Of the memoirs, none demonstrates this disconnect in tone more than Feynman, “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feyman!” ↩

Hoddeson et al., Critical Assembly , chs. 7 and 13. ↩

Hoddeson et al., Critical Assembly , chs. 7 and 13; see also Reed, The History and Science of the Manhattan Project and Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan Project . ↩

Manhattan District History covers most of this far-flung work. On American efforts to acquire uranium during the war, see Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores . Total uranium comes from Manhattan District History , Book 5, Volume 6 (“Electromagnetic Project – Operations”), Top Secret Appendix; plutonium data comes from Garner, “49 Interim Processing Program No. 24.” ↩

Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice . ↩

Gordin, Five Days in August ; Coster-Mullen, Atom Bombs . Coster-Mullen’s book, though self-published (and constantly being updated), contains a wealth of primary sources, notes, and detailed information about the construction and deployment of the first atomic bombs. ↩

Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission , chs. 10-11; Sherwin, A World Destroyed ; Smith, A Peril and a Hope . ↩

Malloy, “’The Rules of Civilized Warfare.’” ↩

According to Groves’ later recollection, Roosevelt expressed some interest in using the weapon against Germany in December 1944. However, no weapons were yet available. See Norris, Racing for the Bomb , 334. ↩

Sherwin, A World Destroyed, with Stimson’s quote on 296. ↩

Smith, A Peril and a Hope ; Badash, Scientists and the Development of Nuclear Weapons ; Norris, Racing for the Bomb . ↩

Gordin, Five Days in August ; Coster-Mullen, Atom Bombs ; Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy . ↩

Coster-Mullen, Atom Bombs ; Wellerstein, “Knowledge and the Bomb”; Gordin, Five Days in August ; Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear ; Walker, “Recent Literature”; Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy . ↩

Walker, “Recent Literature”; Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction ; Nobile, Judgment at the Smithsonian ; Kohn, “History and the Culture Wars.” For those who emphasize the “momentum” of the project, see Goldberg, “General Groves”; Gordin, Five Days in August ; and Malloy, “’The Rules of Civilized Warfare.’” ↩

Bernstein, “The Quest for Security”; Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission ; Smith, A Peril and a Hope ; Barnhart, “To Secure the Benefits of Science." ↩

Manhattan District History , Book 8, Volume 2 (“Los Alamos–Technical”), XIII-10. On the H-bomb, see Galison and Bernstein, “In Any Light.” On later work and controversies, see, e.g., Leslie, The Cold War and American Science . ↩

Alex Wellerstein, "Manhattan Project," Encyclopedia of the History of Science (October 2019), accessed 27 June 2024. https://doi.org/10.34758/9aaa-ne35 .

Citation Information and Article Archives

The Manhattan Project

Written by: edward g. lengel, the national world war ii museum, by the end of this section, you will:.

• Explain the causes and effects of the victory of the United States and its allies over the Axis Powers

Suggested Sequencing

Use this narrative with the Dropping the Atomic Bomb Decision Point and the Was the Use of the Atomic Bomb Justified? DBQ Lesson to show the development of the United States’ nuclear program and subsequent use in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

Fundamental discoveries about the nature of the atom took place during the most war-torn century in human history. By the 1920s and 1930s, scientists were intensively studying the military ramifications of atomic power. In 1938, German chemist Otto Hahn scored a breakthrough by not only splitting the uranium atom but also discovering the immense explosive potential of the process. He and other German scientists immediately moved on to focus their research on creating an atomic bomb for the Nazi state.

Scientists in other nations quickly became aware of the German work in this field and initiated atomic programs of their own. Nuclear research in Britain, led by German scientists who had fled the Nazi regime, surged ahead with the discovery that it would be possible to build a bomb with only small quantities of the rare isotope uranium-235. Lacking this knowledge, and assuming it would take many years to acquire the supplies necessary to build a bomb, German scientists had slowed their work by the early 1940s. But other scientists did not know this. On August 2, 1939, famed scientist Albert Einstein wrote to President Franklin Roosevelt urging him to accelerate his country’s atomic program to ensure that the Germans did not develop the bomb first.

An alarmed Roosevelt responded energetically, especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the American entry into World War II in Europe and Asia. Led by his scientific advisors to believe that, with great effort, an atomic weapon could be developed by 1944, on June 17, 1942, the president initiated the atomic program that came to be called the Manhattan Project. Unlike the Germans, who assumed they would win the war quickly and that continuing their atomic program was thus not worth the trouble, the Americans and British anticipated a long conflict and so were deeply committed to their projects. They shared information with each other along the way, but not with the Soviet Union. Soviet espionage nevertheless monitored the Anglo-American programs with a degree of success that was not known until many years later.

The Manhattan Project, named after a supervisory district of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Manhattan, New York, oversaw the U.S. atomic program. It was headed by General Leslie R. Groves and carried out its work at facilities in Illinois, Tennessee, Washington state, and New Mexico ([link]Figure_12_03_ManProjMap[/link]). Progress was rapid, thanks not just to scientific work but to America’s vast industrial capacity. In December 1942, scientists Enrico Fermi and Arthur Compton created the first-ever uranium chain reaction in the basement of the University of Chicago’s football stadium. In a facility built the following year on a mesa at Los Alamos, New Mexico, meanwhile, scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer and his team worked to create the first atomic bomb.

(a) Enrico Fermi, one of the Manhattan Project scientists, created the first nuclear reactor, the Chicago Pile-1. (b) Important sites associated with the Manhattan Project were scattered across the country.

The expenses of the top-secret Manhattan Project were concealed from Congress, subsumed in appropriations for the War Department. By the time the war ended, they totaled approximately $2 billion, dwarfing every other wartime military project except the creation of the B-29 Superfortress bomber. Roosevelt ensured that his atomic scientists were never short of funds, however, knowing that if the project succeeded, no one would question the cost.

The first bomb was nearly complete at the time of President Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945. New president Harry S. Truman ordered the program to move forward despite Germany’s impending surrender, with a view toward possibly using the weapon against Japan. While the interim committee Truman created considered the military, political, and moral advisability of using the bomb, Oppenheimer’s team completed the first-ever atomic weapon and prepared it for testing.

The test, codenamed “Trinity,” took place on July 16, 1945, in the desert at Alamogordo, New Mexico, 200 miles south of Los Alamos. The device, mounted on a metal tower, consisted of just 13.5 pounds of plutonium encased in two-and-a-half tons of explosives. It exploded at 5:29 a.m. to devastating effect, equal to the detonation of almost 20,000 tons of TNT. Groves and Oppenheimer witnessed the atomic fireball expand into a mushroom cloud visible 60 miles away. Horrified by what he saw, Oppenheimer called to mind words from the Bhagavad Gita: “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.” But it was too late to turn back. The world had entered the nuclear age.

(a) In 1945, the mushroom cloud from the first atomic weapon test, “Trinity,” could be seen as far as 60 miles away. (b) J. Robert Oppenheimer and General Leslie Groves inspect the aftermath of the explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in July 1945.

On August 6, the Enola Gay , a B-29 Superfortress, dropped the uranium bomb nicknamed Little Boy, which exploded with the force of 12,500 tons of TNT 1,900 feet above the Japanese city of Hiroshima. With a blinding flash and rising mushroom cloud, the blast and resulting firestorm obliterated the city and destroyed 70,000 buildings. People were vaporized from the blast and their shadows imprinted on walls. An estimated 70,000 to 80,000 civilians and soldiers were immediately killed, and thousands later died of radiation poisoning and burns. Tormented survivors were disfigured with hanging skin and burns. President Truman sent public messages announcing the dropping of an atomic bomb and threatened more if Japan refused to surrender. Still, the Japanese government fought on.

On August 9, another B-29 bomber dropped a plutonium bomb called Fat Man on Nagasaki, with an even larger blast equivalent to 22,000 tons of TNT. Due to significant cloud cover this second bomb missed its target by a wide margin, somewhat limiting its destructive impact. Nevertheless, it killed at least 30,000 people and caused suffering for thousands of survivors. Over the next five days, conventional bombings of other major cities killed an additional 15,000 Japanese. Finally, on August 14, Japan surrendered and World War II ended.

The development of the atomic bomb and the ensuing arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with their allies, ushered in the nuclear age and imperiled all humanity. Although the only atomic bombs ever used were those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II, the Cold War led to the credible threat of their additional use and the fear of widespread destruction.

Review Questions

1. The costs associated with the Manhattan Project did not lead to protest primarily because

• Congress considered the costs to be justified
• President Roosevelt overruled any objections
• atomic bombs were inexpensive to build
• they were concealed from Congress

2. The atomic explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945

• failed to produce the desired results
• ended World War II
• proved the success of the Manhattan Project
• convinced President Truman the atomic bomb was too powerful to use

3. Development of the atomic bomb in the United States during the 1940s occurred

• at various locations throughout the United States
• primarily in Manhattan, New York
• exclusively under civilian leadership
• primarily using the research generated by American scientists

4. The American scientist who oversaw the Manhattan Project was

• Leslie Groves
• Robert Oppenheimer
• Enrico Fermi

5. The scientific advances behind the Manhattan Project primarily benefited from

• the work of émigré scientists from totalitarian regimes
• Anglo-American military cooperation
• American anticipation of a short military conflict
• exchange of nuclear scientific knowledge between the United States and the Soviet Union

Free Response Questions

• Analyze the factors that led the United States to build the first atomic bomb.
• Describe the organization of the Manhattan Project.

AP Practice Questions

“Sir: Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard . . . leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future. . . . I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations. . . . It may be possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium . . . This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs . . . A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might very well prove too heavy for transportation by air. . . . In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America.”

Albert Einstein, Letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, August 2, 1939

1. The sentiments expressed in the excerpt most directly led to the

• creation of the Manhattan Project
• implementation of the island-hopping strategy
• D-Day invasion
• defeat of Nazi Germany

2. Which group would most likely support the argument made in the excerpt?

• Critics of the military-industrial complex
• Opponents of the Treaty of Versailles
• Proponents of the Lend-Lease Act
• Isolationists such as the America First group

3. This excerpt was written in response to the

• federal programs created by the New Deal
• rise of fascism in Europe
• debates about the morality of using atomic weapons
• expansion of communist ideology in Southeast Asia

Primary Sources

Einstein, Albert. 1939 letter to President Roosevelt. http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/docsworldwar.pdf

“Trinity Test Eyewitnesses.” Atomic Heritage Foundation . https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/trinity-test-eyewitnesses

Suggested Resources

Bird, Kai, and Martin J. Sherwin. American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer . New York: Knopf, 2005.

Chambers, John Whiteclay, ed. The Oxford Companion to American Military History . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Conant, Jennet. 109 East Palace: Robert Oppenheimer and the Secret City of Los Alamos . New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005.

Kelly, Cynthia C., ed. Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in the Words of its Creators, Eyewitnesses, and Historians . New York: Black Dog & Leventhal, 2009.

Kunetka, James. The General and the Genius: Groves and Oppenheimer – The Unlikely Partnership that Built the Atom Bomb . New York: Regnery, 2015.

Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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51f. The Manhattan Project

Early in 1939, the world's scientific community discovered that German physicists had learned the secrets of splitting a uranium atom. Fears soon spread over the possibility of Nazi scientists utilizing that energy to produce a bomb capable of unspeakable destruction.

Scientists Albert Einstein , who fled Nazi persecution, and Enrico Fermi , who escaped Fascist Italy, were now living in the United States. They agreed that the President must be informed of the dangers of atomic technology in the hands of the Axis powers. Fermi traveled to Washington in March to express his concerns to government officials. But few shared his uneasiness.

Einstein penned a letter to President Roosevelt urging the development of an atomic research program later that year. Roosevelt saw neither the necessity nor the utility for such a project, but agreed to proceed slowly. In late 1941, the American effort to design and build an atomic bomb received its code name — the Manhattan Project .

At first the research was based at only a few universities — Columbia University, the University of Chicago and the University of California at Berkeley. A breakthrough occurred in December 1942 when Fermi led a group of physicists to produce the first controlled nuclear chain reaction under the grandstands of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago.

After this milestone, funds were allocated more freely, and the project advanced at breakneck speed. Nuclear facilities were built at Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Hanford, Washington. The main assembly plant was built at Los Alamos, New Mexico . Robert Oppenheimer was put in charge of putting the pieces together at Los Alamos. After the final bill was tallied, nearly $2 billion had been spent on research and development of the atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project employed over 120,000 Americans.

Secrecy was paramount. Neither the Germans nor the Japanese could learn of the project. Roosevelt and Churchill also agreed that Stalin would be kept in the dark. Consequently, there was no public awareness or debate. Keeping 120,000 people quiet would be impossible; therefore only a small privileged cadre of inner scientists and officials knew about the atomic bomb's development. In fact, Vice-President Truman had never heard of the Manhattan Project until he became President Truman.

Although the Axis powers remained unaware of the efforts at Los Alamos, American leaders later learned that a Soviet spy named Klaus Fuchs had penetrated the inner circle of scientists.

By the summer of 1945, Oppenheimer was ready to test the first bomb. On July 16, 1945, at Trinity Site near Alamogordo, New Mexico , scientists of the Manhattan Project readied themselves to watch the detonation of the world's first atomic bomb. The device was affixed to a 100-foot tower and discharged just before dawn. No one was properly prepared for the result.

A blinding flash visible for 200 miles lit up the morning sky. A mushroom cloud reached 40,000 feet, blowing out windows of civilian homes up to 100 miles away. When the cloud returned to earth it created a half-mile wide crater metamorphosing sand into glass. A bogus cover-up story was quickly released, explaining that a huge ammunition dump had just exploded in the desert. Soon word reached President Truman in Potsdam, Germany that the project was successful.

The world had entered the nuclear age.

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Manhattan Project summary

Uncover the purpose of the manhattan project.

Manhattan Project , (1942–45) U.S. government research project that produced the first atomic bomb . In 1939 U.S. scientists urged Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish a program to study the potential military use of fission, and $6,000 was appropriated. By 1942 the project was code-named Manhattan, after the site of Columbia University, where much of the early research was done. Research also was carried out at the University of California and at the University of Chicago, where scientist Enrico Fermi built the first nuclear reactor in 1942. In 1943 a laboratory to construct the bomb was established at Los Alamos, N.M., and staffed by scientists headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer . Production also was carried out at Oak Ridge, Tenn., and Hanford, Wash. Manhattan Project scientists detonated the first atomic bomb in a test near Alamogordo in southern New Mexico. By its end the project had cost some $2 billion and involved 125,000 people.

March 2, 2022

The Manhattan Project Shows Scientists’ Moral and Ethical Responsibilities

As more of physics research is funded by the military, it is important to learn the full history of our past

By George Iskander

Enrico Fermi consults with a colleague during a meeting at Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project. J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Project, and Richard Feynman, sit behind him.

Corbis via Getty Images

After the first-ever explosion of an atomic bomb on July 16, 1945 near Socorro, N.M., J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, recited a line from the Bhagavad Gita : “Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Less than a month later, a quarter of a million lives were lost to the technology created by the Manhattan Project: people vaporized, buildings torn to dust, survivors dying in agony weeks or months later. There’s the lesser-known fact that about 50,000 Koreans, prisoners of Imperial Japan, died in the attacks .

The human toll is hard to comprehend. To many Americans, the bombings were justified, a necessity for ending the war. As a physicist, I have to wonder: how could my predecessors have participated in something used for such violent ends? Did no one think about walking away?

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To answer that, it’s important to understand Oppenheimer and his colleagues. Oppenheimer has captivated the American imagination as the brilliant physicist who wrestled with the implications of his creation; in the same week that he helped top brass optimize the explosion of the bomb, he was heard muttering “ those poor little people ” on his morning walk. After the war, Oppenheimer sat with President Truman to talk about international control of nuclear weapons, telling him: “I feel I have blood on my hands.”

Oppenheimer would become an advocate for nuclear peace and oppose the construction of the hydrogen bomb, but not without consequence. He was publicly humiliated in a security hearing where a colleague testified against him and his security clearance was revoked.

History has rehabilitated Oppenheimer as a tragic moral actor, with director Christopher Nolan of Inception and Interstellar fame recently announcing the production of an Oppenheimer biopic. What astonishes me, however, is the obscurity into which Oppenheimer’s colleague Joseph Rotblat has been cast. A Polish physicist, Rotblat worked with the British Mission to the Manhattan Project. Despite his reservations, he believed that stopping Nazi Germany justified the work. In March 1944, however, he had dinner with General Leslie Groves, Jr., director of the project, who remarked that its objective was to subdue the Soviet Union. Disgusted, Rotblat departed the project a few months later and would spend his life working toward atomic nonproliferation. For this, Rotblat shared the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize.

“Science became identified with death and destruction,” Rotblat said in his Nobel lecture as he described the inception of the atomic age. The comparison with Oppenheimer’s famous line is stark: two men who both knew the danger of their work yet chose different paths . The world recognized Rotblat’s impact, but I find few people, physicists or not, have heard his name.

Why does this matter? Anybody who bothers to do the research can see for themselves whether using atom bombs were necessary for ending the war: intercepted Japanese wires indicated they were preparing to surrender; American intelligence showed that the Germans were not close to developing a nuclear bomb ; Truman’s Secretary of State admitted wanting to end the war with Japan before Stalin became involved. Many project scientists favored only a demonstrative use, such as an explosion over the Pacific, which would terrify without harming. But how many Americans, whose view of history is crafted by popular narratives to support U.S. policy decisions, know all this?

How we tell history changes how it is understood. The national project predicates itself on maintaining a specific, widely disseminated version of history. In turn, it shapes our understanding of ourselves. Our decisions of who to look up to and who to talk about have consequences for the way we place ourselves relative to our predecessors and contemporaries—and the decisions that we, in turn, make. 

It means a lot if we don’t talk about Rotblat and instead center Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer’s voice, early on, would have made an impact, Rotblat believed. Instead, Oppenheimer tried to live with the bomb. Conversely, Rotblat simply ended his work with the Manhattan Project once he realized what its true purpose was. If our research leads to technology that shapes international affairs, then its politics are commensurate with the science. Rotblat spoke to this point in his Nobel lecture by quoting Lord Zuckerman, another advocate for nuclear nonproliferation: “When it comes to nuclear weapons … [i]t is he, the technician, not the commander in the field, who is at the heart of the arms race.” 

The Manhattan Project demonstrates that physicists must wrestle with the tight bonds of our research with national security. As civilian funding in science shrinks, the incentive to pursue support from the military grows. In fiscal year 2021, the National Science Foundation received $8.5 billion in total—half the $17 billion that the Department of Defense (DoD) received just for science and technology research . The DoD often funds basic research, with the hope that someday it could be useful for the military. Improvements in atomic clocks, which undergird GPS, can improve navigation for weapons and targeting, for example. Understanding turbulence can help the Air Force improve aircraft efficiency. Plasma physics helps to build new, long-range weapons. Such connections muddy the waters. I think if most physicists were asked to build a weapon, they would object. But if the military meets you on your own terms, offering to fund your basic research, the decision is difficult. 

It is even more challenging for students. The DoD maintains the National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate (NDSEG) Fellowship, which has awarded over 4,000 fellowships. In the application, the DoD details the needs of different branches of the military and asks students to connect their skills with a particular military interest . With many benefits in tow, the NDSEG is considered one of the most prestigious graduate fellowships. The DoD also offers the SMART Scholarship, a full-ride scholarship open to undergraduate and graduate students, conditional on postgraduation employment with the DoD . As tuition soars and as the cost of living for graduate students rises, these morally complex career decisions are increasingly being made for, rather than by, young Americans.

Still, we must speak and act in accordance with our conscience. We must push science to advocate for peace. We can learn from Rotblat. He didn’t make the decision to leave the Manhattan Project lightly, not to mention that the United States presented him with a false dossier alleging that he left to leak information to the Soviets. The decisions we make today are not so grand or liable to run us in as much trouble. If we turn down a grant or seek alternative research funding, who will bat an eye?

Collective action has power, but it starts with the individual. Today, we resign ourselves to the state we find the world in. We tell ourselves that we mustwork within a world dominated by the military-industrial complex, rationalizing that this is how it is. What is stopping us from doing what we believe to be right? We can’t rest easy knowing, “This is wrong,” but doing nothing. Thoughts without commensurate action effect no material change. We must have the courage to reimagine history and our place in it. In doing so, we don’t have to feel resigned. We don’t have to see our place in the world as destroyers, but instead, as creators of a better one.

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How to find information about the Manhattan Project

The Department of Energy releases declassified Manhattan Project-related reports and documents on its  OpenNet  website. This searchable database includes bibliographical references to all documents declassified and made publicly available after October 1, 1994. Some documents can be viewed as full text. This website also provides a comprehensive Manhattan District History.

To start your research into Columbia's role in the Manhattan Project, read Laurence Lippsett's article "The race to make the bomb. The Manhattan Project: Columbia's wartime secret." The article appeared in Columbia College Today , Spring/Summer 1995, 18-21, 45. 

• The Manhattan Project: Columbia's wartime secret Lippsett, Laurence. "The race to make the bomb. The Manhattan Project: Columbia's wartime secret." Columbia College Today, Spring/Summer 1995, pp. 18-21, 45.
• Archival Collections
• Additional Sources

The following are the most often consulted resources available at the University Archives. Archival collections are  non-circulating  and  can only be viewed in the Rare Book & Manuscript Library's reading room  (RBML).  In order to use the University Archives collections at the RBML, y ou will be required to register your own Special Collections Research Account before your visit and to validate the account in person with government-issued photo identification or Columbia ID card. Once you have created your Special Collections Research Account , you will be able to request materials directly from the finding aid: click the check box located on the right for the box(es) you need, and then scroll back to the top of the container list document and click “Submit Request” button in the red-rimmed box at top. This should lead you directly to your Special Collections Research Account to complete the request form.

• Annual Reports The Annual Reports of the President and Treasurer to the Trustees offer a yearly "state of the University" from 1891 to 1946. You can find statements about Columbia's role in the 1945 Annual Report presented to the Trustees (starting on page 14).  
• Central Files, 1890-1984 Central Files contain the core administrative records of the University. The records that comprise Central Files originated in the Office of the President starting in 1890 and continue through the present. Central Files chiefly contains correspondence (sent and received) between Columbia University administrators and other University officers, faculty, trustees, and individuals and organizations from outside the University. Box 301, folder 1 contains the August 6 and 14, 1945 telegrams from War Department to President Butler about continuing the secrecy of atomic bomb research. In addition to the War Department, Central Files includes correspondence with Fermi, Dunning, US Atomic Energy Commission, etc.  
• George Braxton Pegram papers, 1903-1958 Nuclear physicist, professor of physics, and Dean of Graduate Faculties at Columbia University, Pegram conducted a great deal of defense-related research and was responsible for the famous meeting between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and American nuclear scientists prior to World War II that eventually led to the establishment of the Manhattan Project. The National Defense Research Committee contracts for work on uranium and the Physics Department, correspondence, 1940-1947 (declassified in 1960), can be found in the "Atomic Energy Commission" folder in Box 41. There is also a folder titled "Atomic Bomb Discussion" in this box. Box 41 is stored offsite and must be requested at least 48 business hours in advance of use in our reading room.  
• Historical Photograph Collection - Series V: Atomic Energy A small series of images related to atomic research conducted by Columbia. Included are images of the Nevis and Pupin Laboratories and a 1948 exhibit about atomic energy; including the Seventh Biennial Award Dinner for The Atomic Bomb Project, sponsored by Chemical & Metallurgical Engineering; Waldorf-Astoria, 1946.  
• "Atomic Energy Research, 1930s-1980s" in Box 6 folder 5
• "Manhattan Project, 1940s-2000s" in Box 41, folder 10
• "SAM Labs--Manhattan Project, 1940s-1990s" in Box 48, folder 3

For more information on how to access our collections, check out our Research & Access website. If you have any questions about how to find materials or how to access materials, please contact [email protected] .

Archival collections are  non-circulating  and  can only be viewed in the Rare Book & Manuscript Library's reading room  (RBML).  In order to use the University Archives collections at the RBML, y ou will be required to register your own Special Collections Research Account before your visit and to validate the account in person with government-issued photo identification or Columbia ID card. Once you have created your Special Collections Research Account , you will be able to request materials directly from the finding aid: click the check box located on the right for the box(es) you need, and then scroll back to the top of the container list document and click “Submit Request” button in the red-rimmed box at top. This should lead you directly to your Special Collections Research Account to complete the request form.

• C. S. (Chien-shiung) Wu Papers The collection consists of speeches, reports, publications, research notes, and correspondence. The bulk of the collection relates to Wu's involvement in the American Physical Society as well as her research activities. The correspondence is chiefly professional, relating to C. S. Wu's physics research, professional commitments, appointments, meetings, conferences, and publications. Correspondence also includes letters from individuals around the world praising Wu for her accomplishments, asking advice, arranging speaking engagements, discussing administrative matters, and trading research notes, as well as information on publications and other topics. In addition, the collection contains information on Wu's involvement in the development of an affirmative action program at Columbia University in the 1970s.  
• Selig Hecht papers, 1914-1937 Professor of biophysics at Columbia University, 1926-1947, and author of Explaining the Atom (1947).  
• Dana Paul Mitchel Papers, [ca. 1925]-1960 Professional and personal correspondence, administrative records, manuscript lecture notes, and some miscellaneous printed materials. The general correspondence file, 1927-1958, contains letters, both personal and professional, with colleagues, with and about his students, about laboratory equipment, about weapons for the Army and Navy, and with industry concerning his research.  
• Department of Physics Historical records, 1862-1997 This collection is made up of an assortment of historical material, consisting of photographs, negatives, faculty and guest lecturer correspondence, biographical materials for some of the faculty, programs from various lecture series given at Columbia, publications, picture postcards, and even a sheet of commemorative postage stamps. These documents were collected in The Columbia Physics Department: a brief history , a booklet of reproductions of some of the archival documents, correspondence, and photographs relating to the history of the Physics department of Columbia. It includes listing and photos of Columbia's Nobel Laureates and discussion of Columbia's involvement in the Manhattan Project. Correspondents include Niels Bohr, Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, H. A. Lorentz, R. A. Millikan, and Max Planck.  
• Department of Physics records, 1870-1983 This collection contains records of the Physics Department of Columbia University and several of its affiliated research laboratories: the Columbia Radiation Laboratory, the Pupin Cyclotron Laboratory, the Nevis Cyclotron Laboratory, and the Pegram Nuclear Physics Laboratory.  
• Columbia Alumni News Alumni News served as a Columbia news magazine in its earlier days, publishing biweekly issues during the academic year. The first September 1945 issue has as its main article " Columbia and the Atomic Bomb " as Columbia's role was no longer secret.    

Columbia News online article: Shea, Christopher D. " Seen 'Oppenheimer'? Learn About Columbia's Role in Building the First Atom Bomb,  24 July 2023.   

• Oral Histories The Columbia Center for Oral History Archives is one of the largest oral history collections in the United States. The Manhattan Project is discussed in a number of interviews under a number of projects. To search for these interviews,  begin by exploring the Oral History Portal . When you have found an oral history interview that interests you, please click the link to view the Full CLIO record .The CLIO record will include information about restrictions and whether or not this interview is open to researchers. You can request the transcripts to be read at the Rare Book & Manuscript Library's reading room by using your Special Collections Research Account . For more information, please visit the Oral History Archives website .

About the images

Top - Two graduate students assembling graphite blocks for the nuclear reactor. (Scan #3114)  Historical Photograph Collection ,  , University Archives, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University Libraries.

Right - "Two leaders in atom work at Columbia -- Dr. John R. Dunning (right), one of the country's pioneer atomic scientists, points out to Dr. Pegram the workings of his "atomic pinball machine," which he uses to explain atomic energy to the public." (Scan #0638) Historical Photograph Collection ,  University Archives, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University Libraries.

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History of Manhattan Project in US Research Paper

• To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
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Introduction

The new technology derived from the manhattan project, benefits and dangers of the new technology, social and cultural effects of the manhattan project, political and technological effects of the manhattan project, the manhattan project and its use in medical science.

The Manhattan Project was a code name for a military project that was conducted during World War II between 1942 and 1946. It is however believed to have officially started in 1939 after President Roosevelt responded to a letter written by the famous physicist, Albert Einstein, expressing his concern that nuclear weapons were being developed by the Nazis. This concern was also fuelled by recent research that had shown uranium could produce large chain reactions that could be used in powerful bombs.

The purpose of the Manhattan project was to develop atomic bombs that were the first to ever be created in the world. The atomic bombs would be used in the War against Germany by countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. The atomic bombs were made of nuclear material that would biologically destroy a large section of the target area and its inhabitants.

Albert Einstein drafted his letter to the President together with Leo Szilard who had escaped the Nazi regime in Germany to the United States. Both Einstein and Szilard believed that the German’s were creating nuclear weapons that would be used in destroying countries that opposed Fascist oppression.

President Roosevelt responded to Einstein’s letter by informing him that he had set up a committee that would be used to conduct research on uranium and its use in atomic bombs. President Roosevelt appointed Robert Oppenheimer to head the Manhattan Project and to oversee the research and project facilities that were based in various parts of America (Gosling, 1999).

The Manhattan project derived its name from the location of its early operation centers which was Manhattan Island in New York City. The island was chosen because of its port facilities as well as a large military presence. Other locations that were used in the production and research of the atomic bombs included New Mexico, Tennessee, Richland, Washington, Canada, Oak Ridge and Los Alamos. These locations were chosen because of their remoteness and because they allowed for secrecy of the research facilities.

The secrecy and remoteness made it possible to obtain large supplies of raw materials and labor as well as make decisions without any political interference. The amount of money that was invested in the project amounted to $2.2 billion dollars that was mostly used in conducting research on the effects of uranium and how this compound could be used in developing atomic bombs (Gosling, 1999).

The Manhattan Project has been considered by many chemical and nuclear scientists to be the revolution in technology, warfare and moral ethics. The technology that was used in creating the atomic bomb was viewed to be more advanced and developed than the scientific technology that existed before that time.

The high level of scientific and technological innovations used in separating the uranium neutrons was used in the development of chemical weapons and technology that would be used by the US military and scientific institutions (Hughes, 2002).

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was a nonpartisan organization established in 1945 by scientists and chemical engineers who were involved in the Manhattan Project. This organization was created because of the important part that science and technology played during the development of the atomic bomb.

The main goal of the FAS was to develop and advance scientific technology that would be used in providing solutions to security and scientific problems in the US. The main programs that fell under the FAS included the strategic security program, the bio security program, the earth systems program and the educational technologies program (FAS, 2010).

The strategic security program was developed to control atomic energy developed during the Manhattan Project. The program was focused on reducing the risks that came from nuclear exposure. The technologies that emerged from this program included portable air defense systems and chemical, nuclear weapons.

The bio security program concentrated on researching on ways that would be used to balance science and security. The scientific and technological work that emerged from the bio security program included biodefense research and biosecurity policies. The educational technologies program focused on how innovative technologies derived from the Project could be used for teaching and learning purposes (FAS, 2010).

The program designed and developed games and learning tools that would be used in the learning process. A major project of the educational technologies program is the Immune Attack game simulation that teaches high school students the inner workings of the body by navigating a tiny drone through the various circulatory and immune systems within the human body.

The Immune Attack project developed by FAS was a program that was meant to introduce molecular and cellular biology in a more visual way to high school and college students.

The earth systems program was developed to examine how the earth’s natural resources interacted with international security. This program was developed as a means of allowing people to use technology to better their lives. The technological innovations that emerged from this program included prefabricated components, composite materials, indoor air quality, and energy efficiency (FAS, 2010)

Since the development of the bomb, chemical scientists and physicists the world over continued to conduct research on how nuclear or atomic technology could be used to make even more powerful bombs. Research into how nuclear energy could be used to power submarines, ships and power whole cities was also been conducted.

This research was mostly based on the Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC) atomic energy research program that saw the development of the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear-powered submarine and the first public utility nuclear power plant in the United States (Herrera, 2006).

The research was also based on the technology that went into the creation of the atomic bomb has been used in creating volatile anesthetic agents such as methoxyflurane, halothane and halogenated ethers. The atomic bomb technology also improved the research information that existed on organofluorine chemistry and halogen agents. This was possible when the chemical engineers and nuclear physicists developing the bomb conducted the exercise of separating uranium 235 from uranium 238 (Angelo, 2004).

The collaboration that has taken place over the years between state, military, industry and university specialists in the development of military and scientific technology has been a result of the Manhattan Project. The institutions that were used in creating the atomic bomb in the Manhattan Project formed the foundations of postwar technology.

The most important wartime technology organization that emerged in the US was the National Defense Research Committee which was later changed to the Organization for Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).

This organization oversaw many scientific and technological projects that were used during and before World War II. The two most important projects that emerged from the OSRD included radar research and uranium project research work. The radar research which was later renamed to Radlab developed 150 technological innovations in the form of radar and electronic systems (Herrera, 2006).

The energy crisis that took place in 1973 saw the United States experiencing a sharp increase in fuel and oil prices as well as related oil products. Until the energy crisis, energy research and development activities were mostly focused on the development of nuclear power which was under the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

The commission was formed by the U.S. Congress after the Manhattan Project to manage civilian and military projects that were related to nuclear and atomic energy in 1946. To respond to the energy crisis, the US Congress incorporated the research and project facilities that were used in the Manhattan Project into the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Atomic Energy Commission (Stine, 2009).

The technologies were proposed to improve the energy problem that was being experienced by the United States included developing alternative technology vehicles that would require less harmful energy sources, developing and building energy efficient buildings that would use no more than 50 percent of the energy used by buildings of a similar size and type, constructing a large scale solar thermal power plant that would be capable of generating 300 megawatts or more at a cheaper cost.

Other technologies included developing biofuels that do not exceed 105 percent and developing carbon capture facilities that will be used in large scale coal burning (Stine, 2009).

Some of the scientists who were involved in the Project used radionucleides in localizing radioactive isotopes that would be used in destroying cancerous cells. Before the Project was started, cancer patients were mostly treated through surgery which most of the times was not successful.

But after the Project was completed radiographic and chemotherapy technology was developed by engineers involved in the project to treat cancerous cells and tumors. This involved introducing the radioactive isotopes in the radiographic and chemotherapy treatments (Lenoir & Hays, 2010).

The Manhattan Project also saw the improvement and development of Aerospace technology such as the American heavy bombers (B-29 Super fortress) that were used in the Japan bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The sophisticated weaponry used these bombers included the bombsights, radar technology and high performance engines that would be used in bombing locations. This technology mostly relied on the scientific innovations that were used in the Manhattan Project (Kelly & Rhodes, 2007).

While the Manhattan Project achieved its goal of creating the first atomic bomb, there were several benefits and dangers that emerged from the technology that was used to develop the bomb. The benefits of the Manhattan project and the technology used in developing the nuclear weapons were used in the medical field to perform radiography operations as well as chemotherapy for cancer patients.

The atomic bomb technology was also used in developing CAT scan machines that would be used in hospitals and medical practices. Another benefit of the Manhattan Project and its technology was that it led to the end of World War II and the Cold War (Elish, 2008).

The fact that the United States possessed a powerful weapon that would cause devastating effects such as those experienced in Hiroshima ended any form of communist era and dictatorship.

The large scale defense program also paved the way for other government research installations that would be used in developing military weapons. The technology that was used in developing the nuclear bombs also paved the way for scientific research work that would be used in developing alternative energy sources from oil such as nuclear or atomic power.

The project also demonstrated the fast response of the government and top scientists when it came to responding to the Nazi threat. The development of the bomb in such a short period of time also showed that the US government was determined to protect the livelihoods of American citizens regardless of the consequences. The dangers or pitfalls of the Manhattan Project were in evidence after the Hiroshima bombings in Japan (Kelly & Rhodes, 2007).

The rain that accompanied the bomb explosion was heavily contaminated with radioactive particles that led to radiation poisoning on the affected civilians. High levels of poisoning led to the death of many innocent people while those who survived the bombings suffered from sever burns, vomiting, hair loss, loss of eyesight, nausea and vomiting. The Manhattan Project was also infiltrated by spies from the Soviet Union who were also keen in developing nuclear weapons.

Klaus Fuchs was a Soviet spy who had infiltrated the Los Alamos research facility as a scientist. Fuchs gathered information and technology that was used in developing the atomic bomb and relayed it to the Soviet Union who speeded up the development of the Soviet bomb. Another Soviet spy was Donald Maclean who also relayed information on the potential of the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union (Kelly & Rhodes, 2007).

Other spies included Theodore Hall, Allan Nunn May and Bruno Pontecorvo who all served as scientists in the Manhattan Project. Such a high number of spies in the United States created an environment of anxiety and fear amongst the American Citizens feared an attack by the German Nazis. The Manhattan Project also increased the emotional and psychological well being of American civilians and civilians in the rest of the world because of the threat of nuclear power and its devastating consequences.

The period of World War II and the Cold War saw the United States experiencing the varied and far reaching effects of the two wars. The country experienced an increase in economic activity and the production, manufacturing industry began to pick up. There were notable developments in aerospace, electronic and atomic energy technology which was mostly attributed to the Manhattan Project.

While the Manhattan Project was lauded by many to be a major breakthrough in research and development as well as in energy technology, there were fundamental forces that would seem unethical in today’s socio cultural context that drove the creation of this historical technological achievement (Koistinen, 2004).

These forces included the ability to change the program from a threat or cause of national concern to a concrete goal that can be used in future innovations and the future use of the technology that was used in developing the atomic bomb. The first factor describes the goal of the Manhattan Project which was to respond to a threat of enemy development of a nuclear bomb by the Nazis in Germany.

The second factor describes the use of the technology which was primarily shifted to the government which had little or no concern on the environment and the devastating consequences of the nuclear weapons on innocent civilians (Stine, 2009).

Most of the researchers who took part in the Manhattan Project weighed their ethical values when they got involved in the development of a weapon that would cause unprecedented death and destruction when released to the general population. The risks had to be outweighed against the anticipated benefits of using the biological product during the war.

The knowledge that the US government was in possession of nuclear weapons also created some levels of apprehension and anxiety amongst the American citizens. This was at a time when the country was experiencing poor economic growth and the American citizens were struggling to make ends meet. The quality of life during World War II and the Cold War was also poor as many American’s lived under the constant fear of being attacked by the Soviet’s and the Germans (Koistinen, 2004).

The Manhattan Project marked the beginning of nuclear science that transformed the everyday lives of the average American. Civilians found themselves within a new global context that was characterized by the presence of dangerous atomic bombs and nuclear weapons.

The detonation of the first atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. The localized effects of the Manhattan Project challenged the social purpose of the project as well as the ethical practices of the US government, politicians, scientists and engineers involved in the making of the bomb.

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was viewed by most Americans to be an unthinkable engagement by the government in ending human life. The nuclear bomb was seen to be an incomprehensible national and cultural project whose effects constantly exceeded the modern logistics needed to build nuclear facilities.

The communities that were most affected by the Manhattan Project included the Los Alamos community in New Mexico where most of the nuclear tests were performed. The community members benefited from the research facility as they were able to gain employment in the laboratories (Masco, 2006).

The political and technological effects of the Manhattan Project were felt on different levels which were the individual, domestic and the international level. On the individual level, many people who were involved in the Project had their ethics and moral values tested when they were called upon to create a nuclear weapon that would kill many people within a certain radius. The ethical and moral integrity of the scientific and engineering team was put to the test because of the nuclear bombs.

Robert Oppenheimer who was the lead director of the Manhattan Project faced several ethical dilemmas as a scientist because of his role in the creation of a deadly weapon that was deemed to be illegal and detrimental to both human beings and the natural environment.

When President Roosevelt died, the helm of presidency was continued by Harry Truman who and made the decision to drop the bomb in Hiroshima after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. His decision was viewed by many people around the world to have been unnecessary as it lead to the loss of thousands of innocent civilian lives in Hiroshima. The bomb also caused unnecessary health complications to civilians who were within the radius of the nuclear bomb explosion (Edmondson, 2009).

The domestic effects of the Manhattan Project were felt in the United States when the money used in developing the bomb would be used in developing the country’s defense budget from that period to the present. The creation of the atomic bomb also made the United States to be the world’s superpower when it came to its military and defense.

The negative effects of the project to the United States residents was that it created a certain amount of fear in the American residents as they feared infiltration by communist dictators and sympathizers. This fear saw Senator Joseph McCarthy performing a witch hunt in the US that was meant to flash out the communist sympathizers and spies from the country. The result of this witch hunt was the destruction of many civilian lives that were suspected to be communist sympathizers (Kelly & Rhodes, 2007).

The international effects of the Manhattan Project saw the face of world politics during that time changing completely. After the Hiroshima bombings in Japan, the Soviet Union began developing itself to be the next country to develop nuclear power. The country was able to gain information on how to create an atomic bomb from Klaus Fuchs who was a Manhattan Project scientist and Soviet spy.

This situation created a security dilemma between the two countries as each increased its nuclear arsenal to counter any attacks from the other. The effects of this situation were that each of the countries sunk a huge amount of funds in developing the nuclear arsenals which saw them facing huge debts. There was also emotional and psychological effects on US citizens who lived with anxiety and fear of being attacked by the Soviet Union at any time (Kelly & Rhodes, 2007).

Since the end of the Cold War, policy makers have raised concerns over importance of federal investment in scientific research. Policy makers have called for a new contract to be developed between science and society that would foster a closer working relationship between scientific laboratories and scientific academicians. Such a model for the science and society contract is known as the Human Genome Initiative.

This initiative has been viewed as a potential Manhattan Project for biological work among scientists, engineers and physicists who are mostly concerned with the commercial production of biomedical technology that will be used in medical science. The Human Genome Initiative incorporates the same approaches and techniques that were used by the Manhattan Project in developing warfare weapons that would be used during the Cold War (Lenoir & Hays, 2010).

Lenoir and Hays (2010) note that after the Cold War there has always been a Manhattan Project in the field of biomedicine and medical science. The scientists and physicists who were involved in the Manhattan Project research contemplated on how to incorporate the project’s plans into various military and civilian fields such as physics, biophysics and nuclear medicine.

One of the initial research efforts that preceded the Manhattan Project was the use of radionucleides in physiological studies to localize radioactive isotopes that would be used in destroying cancerous cells.

These research efforts began in 1923 and they became fully operational in 1943 when the Manhattan Project was fully underway. The Manhattan Project also created a substantial amount of medical research programs that were used in the medical care of project workers that were based in Oak Ridge, Washington and Hanford. These programs were seen to be important as they created the means of reducing the hazardous side effects of radioactive materials (Lenoir & Hays, 2004).

The Manhattan Project has been viewed as the genesis of research and development in the field of scientific technology and atomic energy creation. The various locations that were used during the Manhattan Project were converted into research laboratories and institutions that are now being used for further scientific and technological developments. The creation of the atomic and nuclear bombs heralded the emergence of nuclear energy that could be used in powering huge cities and supporting the energy consumption of civilians.

The project also ensured that there were theoretical breakthroughs in the field of nuclear physics and chemistry that has improved experimentation and research work in the field. The Manhattan Project is therefore an important program in the history of the world because of the technological developments that were invented during the period of the project.

Angelo, J.A., (2004), Nuclear technology . Westport, US: Greenwood Press.

Edmonson, N., (2009), Technological foundations of cyclical economic growth: the case of the United States economy . New Jersey: Transaction publishers.

Elish, D., (2008). The Manhattan Project . Canada: Children’s Press.

Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (2010). Programs. Web.

Gosling, F.G., (1999). The Manhattan Project: making the atomic bomb . Washington: History Division, Department of Energy.

Herrera, G.L., (2006). Technology and international transformation: the railroad, the atom bomb and the politics of technological change . Albany, New York : State University of New York Press.

Hughes, J., (2002). The Manhattan Project: big science and the atom bomb . New York: Columbia University Press.

Kelly, C.C., & Rhodes, R., (2007). The Manhattan Project: the birth of the atomic bomb in the words of its creators, eyewitnesses and historians . New York: Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers.

Koistinen, P. A.C., (2004). Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945 . Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Lenoir, T., & Hays, M., (2010). The Manhattan project for biomedicine . Web.

Masco, J., (2006). The nuclear borderlands: the Manhattan project post Cold War . New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Stine, D.D., (2009). The Manhattan Project, the Apollo program, and the federal energy technology R&D programs: a comparative analysis . New York: Gale Cengage Learning.

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Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Ethics — Julius Oppenheimer And The Manhattan Project

Julius Oppenheimer and The Manhattan Project

• Categories: Ethics

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Published: Mar 16, 2024

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Julius oppenheimer: the "father of the atomic bomb", ethical and moral implications.

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National Museum of Nuclear Science & History

Document Based Question on the Manhattan Project

• Middle School

Students are introduced to the Manhattan Project with film and open discussion, then use primary source documents to write an essay about the Manhattan Project.  Submitted by Jeff Carr.

• " The American Pageant," 13th Ed.
• "A Sense of Place" DVD
• "The Story of US" DVD by The History Channel
• The Manhattan Project by Cynthia C. Kelly

Assignment:

Students will achieve and understanding of:

• The science that led to the atomic bomb
• The comparisons to other scientific achievements
• The historical significance
• Problem-solving issues
• The future ramifications
• Viewing of "A Sense of Place,"  a clip of the explosion over Hiroshima and its aftermath
• Read about Harry Truman and his decision to drop the bomb
• Socratic dialogue of the decision to drop the bomb.
• Introduction to the Document Based Question (DBQ) Essay
• Writing of DBQ
• Optional field trip to Los Alamos
• Students produce an original DBQ Essay based on the DBQ Essay Packet that is provided at class.
• Students will participate in an open discussion on how to approach the DBQ process.

The Manhattan Project

Engineers, because much of the early research was done in New York City (Badash 238). Sparked by refugee physicists in the United States , the program was slowly organized after nuclear fission was discovered by German scientists in 1938, and many US scientists expressed the fear that Hitler would attempt to build a fission bomb. Frustrated with the idea that Germany might produce an atomic bomb first, Leo Szilard and other scientists asked Albert Einstein, a famous scientist during that time, to use his influence and write a letter to president FDR, pleading for support to further research the power of nuclear fission (Badash 237).

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Dr. Franklin and Dr. Mudd Receive Grant

Robert Franklin (PI) and Phil Mudd (DTC, WSU Tri-Cities – Co-PI) received funding for the Documenting Undertold Narratives of the Manhattan Project at Hanford P24AC01008-00 Grant. The goal of the project is to marry archival holdings and oral histories with contemporary interviews to produce a series of podcasts documenting undertold narratives of the Manhattan Project, focusing on Tribal perspectives, African Americans, women, atomic bomb survivors, downwinders, and LGBTQ project workers.  The project is currently funded for $67K through 12/2026

Fact-checking 'Oppenheimer': Was Albert Einstein really a friend? What's true, what isn't

Christopher Nolan’s three-hour movie “Oppenheimer” is getting rave reviews and shaping up as an early Oscar favorite.

But years ago, one man doubted that the complex tale of a hero-turned-villain nuclear scientist could be accurately told on the big screen.

“I was very skeptical Hollywood could do anything with a 700-page book,” says Kai Bird, who, along with his late writing partner Martin J. Sherwin, won the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for “American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer.”

That book, which is back on bestseller lists thanks to the movie, was the source material for Nolan’s 180-page screenplay. Bird got a glimpse of that script early on and his fears vaporized. “There are no major historical bloopers,” he says.

But there is a lot to discuss, and plenty of historical nuances. Bird takes us through the movie’s most explosive moments:

Were Manhattan Project scientists worried an atomic explosion would set fire to Earth?

“They were as calculations were made that showed it might be a possibility,” says Bird. Specifically, the fear was that a detonation would use the oxygen in the atmosphere to fuel a never-ending series of explosions.

The concern was so great that Oppenheimer, played by Cillian Murphy, took a train from the New Mexico site of the lab work back east to consult with physicist Hans Bethe.

“Fortunately, Bethe took a look at the math and came to the conclusion that the likelihood of setting fire to the atmosphere was near zero,” says Bird. “And they went on with their work.”

Did Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein really have conversations about the bomb at Princeton?

Yes. Both men were attached to Princeton University in the 1940s, Oppenheimer as director of the school's Institute for Advanced Study and Einstein as a professor.

“They had offices down the hall from each other, and I’m sure they took walks together by that pond,” he says. But the two conversations between the physics giants, as portrayed in “Oppenheimer,” were “really just something that Nolan imagined.”

In the first, Oppenheimer expresses concern about igniting the atmosphere, and in the second, after the war ends, Oppenheimer is afraid of the power he has unleashed, which leaves Einstein speechless.

How accurate is the 'Oppenheimer' Trinity Test that shows the atomic bomb being detonated in the New Mexico desert?

“That is wholly accurate, down to the distance described, which was roughly 10,000 yards from the bomb site,” says Bird.

“In the movie, you see (physicist Edward) Teller putting on sunscreen and dark glasses, and (young physicist) Richard Feynman did pass on putting glasses on because he said the windshield of the truck he was sitting in would be enough protection,” he says. “There are records of all of this.”

What were Robert Oppenheimer's relationships with women like?

In a word, fiery, beginning with his first big love affair with Jean Tatlock, played by Florence Pugh in the film. He proposes marriage to her repeatedly but she declines.

“In our book, we have a lot of evidence about her own sexual identity, and it seems she was either bisexual or a lesbian, which is why she turned him down,” says Bird. Tatlock later took her own life, which weighed heavily on Oppenheimer.

Oppenheimer was married to Katherine “Kitty” Puening, who was already on her second husband when they met. “It was a tumultuous marriage, but in a weird way also rock solid,” he says. “It’s clear he was a very charismatic guy who was attractive to women, even if as an adolescent he was awkward around them.”

What happened to Robert Oppenheimer after he was stripped of his security clearance?

“He became a pariah; he couldn’t give presidents advice or walk the halls of the Pentagon,” says Bird. “He was even disinvited to lecture at universities. He was devastated.”

In the summer of 1954, Oppenheimer and his family took the helm of a sailboat and spent time in and around St. John in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Also along for that trip: snooping FBI agents, still intent on proving Oppenheimer had Communist leanings, which evidence disproves.

“He bought land on St. John and built a small cabin on a place now called Oppenheimer Beach,” says Bird. “His daughter (Toni) lived there later, and (at age 32) she took her own life there. She was a brilliant linguist and applied for work at the United Nations as a translator. But she was denied security clearance. She left New York, and then went for the last time to St. John.”

Did President John F. Kennedy actually have a role in restoring Robert Oppenheimer's reputation?

Yes, both as a senator and later as president.

When Oppenheimer’s supporter-turned-nemesis Lewis Strauss (played by Robert Downey Jr.) goes before lawmakers in 1959 to be confirmed as the new secretary of commerce, his appointment is blocked by a swing vote cast by the young senator from Massachusetts.

In mid-1963 Kennedy, then president, is urged by close advisers who admired Oppenheimer to bestow him with the Enrico Fermi Award, named after the famous Italian physicist. Kennedy was assassinated that November, and “one of the first decisions for now-President Lyndon Johnson was whether to go forward with this award, which was seen as a way to restore Oppenheimer’s reputation,” says Bird.

On Dec. 2, 1963, less than two weeks after the assassination, Johnson told the assembled crowd, “I know every person in this room grieves with me and with Dr. and Mrs. Oppenheimer that the late president, who gave his all for his country, could not present this award as he anticipated.”

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How the War in Gaza Disrupted an Elite Private School

The Little Red School House and Elisabeth Irwin High School, like similar institutions across the city, was consumed by strife over how to manage education about the conflict.

By Katherine Rosman

This spring, 30 ninth graders from a progressive private school near Greenwich Village went on a field trip.

There was nothing unusual about venturing out into New York City to boost their classroom studies. At the school, Little Red School House and Elisabeth Irwin High School, this sort of experiential learning was so routine that few parents were even notified of the destination: The People’s Forum in Midtown Manhattan, a hub for gatherings of left-wing activists. Its executive director has called for the destruction of Israel.

Afterward, parents were flabbergasted to learn where the students were taken, and what they were told.

During their visit, a People’s Forum employee gave the students a 90-minute lecture on the perils of America’s support for Israel and Ukraine. The students were “a captive audience who were subjected to anti-Israel and anti-American propaganda,” according to a grievance report filed by a parent and shared with school leadership. A handful of Jewish students walked out during the presentation, upset.

Later, the head of school, Phil Kassen, sent a message to parents acknowledging that he had been aware of the plan and taking responsibility for what he said was an error in judgment. “I could have stopped this trip,” he wrote. “I didn’t.” It was not his first apology this school year.

In the eight months since Hamas attacked Israel and Israel retaliated with a military campaign in Gaza, private schools across New York have been disrupted by strife over how to manage education about the war, political expression by faculty and students, and accusations of antisemitism and Islamophobia.

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